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HV-HZ

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14 March 1946

Mr. T. T. Hunt, Managing Editor
The Enterprise Company, Publishers
Beaumont, Texas

Dear Mr. Hunt:

Thank you for your letter of 6 March 1946 concerning the possibility of a position with this agency.

I have referred your letter to the Chief of our Personnel Procurement Branch who informs me that one of our field representatives, Captain Hamilton Westphal, will contact you next week for the purpose of arranging a personal interview.

After this interview and after we have received the application forms which our Personnel Procurement Branch is submitting to you, we will make every effort to determine if there is a suitable vacancy in this agency which might be of interest to you.

In the meantime, I appreciate greatly your interest in us.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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14 March 1945

Mr. T. T. Hunt, Managing Editor
The Enterprise Company, Publishers
Beaumont, Texas

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Director

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13 March 1945

Mr. T.L. Hunt
Beaumont Enterprise
Beaumont, Texas

Dear Mr. Hunt:

General Donovan has referred to me your letter of 6 March 1945 expressing your interest in a possible assignment with this Agency.

I am enclosing two copies of an application form which I will appreciate your filling out.

One of our field interviewers, Captain Maurice Nesthal, will be in Dallas, Texas next week. He will telephone you from there and make an appointment to meet you personally and to receive these forms from you.

Thank you very much for your interest.

Yours very truly,

W.W. ANTELL
Lt. Comdr. USNR
Chief, Personnel Procurement Branch

enclosures:
(2)

Sent via
Airmail

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16,322

MRS. J. L. MAPES
President

B. G. DAVIS
V. Pres. & Business Mgr.

MRS. EVA H. DUJAY
Secretary

BEAUMONT ENTERPRISE
MORNING

BEAUMONT JOURNAL
EVENING

THE SUNDAY ENTERPRISE

THE ENTERPRISE COMPANY, PUBLISHERS

Enterprise Editorial Offices
T. T. HUNT
Managing Editor

BEAUMONT, TEXAS

March 6, 1945

General Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

I am writing you in the course of a sincere effort to find service in the military forces and believe my qualifications might find use in your organization.

My belated application is due to the fact that I was obliged to hold down a homefront job during the first phases of the war, while others went. But I have discharged that obligation to the extent that my associates now can carry on.

I am 48, have 20 years' experience in rounding up and evaluating information, and writing it, as a reporter and an editor; have a college degree plus two years of law study . I am used to hard work, and action; do not want a soft berth, and in fact desire sincerely to share the war front work with others who have been doing my share of this for me.

Please consider this, sir, as an honest bid to do what I consider to be my duty and my share of an American citizen's job.

Yours sincerely,

T. T. Hunt

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10 May 1945

FROM: Director of Strategic Services

TO: Chief of Naval Personnel

SUBJECT: Lieutenant Commander John O. W. Husted, [redacted], USNR - Inactive Duty

Enclosure (A): Memorandum from Lieutenant Commander Husted, on above subject, 7 May 1945

1. Lieutenant Commander Husted's request for release to inactive duty has been approved by the Director of Strategic Services who recommends that it be favorably considered by the Chief of Naval Personnel.

2. Lieutenant Commander Husted was assigned to the Office of Strategic Services on 19 April 1944 and subsequently served eight months overseas in the European Theater of Operations. The Director wishes to express his sincere appreciation for the devotion to duty and loyalty which have always characterized Lieutenant Commander Husted's services with this Agency.

CHARLES S. CHESTON
Acting Director

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16,098

Hunted, John G.

COPY

End-1 on NavCom ltr BuPers/2608
LBF:jcc (38639) dated 17 Jan 45.

From: The Director of Strategic Services.
To : Chief of Naval Personnel.

Subj: Lieut. Comdr. John G. W. HUSTED, S(I), USNR;
Recommendation for promotion of.

1. Forwarded.

2. The Director believes that the mission on which this officer is presently engaged will be facilitated if he is promoted to the rank of Commander. He has performed his duties in a highly satisfactory manner, and the Director concurs in the recommendation for a spot promotion of Lieut. Comdr. Husted to the rank of Commander.

CHARLES S. CHESTON,
By direction.

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480004-8

16,091

NAVAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

COPY

In reply refer to
Initials and No.
BuPers/2608
LDF:jcs
(38639)

17 January 1945.

From: Commanding Officer.
To : Chief of Naval Personnel.
Via : Acting Director, Office of Strategic Services.

Subj: Lieut. Comdr. John G. W. HUSTED, S(I), USNR;
Recommendation for promotion of.

1. Lieut. Comdr. Husted served in World War I as a Naval Aviator with the rank of Ensign. He was commissioned a Lieutenant Commander on 23 April 1942 and ordered to duty with the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier as assistant Air Officer, a position he held until 5 November 1942. From 10 November 1942 until 24 April 1944, Lieut. Comdr. Husted served on the staff of the Commanding General, Eastern Defense Command as assistant to the assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, in the War Plans Section. In March 1944, subject officer was recommended for promotion by Lieutenant General George Grunert and by Vice Admiral Leary, Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier.

2. Lieut. Comdr. Husted has been on duty with this Command since 24 April 1944, and has served overseas from 15 May 1944 to 10 November 1944, as Assistant Chief and Acting Chief of one of the Intelligence Branches of this agency. Lieut. Comdr. Husted has returned to the United States and is now ordered overseas for additional duty in connection with intelligence work performed by his branch.

3. During the time that subject officer has been on duty with this Command, the manner of his performance has been superior in every respect, and by his skill and ability he has facilitated the work of this agency to a very great extent.

4. It is requested that Lieut. Comdr. Husted be promoted to the rank of Commander, as it is believed he will be better able to carry out his duties in that higher rank.

JUNIUS S. MORGAN,
Captain, USNR,
Acting.

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CONFIDENTIAL

November 28, 1944

Mr. William P. Hunt
China Corporation
Room 2600
30 Pine Street
New York City

Dear Bill:

I am pleased to acknowledge receipt of nine copies of your "Review of Pre-War Merchant Shipping in Far Eastern Waters".

According to your wishes as expressed during my good conference with both you and Admiral Freeman on Tuesday, I am making the following disposition of them:

One copy to be retained in our New York Office for study and reference.

Two copies to be sent to Judge Allman in Washington for study and reference purposes. (These are in addition to the one advance copy which you sent directly to General Donovan, and which was very much appreciated by him. Thus OSS will have four copies for its own use.)

Two copies to be delivered with your compliments to O.N.I., Washington.

Two copies to G-2, Washington.

Two copies to A-2, Washington.

May I take this opportunity to again express my own personal appreciation as well as that of my organization for placing in our hands this truly monumental work on Far Eastern shipping, which, while valuable in a commercial way is also a very valuable contribution to the war effort.

Your consistent and eager willingness to drop your own affairs at any time to assist us in obtaining pertinent information on China is noteworthy.

With kind personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Hollis P. Gale

CC to Judge Allman
General Donovan
Mr. Hughes

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE 29 JANUARY 45 RECD 1754 29 JAN 45 OUT 2391

TO PARIS, FRANCE PRECEDENCE

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES CLASSIFICATION SECRET

CONFIRMATION 31

INFORMATION DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER, BIGELOW, O'GARA, FIELD SECTION, X-2.

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#6864. CASEY FROM 154:

FEEL TIME COME FOR SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO BE GIVEN TO TRANSFER HENRY HYDE FROM 7TH ARMY TO XXXXXX ASSIGNMENT OF BROADER SCOPE IN GERMAN OPERATIONS YOUR #3614 (IN-1464). HIS WIDE EXPERIENCE IN DEEP AGENT PENETRATION SHOULD BE UTILIZED TO FULLEST POSSIBLE. ADVISE ME WHAT ACTION YOU TAKE.

TOD: 1907 29 JAN 45

INITIALS: RH BHH WHS JDW VB

FILE COPY

SECRET

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SECRET

15,631

Hyde, Henry

22 November 1944

Mr. Henry Hyde
c/o Commanding Officer
Headquarters Company
2677th Regiment OSS (Prov)
Caserta

Dear Henry:

I take great pleasure in forwarding to you the enclosed copy of a letter of commendation from the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ.

In addition I should like to express my own personal appreciation of the imaginative and competent manner in which you organized and directed our work in Southern France. The experience which we have gained as a result of our operations there will, I am sure, be of great value to this organization in other theaters.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure

Transcript # 15,631

SECRET

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15711

Hyde Henry

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

29 September 1944

TO: Brig. General W. J. Donovan

FROM: John E. O'Gara, Acting Chief, SI

Your suggestion relative to the transfer of Henry Hyde from his present assignment to duty in Indo-China has been cleared with Mr. Bernhard Knollenberg who will be able to utilize his services to good effect.

Colonel John Haskell advises that Hyde's release is dependent on the "desires of the 7th Army". Col. Haskell will let us know when Mr. Hyde is available "in light of military developments".

J. E. O. 29

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Form 2202

FROM:

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Hyde, Henry

Accession No. 12.6.5-9.7.2

Date Rec'd. SA. SEP 2[illegible] 1944

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
O'Gara	1212	SEP 23 1944	SEP 26 1944	JEO	Will you kindly discuss with
Hall		20	9.27	[illegible]	B.K. and advise me.
O'Gara		SEP 27 1944	SEP 28	[illegible]	[illegible] 25
Director OSS				✓	Cable requesting subject's transfer sent 27/44

[illegible] 27

[illegible] should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
[illegible] be drawn across sheet under each comment.
[illegible] should be used in To column.
[illegible] should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
[illegible] or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
[illegible] should always be returned to Registry.
[illegible] Designations see separate sheet.

SECRET

JWA

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNME

TO : Messrs. O'Gara, Ehrlenberg; Lt. Comdr. McBaine DATE: 22 Sept. 1944

FROM : Gen. Donovan

SUBJECT: Henry Hyde

Henry Hyde talked to me of his great desire to get into Intelligence in the Far East, particularly Indo-China. It may be that he will have completed his work within a short time, and I suggest you communicate with him and see when he will be able to go. As you know, he has done an exceptional job.

W.J.D.

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Hyde, Henry J/ 311

SECRET

Messrs. O'Gara, Knollenberg; Lt. Comdr. McCains 22 Sept. 1944

Gen. Donovan

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14.849
Huet, Andre

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan DATE: 20 July 1944

FROM: Colonel Connely

SUBJECT: Monsieur Andre Huet

In regard to the attached cable I traced the source of Huet's call at our N.A. Headquarters. I found that M. Huet was employed by a French subsidiary of the Combustion Engineering Co., which in turn is a subsidiary of the Super Heater Company of America.

I talked to Mr. Fitzpatrick who told me in detail the following story which I will attempt to brief. "M. Huet ran a factory in France when France fell. He was anti-Nazi and he, his wife and son were all put in concentration camps. He escaped and according to Fitzpatrick was assisted out of France and into Spain by OSS agents. His son escaped and was recaptured, escaped again and was likewise assisted into Spain by OSS agents. It is rumored that Huet's wife also attempted escape and has been executed."

Fitzpatrick stated that Huet has the respect of the French National Committee and is active in it and that he could be useful to the Allied cause. Fitzpatrick confided that the reason that they were anxious to get Huet back to Paris as soon as it is captured was to protect their interests as they had information that made them very dubious of the fate of private industry.

He has received a cable today from Huet stating that he had contacted "Olairk" which may be a distortion of either Olavin or Gamble and followed by "please help and send regards" which may be a code. Fitzpatrick said if we had any use for Huets services all well and good but that there was no money question involved as he would finance Huets needs.

The thing adds up in my mind as the work of a smart Frenchman whose primary interest is to get back and look after his own property and affairs, which is certainly not a reprehensible motive.

E. E. C.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan DATE: 7 March 1945

FROM : Colonel Doering

SUBJECT: Attached Memo re Impending Publication of the Narrative of Major Louis Huot

I sympathize with Con Read's feeling about Huot and his book. However, our only authority in the matter is to advise the War Department whether or not it will jeopardize security. We at first said it would. Some months later OWI and the War Department again raised the point with us, and after full consideration we advised them that it would not jeopardize OSS security. Con Read does not dispute this position but, in effect, thinks we should try to suppress it for other reasons. This we can not very well do.



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CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 5 March 1945

TO : Major General William J. Donovan

FROM : Conyers Read, OSS History Project CR

SUBJECT: Impending Publication of the Narrative of Major Louis Huot

To Col. Dreux - for comment

This narrative is an account of the adventures of Major Huot while he was operating for OSS in Yugoslavia. Its publication is announced for 15 March 1945. I am informed that OSS has consented to its publication and I wish to raise the question as to the wisdom of this course. It may be that we can not prevent publication, but I do not believe that we should have acquiesced in it and certainly not have given any kind of formal or informal consent to it.

My reasons are:

(1) Security. It may be that there has been no breach of formal security, but it will not be long before Major Huot's adventures are identified with OSS, and, lacking any other public account of our operations in Yugoslavia, it will be taken to be an authentic account of our operations there. I am credibly informed that Major Huot's relations with the British Secret Intelligence were far from friendly. Publication of his account may well exacerbate our relations with our British opposite numbers, who may regard the publication as a public affront, particularly if they learn that the account has been released by OSS.

(2) Distortion and inaccuracy. There appears to be a general agreement among those who are familiar with Major Huot's work that his narrative, while contributing to the greater glory of Major Huot, presents a distorted and inaccurate picture of OSS operations. I believe that we should not consent to the release of any narrative of OSS operations which is inaccurate and misleading. If the copy which we have of Major Huot's manuscript is the same as the one which is to be published, it would not be difficult to establish its inaccurate and misleading character.

(3) Effect on morale. We have in our files the narratives of many operatives which are much more accurate, much more objective, and to my thinking much more interesting than Huot's account. The authors of these narratives have been scrupulous in resisting all temptations to publish, though many of them are professional writers.

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As soon as they discover that one of the least among them has been allowed to put a potential best seller on the market, they will probably take the position that what is fair for one is fair for all. They may well feel that they are entitled to their share of any prestige and any royalties which may accrue to Huet by his personal exploitation of secret operations directed by OSS. It will be very difficult to restrain professional writers from rushing into print, particularly those who are no longer connected with OSS or with the Army and most particularly those who for one reason or another cherish a personal grievance against OSS.

In short, the publication of this book, although it may not in itself constitute a breach of security, will invite breaches of security which it may be impossible to check. The maintenance of security in such cases is bound to be extremely difficult. In the long run it will have to be based upon a sense of moral obligation. This sense of moral obligation is likely to fade quite away if OSS does not do everything in its power to fulfill its side of the engagement.

Quite apart from all considerations of this sort, there has been attached to OSS in these difficult and dangerous operations a band of very gallant gentlemen whose heroic deeds will long remain unrecorded because they have neither the skill nor the inclination to blow their own horns. It is an insult to them and to the self-effacing and self-sacrificing spirit which prompted them, to be faced with such a narrative. They knew Major Huet and they knew how to appraise him. They will shudder to think that his performance is put forward as the one public record of their gallant adventures.

Recommendations: OSS should not give its consent to the publication of any account of its operations without:

(a) Check for factual content by the History Project.

(b) A careful check for security.

(c) Satisfactory clearance in both cases.

cc: Mr. Alvah Sulloway
Lt. Col. O.C. Doering

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OSS
Form 68 (Revised)

14,375
Huot, Maj. Louis

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 9/23/44 REC'D 9/23/44 12:43 PM

TO USTRAVIC, LONDON

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

OUT 18601

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR) (FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR SECRETARIAT

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 18 87888 1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#70711. From Executive Officer.

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Deliver following message to Major Louis Huot, formerly OSS, and according to our last advices was assigned to ETC Press Communications Section under Colonel Guenther.

2. Your manuscript being released for publication. Following called to your attention as you may wish to change script accordingly.

3. References to NOIC (presumably British) not very complimentary (pages 83 and 90 of final draft of script).

4. Description of meeting with British and their estimate of 500 tons per month for TITO (page 266) implies critical attitude on our part regarding their foresight and planning abilities.

5. Tim's taking 150 carton cigarettes (page 271) suggests element of irresponsibility. Also you may wish to alter reference to funds on page 51. To reader who was unfamiliar with conditions it might appear you were spending too recklessly.

6. Your statement "our British colleagues" being on scene in full strength after supply lines established may seem unfair criticism of British effort.

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OCD: 9/23/44 [illegible] PM

OCD
INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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CONFIDENTIAL

20 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Review Branch
Bureau of Public Relations
War Department
Attention: Lt. Col. E. W. Davidson

SUBJECT: "Guns for Tito", a book manuscript by Major Louis Huot

REFERENCE: Memorandum from the Chief, Review Branch, to Director of Strategic Services, subject as above, 16 June 1944.

1. In view of the changed conditions which now exist in Europe this Agency offers no objection to publication of subject manuscript.

2. The draft of the manuscript upon which the decision of this Agency is based is inclosed for the information and guidance of the Review Branch.

For the Director:

O. C. Doering, Jr.
Lt. Col., A.U.S.
Executive Officer

Inclosure.

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CONFIDENTIAL 14,375

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Huot, Maj. Louis

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

x "Balkan Operation"

TO : Colonel Doering

DATE: 15 September 1944

FROM : Secretariat

SUBJECT: Report by Major Huot

Col Davidson

I have read Major Huot's typescript, "Guns for Tito" and have noted below several pages on which there are statements possibly open to question:

p. 56 - "I gave Tim two thousand dollars and told him to buy or requisition two cars, and to get us a billet."

I suggest that the words "two thousand dollars" be omitted and that the sentence be changed to read, "I asked Tim to buy or requisition two cars and to get us a billet".

pp. 83 and 90 contain not entirely flattering references to NOIC (naval officer in charge) who I assume is a British officer.

Personally, I do not think these remarks are objectionable as they merely state in substance that he did not understand who the Partisans were or the reasons for helping them and therefore was, as Huot puts it on p. 90, "none too friendly".

pp. 265 and 266 - Huot describes a meeting attended by British and American officers held after he had gotten his supply operations going.

One of the officers who was not identified as British but who probably is, makes a little speech (p. 266) to the effect that within a few weeks we should be able to get supplies moving at the rate of 500 tons a month when actually Huot already had supplies moving at a rate of 100 tons per night. This of course made the officer look foolish. However, this seems really a minor point and is no more than in the spirit of friendly competition between the Services.

p. 271 - Huot describes a supply stealing episode in which Tim swipes 150 cartons of Lucky Strike cigarettes after the officer in charge had refused his request for them.

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Such antics while perhaps justifiable from the standpoint of the cause involved might add to our reputation for irresponsibility. However, this again is probably a very minor point.

p. 359 - "Our British colleagues, who were now on the scene in strength, congratulated us all on the establishment of the supply lines."

This, of course, implies that the British were not on the scene in strength before Huot had established his supply lines. I suppose this is true but in view of the number of liaison officers which the British had with the Partisans and the efforts which they had made to supply Tito by air before we got into the field, this remark seems a little gratuitous.

Aside from the points which I have mentioned above, I did not notice anything else which raised any question in my mind. The reference to the money is the only one which I personally would insist that Huot change. However, you may feel that the other points concerning our relations with the British are also important.

A. W. S.

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480004-8

Form 88 (Revised)

Huot 14,375

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE June 23, 1944

FROM USTRAVIC, LONDON	PRIORITY / ROUTINE / DEFERRED
TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES	IN-12967
DISTRIBUTION	
(FOR ACTION) DIRECTOR	(FOR INFORMATION) SECRETARIAT

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

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#66891. To 106 from 105.

1. SOE has shown me cable advising that OSS has persuaded War Department to stop publication in United States of Huot's book. "Guns for Tito". Are now informed book shortly to be published in England.

2. Since Huot is now in FWD and has no connection our organization and you agree book should not be published here, suggest you have War Department, Washington, cable Huot prohibiting its publication anywhere.

TOR: 6/23/44 5:36 p.m.

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CONFIDENTIAL

29 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. Colonel O. C. Doering, Jr.
Executive Officer, Office of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Subject: Book ms., "Balkan Operation" by Maj. Louis Huot, AUS

1. The War Department, with British concurrence, objects for the time being to the publication of "Balkan Operation" by Major Huot, written during his service as an OSS officer.

2. Discussion in this manuscript of OSS, Army and British operations in October, 1943, in a sensitive area whose military and diplomatic status has not materially changed as of this date, is considered highly inadvisable.

3. Two copies of "Balkan Operations" reached this Branch. A photostat copy submitted by Major Huot accompanies this memorandum. A ribbon copy received from you with your letter of 19 April 1944 is kept in Confidential file in this Branch pending possible resubmission by Major Huot of this book at a later date.

For the Chief, Review Branch:

E. W. DAVIDSON
Lt. Col., A. U. S.

Incl.
Manuscript

EWD/ca

CONFIDENTIAL

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23 June 1944

Mr. Allan Oakley Hunter
551 Santa Rosa Ave.
Berkeley-6, California

Dear Mr. Hunter:

Immediately on receipt of your letter of June 12, I contacted the branch concerned. The only contingency was the availability of a Naval slot. The branch immediately cleared a slot, but it was found that you had been commissioned in the Naval Supply Corps on the 17th of June.

Your availability to this agency depends on a change in the basis of your commission. Any action to be taken, will have to be taken between the Naval Command here, and the Supply Corps. It is probably not possible for you to do anything; indeed, at this point it is only proper that the contact be made by the Commanding Officer of the Naval Command with your new branch, rather than directly with you.

Whatever your assignment may be I wish you the best of luck.

Sincerely,

Robert Thrun
Assistant to the
Executive Officer

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OSS FORM 40014

Date 18 June 1944

To: Bob Thrun

1. Mr. Sherwood says Hunter will be contacted in Calif. by OSS. In view of fact Hunter has resigned from FBI and is probably now 1-A, OSS will ask National Hqs. here to have Hunter's local board transfer draft papers to National Hqs. where we maintain good liaison. Hunter will be asked to come to DC.

2. Sherwood also says Hunter's commission application has been in process only 1 month. Usually takes 2 months to get a commission from the Navy. So we still have approximately 1 month to wait.

3. Sherwood will inform Cushing of X-2's interest in Hunter and have the letter "ear marked" for X-2.

4. In regard to Hunter's letter: your reply should advise him to keep in touch with Lt. Lambert of San Francisco Office.

PFP

Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

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Hunter, Allan Oakley 14 3 5-2
x Gearhart, Cong.

Fresno, California
June 12, 1944

Office Of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Attn. Mr. Thrun

Dear Sir:

I am writing in regard to my application for appointment to a position with the Office of Strategic Services. About two weeks ago I talked to Lieutenant Lambert at the San Francisco office. He had just come out from Washington and advised me that a place had been found for me. He wanted to know if I were still interested. My answer to that question was a definite yes. He then wanted to know the status of my application for a commission in the U. S. Naval Reserve. I informed him that my application had been forwarded on May 6th by the Office of Naval Officer Procurement in San Francisco to the Bureau of Naval Personnel in Washington with favorable recommendation. Lambert stated that in that case, OSS would contact the Bureau of Naval Personnel and recommend me for a commission and assignment to it. Since my conversation with Lambert, I have had no further word regarding the matter.

I am writing at this time to advise that I am in receipt of information that my naval application is up for final review before the Bureau of Personnel this week. If I am now informed that I am being commissioned in the Naval Reserve but am not informed as to what action has been taken by OSS, I am wondering what course I should pursue. Although I applied for general sea duty with the Navy, I would prefer assigment to OSS. The preference is natural inasmuch as my training and experience suits me much better for such a position. General sea duty is my second choice. My reason for making two applications is that I wish to serve in the Armed Forces in some capacity, if not in my first choice, then in some other.

I would greatly appreciate a letter of advice in the above matter at an early date. Thanking you for your assistance and attention, I remain

Very truly yours,

Allan Oakley Hunter

Allan Oakley Hunter

551 Santa Rosa Ave.
Berkeley-6, California

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Hunter, Allan O. - 14,352
x Gearhart, Cong. B.W.

BERTRAND W. GEARHART
9TH DISTRICT CALIFORNIA

KERN McLAUGHLIN
SECRETARY

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

Call Sherwood
Mrs O'B's files

April 28, 1944

General William J. Donovan, Director
Office of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Donovan:

I am very much interested in Allan Oakley Hunter, 3153 Kerckhoff Avenue, Fresno, California, who I am told has filed formal application with you for a commission in the armed forces and assignment to the Office of Strategic Services.

I have known Allan for several years, and have for him a very real and high regard. He has a splendid educational background, is a gentleman of excellent character and ability, and I have no hesitancy, therefore, in commending him to your favorable consideration.

Allan has recently tendered his resignation as an Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the sole purpose of serving with the armed forces, and, while I dislike to bother you with such a matter, frankly, my very keen personal interest impels me to ask your early and favorable consideration in this particular instance.

May I hear from you about the matter at your early convenience?

Most cordially yours,

Bertrand W. Gearhart

BERTRAND W. GEARHART
Member of Congress

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SECRET

January 28, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO MR. MARTIN M. HIMLER

Subject: Orders

1. You are hereby authorized and directed to proceed to Cairo, Egypt, where you will report to the Strategic Services Officer for the Middle East Theater of Operations. You are thereafter to act under the instructions of the Strategic Services Officer for the Middle East Theater.

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

APPROVED:

Norton Dodge
Deputy Chief, FO

E. Dodd, Jr.
Middle East Theater Officer

Joseph M. Scribner
Deputy Director, SSO

SECRET

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10,721/A
Hutchesson, Andrew W.
VC 13.1.
V 3.1,

February 8, 1944

BRIEF FACTUAL
REPORT OF TRIP TO CBI THEATER OF LIEUT. COL. A. D. HUTCHESON
AUGUST 4, 1943 TO DECEMBER 20, 1943

SUBJECT MATTER

1. Itinerary
2. Purposes of Trip
3. Action
4. Comments
5. Results

1. ITINERARY

Aug. 4 - Left Washington, D.C. and arrived Montreal, Canada, via American Airlines.
Aug. 6 - Left Montreal, via British bomber (B-24); arrived Gander Airport, Newfoundland; left Gander (same plane).
Aug. 7 - Arrived Prestwick, Scotland. Left Prestwick, via ATC (DC-3), and arrived London.
Sept.4 - Left London, via R. R.
Sept.5 - Arrived Prestwick, Scotland. Left Prestwick, via ATC (C-54).
Sept.6 - Arrived Marrakech, French Morocco; left Marrakech (same plane); arrived Algiers; left Algiers (same plane).
Sept.7 - Arrived Cairo, Egypt.
Sept.8 - Left Cairo, via ATC (DC-3), arrived Khartoum, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.
Sept.10- Left Khartoum, via ATC (DC-3); arrived Aden, Arabia; left Aden (same plane).
Sept.11- Arrived Masirah Island, Arabia; left Masirah (same plane); arrived Karachi, India.
Sept.14- Left Karachi, via ATC (DC-3); arrived New Delhi, India.
Oct. 7 - Left New Delhi, General Stilwell's plane (DC-3), arrived Agra, Chabua, and Mohanbari (Assam, India).
Oct. 8 - Left Mohanbari, same plane, arrived Kunming, China.
Oct.14 - Left Kunming, General Chennault's plane (DC-3); arrived Chungking.
Oct.24 - Left Chungking, General Stilwell's Plane (DC-3);arrived Kunming.
Oct.26 - Left Kunming, same plane, arrived Mohanbari, India; left Mohanbari, same plane;arrived New Delhi.
Dec. 4 - Left New Delhi, via bomber (C-60), for Agra and returned New Delhi.
Dec. 8 - Left New Delhi, via R.R.
Dec. 9 - Arrived Agra; left Agra, via bomber (B-24); arrived Jorhat, Assam, and Nazira.
Dec.10 - Left Nazira and Jorhat, via bomber (B-24); arrived New Delhi.

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Dec. 12 - Started take off for Ceylon, via bomber (B-24); plane failed on take-off, trip cancelled.
Dec. 16 - Left New Delhi, via ATC (C-54); arrived Karachi. Left Karachi, same plane, arrived Cairo, Egypt (Cairo time).
Dec. 17 - Left Cairo, same plane, arrived Algiers, and Marrakech; left Marrakech, same plane.
Dec. 18 - Arrived Dakar, French West Africa. Left Dakar, same plane.
Dec. 19 - Arrived Belem, Brasil; left Belem, same plane; arrived Porto Rico.
Dec. 20 - Left Porto Rico, same plane; arrived Washington, D. C.

MILEAGE COVERED - 32,575 MILES.

2. PURPOSES OF TRIP.

(a) As Chief of S.I., CBI Theater, I was to report to Lieut. General Stilwell's Headquarters at New Delhi, India, for temporary duty on the General's Staff, under Lieut. Col. Heppner, Chief OSS, CBI Theater. The purpose was to make a survey of the S.I. possibilities and needs in the Theater and to establish an S.I. set-up therein to obtain information on the Japanese as wanted by the U. S. Army. On completion of my mission I was to return to OSS Washington.

(b) To meet and confer in London with the Chiefs of the British SIS and SOE Far East Sections regarding cooperation with them in the CBI Theater.

(c) Then to proceed to New Delhi, India, and to Chungking, China, for duty as per the above.

3. ACTION.

My cables and thirteen reports, and those sent by General Donovan from New Delhi to OSS Washington, constitute a detailed report of the action taken.

4. COMMENTS.

OSS relationships with the U. S. Army in the Theater were excellent, their attitude being that any ability S.I. may have for obtaining information on the Japanese by deep penetration into Jap occupied territory would be valuable to them.

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It was thus decided to how to that objective, principally by attempting to bring out friendly natives who lived at such points from which the Army desired information, then instructing them in S.I. methods, communications, and the specific information which the Army requested, then reintroducing them into the territory from which they came so that they in turn could obtain the services of other local friends and could instruct them in the above S.I. details and put them to work. In this manner a mushroom growth of S.I. agents could expand from within a territory inconspicuously and effectively.

Other methods of obtaining information were to be used as developed, which my reports and cables deal with.

There were a number of situations, especially in China, which needed attention from OSS high echelons, such as the Miles situation. On General Donovan's arrival in the Theater the Miles situation and methods of obtaining information on the Japs from China, as a base, were resolved by him in what appeared to be a most expeditious manner--all on record in my reports and cables.

The British SIS, known in the Theater as ISLD, was cooperating well with our S.I.

An especially gratifying feature of the OSS set-up in the Theater was the fact that everyone of our personnel was working as an OSS team--there were no factional difficulties when I left and there was nothing to prevent our going full steam ahead, given the proper personnel.

The lack of speed in getting requested personnel out into the field was a cause of delay in getting into action.

In view of the fact that S.I. is the number one priority in the CBI Theater, I suggest that S.I. take the following steps:

1. Submit a list of proposed S.I. personnel for the China base.

2. Ask that full authority and responsibility to operate S.I. from the China base be solely delegated to S.I. Far East personnel both here and in China as a central control point, so that we may be fully acquainted with ALL MOVES, and so that the effectiveness of said operations may not be hindered by divers individuals taking various uncoordinated action.

5. RESULTS.

In our several conversations with General Stilwell and Admiral Mountbatten they both expressed satisfaction and pleasure at the OSS situation and activities in the Theater, and in fact asked us to perform missions, and offered their good offices in assisting us.

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Due to the vast distances involved, and the different problems concerned between China and India (as bases of operation), it was thought best to divide the Theater into two parts; one, SEAC (South East Asia Command), which is the Theater commanded by Admiral Mountbatten based in India, and consisting of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Burma, Malaya, Sumatra, and Thailand, and, two, the China Theater, which is under General Stilwell's command.

These two Theaters each were given a Chief of OSS, under whom were a Director of Operations and a Director of Intelligence, for each Theater. The Director of Operations headed the SO, MO, MU and OG groups, while the Director of Intelligence headed the SI, R and A and X-2 groups. In turn these groups each had a head who commanded the various geographic section heads and their personnel, which were to consist of instructors, camp and administrative personnel, etc.

The Communications Branch of OSS were furnishing men, equipment, and instructors who were specialists in their field.

Services Officers for the Theaters had been appointed, as well as Special Funds Officers.

The facilities for recruiting, training, and holding agents were arranged for and being built. Detachment 101 in Assam was of course available, and being an ideal spot and set-up for the purpose gave great advantage in making possible immediate action.

A new OSS camp site was selected for the SEAC Theater in Ceylon.

Since Major Hoffmann was making final arrangements in the China Theater, his report should more adequately cover the latest developments there.

Due to health, I was ordered by General Donovan to return to Washington for a physical examination, and when my health permitted I was to be Far East "Advisor" (or some similar capacity) in Washington when possible to set it up.

When I left New Delhi, the middle of December, enough S.I. personnel had arrived to form a skeleton organization, and further personnel has proceeded (and is proceeding) to the Theater since, so that the purpose of the trip has been accomplished to date. However, as yet there is insufficient personnel in the field to operate to capacity and the organization in Washington for the direction [illegible] Far East affairs is at present unstabilized.

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Hutchison, Aubrey 10,981
x War Dept Personnel

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
Office of The Adjutant General
Washington, D.C.

AG 201-Hutchison, Aubrey D.
(6 Jul 43)PO-A

BDC/151/151.5
Br. 77167

Subject: Movement Orders.

10 July 1943.

SECRET
Auth: T.A.G.
Initials: [illegible]
Date: 10 July 43

Thru : Director, Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

To : Major Aubrey D. Hutchison, 0516262, AUS.

1. The Secretary of War directs that Major Aubrey D. Hutchison, 0516262, AUS, proceed on temporary duty from Washington, D. C., to New Delhi, India. He will report to the Adjutant General, Room 1048, Munitions Building, for temporary duty, and upon completion of this temporary duty, he will proceed on or about 24 July 1943, from Washington, D. C., to London, England, thence to New Delhi, India, reporting upon arrival to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in China-Burma-India, for duty. Upon completion of this temporary duty, he will return to his proper station, Washington, D. C. 2GN 1-5000 P 432-02, 03 A 0125-24.

2. Travel by military, naval or commercial aircraft, Army or naval transport, commercial steamship, belligerent vessel or aircraft and rail is directed. To by air (APR-4-69715) from Washington, D. C., to London, England, thence to New Delhi, India, and return, is necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission. A baggage allowance of fifty-five (55) pounds, to include all personal effects, clothing, medical kit, canteen and emergency rations, and an excess baggage allowance (official equipment) of twenty-five (25) pounds, is authorized while traveling by military, naval or commercial aircraft.

3. In lieu of subsistence, a flat per diem of $5.00 is authorized while traveling by military, naval or commercial aircraft, and for the period of temporary duty outside the continental limits of the United States, in accordance with existing law and regulations. When Government quarters or billets are furnished and messing facilities are available, per diem allowances are suspended.

4. Major Hutchison is authorized to wear civilian clothing in the performance of this mission.

5. Prior to departure from present station, he will be equipped with pistol, steel helmet and gas mask. Such other field equipment as may be required will be obtained at destination.

6. Reimbursement for expenses incurred in connection with the travel will be made to the War Department by the Office of Strategic Services. Finance officer making payment in connection with the travel performed will submit a copy of the voucher, showing the amount paid, month in which paid, voucher number and citation of this order. The copy of the voucher will be forwarded by letter of transmittal to The Adjutant General's Office, attention Fiscal and Budget Section, stating that the inclosed copy of voucher is furnished for the purpose of securing reimbursement from the Office of Strategic Services.

SECRET

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Movement Orders, continued.

10 July 1943.

7. Officer should advise his correspondents that mail will be addressed to him at APO 4004, c/o Postmaster, New York, N. Y. Immediately upon arrival at destination, he will complete and mail WD AGO Form No. 204, Change of Address Card, to advise friends and relatives of his permanent APO address. He will also send a completed WD AGO Form No. 204 to the theatre postal officer.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
OFFICIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT

Ben D. Culleton
Adjutant General.

Incls.

Distribution
Officer (7)
Officers Branch, Record Section, AGO
Fiscal & Budget Section, Operations Br., AGO, Attn: W. E. Walker.
[illegible], Embarkation [illegible], 464 Lexington Ave., NY, NY (2)
Army Postal Service, Room 3E501, Pentagon
[illegible], APO 8[illegible]5, c/o PM, NY, NY
[illegible], APO 8[illegible]7, c/o PM, NY, NY
Postal Officer, APO 38[illegible], c/o PM, NY, NY
[illegible], Embarkation [illegible], Miami, Florida
[illegible], Room 15[illegible]5

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27 August 1943

My dear General MacArthur:

Joe Hayden is just leaving with my blessing and I know that he can be of great use to you.

I wanted to take advantage of his going to send you this brief message.

I was in the Sicilian operations and I am going back to Europe whatever else may happen. After that is over I am planning to go out to the Far East, and I wanted to let you know that I will then take advantage of your kind offer and stop for a day or two at your theater.

I have been doing some work with Mountbatten, and he is really a cooperative fellow. I hope that some time you will see him.

The best of luck to you, and I look forward to seeing you very soon.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

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OSS Forms 69

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE JUNE 18, 1943

FROM BRISBANE, GHQ SPWA, MACARTHUR

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WAR DEPARTMENT, AGWAR, DONOVAN

ACKNOWLEDGE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION) DONOVAN

(FOR INFORMATION) DR. HAYDEN, SECRETARIAT, MAJOR JONES.

INCOMING HEADING

RECEIVED

SECRET

03268

Delighted to see you here both officially and unofficially. Thank you for your reply to my request for Hayden. Believe he will be increasingly valuable to me and involve more and more deeply in the work as the campaign progresses. However, will of course return him at your wish.

FILE COPY

Action: G-2 (OSS)

CM-IN-11190, June 18, 1943

WAR DEPARTMENT PARAPHRASE

FM: 6/18/43 6:37 P.M.

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480004-8

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480004-8

OSS FORM 69

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE JUNE 18, 1943

FROM

BRISBANE, GHQ SPWA, MACARTHUR

TO

~~OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES~~ WAR DEPARTMENT, AGWAR, DONOVAN

ACKNOWLEDGE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

DONOVAN

(FOR INFORMATION)

DR. HAYDEN, SECRETARIAT, MAJOR JONES.

INCOMING HEADING

RECEIVED

03966

Delighted to see you here both officially and unofficially. Thank you for your reply to my request for Hayden. Believe he will be increasingly valuable to me and involve more and more deeply in the work as the campaign progresses. However, will of course return him at your wish.

Action: G-2 (OSS)

CM-IN-11190, June 18, 1943

WAR DEPARTMENT PARAPHRASE

TOR: 6/18/43 6:37 P.M.

FILE COPY

OPERATOR'S RECORD

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480004-8

OSS Form 68

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE June 18, 1943 Rec'd. 6/18/43 10:00 a.m.

TO MACARTHUR, BRISBANE

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

CLEAR TEXT ___ CODE OR CIPHER ___ ACKNOWLEDGE ___ PRIORITY ___ ROUTINE ___

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR) DONOVAN

(FOR INFORMATION) SECRETARIAT FETO

OUTGOING HEADING

UNLESS DESIGNATED OTHERWISE TRANSMIT THIS DISPATCH AS DEFERRED

TRANSMIT SECRET

From Donovan to MacArthur in answer to your C-3037.

I am prepared to release Doctor Hayden to you, even though the qualities you see in him make him valuable to us. I am doing this because it is your personal wish and for the reasons of national interest which you mentioned.

If the time comes when you no longer need his services, I would wish to have him return, but I am most ready to make him available to you with no restrictions. I am only too glad to consult your convenience as to the manner of effecting his release; whether outright or by loan.

I hope that you will let me stop by and see you on my way to the Far East, which will be within the next few months. I wish you the best of luck.

FILE COPY

TOD: 6/18/43 11:45 a.m.

OPERATOR'S RECORD

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16--81460-1

SECRET

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE June 8, 1943

FROM BRISHANE, MacARTHUR

TO CHIEF OF STAFF, WASHINGTON, D. C., OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

ACKNOWLEDGE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)	(FOR INFORMATION)
G-2 (OSS), DONOVAN	SECRETARIAT

INCOMING HEADING

RECEIVED

SECRET

C-5037.

I would very much like to commission Dr. Joseph R. Hayden in the army of the United States subject to your approval and his willingness to serve for assignment to my headquarters. I would not ask you to release him save that I know that in consenting thereto you would be moved only by considerations of impelling national interest. Dr. Hayden's intimate knowledge of the Philippine Islands, his mature judgment, and general experience in the Far East could now be of great assistance to me, both in matters relating to the Philippines and in broader fields. May I send to you my most cordial regards.

Action: G-2 (OSS)

Information: OPD

CM-IN-4768, June 8, 1943

TOR: 6/8/43 6:30 P.M.

FILE COPY

SECRET

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480004-8

OSS Form 69

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE JUNE 8, 1943.

FROM BRISBANE, MacARTHUR

TO CHIEF OF STAFF, WASHINGTON, D. C., OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

ACKNOWLEDGE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION) O-2 (OSS), DONOVAN

(FOR INFORMATION) SECRETARIAT

INCOMING HEADING

RECEIVED

SECRET

C-30037.

I would very much like to commission Dr. Joseph R. Hayden in the army of the United States subject to your approval and his willingness to serve for assignment to my headquarters. I would not ask you to release him save that I know that in consenting thereto you would be moved only by considerations of impelling national interest. Dr. Hayden's intimate knowledge of the Philippine Islands, his mature judgment, and general experience in the Far East could now be of great assistance to me, both in matters relating to the Philippines and in broader fields. May I send to you my most cordial regards.

Action: O-2 (OSS)

Information: OPD

CM-IN-4758, June 8, 1943

TOR: 6/8/43 6:20 P.M.

FILE COPY

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New York Times
2 November 1944

THE

AIDING AMERICANS IN PHILIPPINES

Col. R. A. Kangleon (right), Filipino guerrilla leader, who has been appointed provincial governor of Leyte by General MacArthur, talking with Dr. J. R. Hayden, civil adviser on Philippine affairs.

Associated Press Wirephoto (U. S. Signal Corps)

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480004-8

Hayden Joseph 11,423 19
. MacArthur, Gen D.
. Mother Pandas Zone Indus

April 15, 1943
x Philippines (FE. 5
x OSS Operations
. Southwest Pacific

From: J. R. Hayden

To: General Donovan

Subject: Memorandum on conferences in Brisbane with General MacArthur, General Willoughby and Colonel Merle-Smith regarding OSS operations in Southwest Pacific Area.

1. My first conference with General MacArthur occurred on Jan. 15. It began about 5:00 and lasted until 6:30 p.m. General MacArthur said that he had not understood that it was I that he had an appointment with and that he was delighted to see me.

2. As instructed, I presented the Southeast Mindanao plan to him. He immediately and definitely ruled it out of consideration, for the following reasons:

a. No white man could be landed in Mindanao, especially in the neighborhood of Davao, secure intelligence and live. The Japanese have at least a division in and around Davao. They had called their Davao subjects into active service, and they and their soldiers had drawn a practically impenetrable cordon around the Davao City area. The Japanese have also offered a reward for every American or hostile Filipino, dead or alive. The natives (apparently meaning both the pagans and the Christians) would be sure to turn any white man in.

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b. General MacArthur stated that he had Mindanao thoroughly covered with his own men. He is in constant touch with active guerilla groups. Has just sent in a party under Major Villamor, an able Filipino air officer who had distinguished himself for courage and resourcefulness in the Philippine fighting. This party had been training for months. They are going to contact others in the field and draw them together. Another party from an outside source would cause duplication and confusion.

c. General MacArthur's chief concern now is to restrain premature guerilla action. A lot of leaders have sprung up and were competing for power. General MacArthur does'nt know what some of them stand for. He does'nt want them to make so much trouble that the Japanese will wipe them out and kill a lot of other people. He does'nt want to put any white men in there until he can properly support them and get them out when the time comes.

d. General MacArthur reacted adversely to Fleischer's name. Stated that he had a distinct impression that Fleischer was "untrustworthy". I sought to check this opinion with others at Headquarters, but could discover

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no definite basis for it.

3. General MacArthur had made up his mind that he did not wish an OSS party to enter Mindanao at this time and it was obvious that any extended discussion of the subject would be unwelcome to him. I therefore stated that we were in a position to help the Dutch with reference to the Netherlands Indies, and said that we had already discussed the matter with them in Washington. General MacArthur replied: "Tell Bill that anything he can do to help the Dutch get information out of the Indies and inspire them to action will be welcome. We are'nt getting much of anything from there and need information badly. We will welcome and facilitate anything that he can do to help the Dutch." It was then suggested that I had better discuss the matter in detail with G-2. General Willoughby came in and arrangements were made for me to talk with him and Colonel Merle-Smith the following morning.

4. In discussing the Southeast Mindanao plan I mentioned submarine transportation and said that I understood that the Navy was ready to furnish it. This statement was like a match to a powder keg. General MacArthur said that the Navy was ready to use "MY" submarines any way they wished, instead of as he decided. He said that the Navy had run away and left him in the Philippines

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and that the whole story would have been different had they attacked the Japanese invasion force, as they could have done. He also said that the Navy could not be depended upon,-that they would take our people out and then leave them in the lurch when the picking-up time came. Later, General Willoughby told me that the C-in-C was seeking to secure a number of submarines that were outmoded for combat service, but which could be used in intelligence operations.

5. On the following day, February 16, I had a conference with General Willoughby and Colonel Merle-Smith (the greater part with Merle-Smith alone) which lasted for three hours. The details of possible OSS operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, and of the proposed operation with the Dutch, were discussed at length. The mission, organization, and capabilities of the OSS were explained. In the end the message sent by me to Colonel Donovan on January 16 was drafted jointly by Colonel Merle-Smith and myself. The substance of the despatch was that the Philippine project was "out" for the present, but that, with the understanding that the project and all OSS personnel involved in it within the Area should be under the direction of General

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MacArthur's Headquarters, a valuable work might be accomplished with the Dutch. The despatch requested authority to discuss this subject with G.H.Q.

6. While awaiting a reply to this message I continued informal discussions with General Willoughby and Colonel Merle-Smith. Occasions for these discussions arose naturally out of conferences with them regarding Philippine intelligence problems and problems of psychological warfare in the Far East. Colonel Merle-Smith was averse to my talking with Dr. van der Plas, but after consultation with General Sutherland finally agreed that I might do so,"at my own risk." He believed that the Dutch were having serious internal difficulties which could not be settled until after the arrival of Admiral Helferich and felt that discussions with Dr. van der Plas at this time would be premature. Particularly, he feared that the Dutch would view with suspicion any aid proffered by the OSS and that such suspicion might cloud subsequent relations between GHQ and the Dutch.

7. Immediately after this stage of my discussions with GHQ was reached I received Colonel Donovan's despatch dated Jan. 22, directing me defer further discussion until receipt of further instructions. These instructions were received on

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February 9. Meanwhile I had completed a memorandum based upon the questioning of a party which had arrived in Australia from Mindanao and Sulu. The memorandum gave a digest and evaluation of the information received from this party and outlined in some detail an intelligence operation based upon it. During this period I conferred with General Willoughby and Colonel Merle-Smith upon other matters, and did a good deal of work in the Philippine Section of the Inter-Allied Intelligence Bureau of GHQ.

8. Immediately after the receipt of Colonel Donovan's message dated Feb. 8, 1943, it was agreed with Colonel Merle-Smith that I should prepare a memorandum or aide memoire of Staff, to be used by him and the Chief, as a basis for further discussions. Colonel Merle-Smith said that he was anxious to get a decision on the whole matter but that the Chief of Staff was so busy that he did'nt know when he could get to it. A draft of this memorandum was handed to Colonel Merle-Smith on Feb. 14. He said that he would let me know when he had read it, and that if I did not hear from him I might call him or his assistant, Captain McVittey.

9. On Feb. 15 I had a conference with General MacArthur which lasted from 11:45 to 12:30. After a pre-

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liminary conversation which largely concerned press reports that a meeting was about to occur between Generals MacArthur and Wavell, I recalled our eariler discussion regarding aid to the Dutch in Australia. General MacArthur inquired what progress had been made with G-2 and how they felt about the project. I replied that that they seemed to feel that we should not enter the Southwest Pacific Area and did not beliefe that I should discuss the subject with Dr. van der Plas. He inquired why they so felt. I replied that they seemed to fear complications from the entry of another organization into the Area; to be afraid that wires might become crossed if I talked with van der Plas; and to believe that there was nothing that the OSS could do for the Dutch that they could not do themselves.

I then read the following paragraphs from Colonel Donovan's message dated Feb. 8 to General Mac Arthur:

"I would like to have you make it clear to General MacArthur that it is not our wish to intrude upon him but that it is our only hope that this organization of ours can be useful to him; also that it is regognized by us, of course, that any persons detailed there would be under his orders entirely.

"It is my belief that there has been forwarded

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to the General a plan involving an area best known to you.

"The Chiefs of Staff are being advised of the messages between you and me. In the event that General MacArthur should desire us to do something specific or should it be his wish to see some of our group first, request him to communicate with the Chiefs of Staff direct."

General MacArthur said to tell Colonel Donovan that he had absolutely no feeling about his "intruding" into his area. That was'nt it at all. That so far as the Dutch were concerned, he had'nt been able to get any information out of the Indies and that information from there was "precious." If we could help to get it in any way he wanted us to do so. He had no objections whatever to the Donovan organization coming into this area. It could'nt make trouble because he controlled whatever came in.

General MacArthur further said that he could'nt believe that Willoughby and Merle-Smith were afraid that I would "cross any wires" and that he saw no reason why I should'nt talk with van der Plas. He had talked with van der Plas when the latter was in Brisbane and had recently written him. Van der Plas, he said, is able and active. Recently General MacArthur had suggested that the Dutch move certain people out of some of their

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ports lest the Japanese capture them. Van der Plas had acted instantly.

"Dr. van der Plas, General MacArthur said, was "part native," like Quezon and other Filipinos. He knew that type thoroughly and when he had met van der Plas he had at once made up his mind to put his cards on the table when dealing with him. His kind were born intriguers and no Westerner could fail to lose by trying to play their game with them. General MacArthur added that he did'ntk know what van der Plas was doing in this matter, or whether he was doing anything. The Dutch had personnel whom they wished to use, but no equipment.

I recalled to the General that the Dutch had already discussed training and equipment; and that I had discussed the matter with van der Plas himself in Washington and that he had since conferred with Colonel Donovan on the subject. I also informed him that Indonesian personnel by arrangement with the Dutch in London and Washington was already in training in the United States.

General MacArthur was also informed that I had breakfasted and had a long conversation with Dr. Van der Plas, but that in deference to the Wishes of Colonel Merle-Smith I had not discussed the OSS project with him. I also said that I feared that unless someone here took up with

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him the question of our collaboration, arrangements might reach the point at which it would be difficult to bring us in. General MacArthur replied that he could!nt see why I should not talk with van der Plas and that he would discuss the matter with Willoughby and Merle-Smith and let me know.

10. On the following morning, by request, I conferred with General Willoughby and Colonel Merle-Smith in the latter's office. The latter said that between the time that the C-in-C had talked with me on the preceding day (between 12:30 and a considerable time before 4:00) and his conference with General Willoughby and Colonel Merle-Smith, he had thought the matter over and had changed his mind about some of the things that he had said to me. He said that the General had already made up his mind before he and Willoughby had gone in, and that they were glad that I had talked to the C-in-C because the results showed that independently the latter had reached the same decisions that they had. These decisions, he said, MacArthur had asked Willoughby and himself to communicate to me, emphasizing that they were not for all time, but that for the moment the matter was settled and that General MacArthur did not wish to take it up again.

General Willoughby and Colonel Merle-Smith then

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informed me of what the C-in-C's decisions had been, referring to an aide memoire of their conference with him and afterwards giving it to me to read. In substance, General MacArthur's decisions were as follows:

a. That it would not be advisable for the OSS to enter the SWP Area at the present time, (1) because of the complications and possible difficulties which might arise from the entrance of an agency outside of the military forces; (2) because the OSS at present could not do anything for the Dutch which could not be as well done by GHQ; (3) that at some future time GHQ might be glad to use the personnel and some of the facilities of the OSS and if so General MacArthur would ask for them. These statements were written down from memory immediately after the interview, and I believe that they are correct in substance. In substance they are 100 per cent different from [redacted] what General MacArthur had said to me during our two conferences, and in verbiage and substance are what General Willoughby and Colonel Merle-Smith had said during our many discussions of the subject.

b. Regarding the Sulu project, General MacArthur had read my memo and had decided against it for the time being. This project will be discussed below.

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11. Colonel Merle-Smith said that the C-in-C had told General Willoughby and himself that ordinarily he did'nt approve of by-passing his staff, but that he had talked with me because he had known me for a long time and because of our friendly personal relations. I explained to them that there had not been the slightest intention of by-passing the staff and explained the specific reasons which had led me to go to General MacArthur at that time. They stated that they had no feeling in the matter, and understood my position perfectly. Further, they said that they greatly appreciated the work that I had done for G-2 while in Brisbane. They then went into the old arguments why it would'nt do to bring in the OSS at the moment. I said that the decision having been made there was nothing more that could profitably be said, except that I was sure that Colonel Donovan would appreciate the careful consideration that had been given to the question of OSS participation in the SWP Area and their courtesy to me.

12. During this phase of the conversation two matters were brought up by General Willoughby which might be mentioned as of possible interest.

a. General Willoughby said that it was all right to agree that the representatives of another

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agency operating with the SWP Area were under MacArthur's orders, but that the experience of ~~MX~~ GHQ was that the representatives of such an agency often did as they pleased and then it was too late. Colonel Merle-Smith said that with a certain British agency there had been great difficulty and that it had gone almost to the point of insubordination. He added that "outside" agencies were a terribly "sore point around here right now."

b. General Willoughby also asked in a pointed manner, whether formerly the OSS had not had some people in North Africa, and how had things gone there. Further, he said that Colonel Clear had given the Donovan organization a bad name throughout the Far East.

13. During the discussion I asked if I might not have a copy of the aide memoir which has been mentioned. Colonel Merle-Smith said no, that it had been prepared for their own use. I then suggested that perhaps the C-in-C might wish to write a brief note to Colonel Donovan, stating the decisions made; or that General Willoughby might wish to give me a brief memo on the subject. They said no, that they were sure that I could convey what was in their minds; and that Colonel Donovan had not written to General MacArthur. After Colonel Merle-Smith had left General Willoughby very confidentially intimated that

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if might be a good thing if Colonel Donovan would write to the C-in-C.

14. The S.I. operation in the Sulu Archipelago which was referred to in paragraph seven above was an exposition of the existing situation in Sulu based upon information obtained from a small party which had recently arrived in Australia from Mindanao and Sulu, and upon other information in G-2's files, and of a plan for an S.I. operation in that area. In my last conversation with General MacArthur I explained this plan to him and stated that I believed myself to be better qualified then anyone else available to head an operation in Sulu. The General evinced enthusiastic interest in the project and I felt at the time that there was an excellent chance of his accepting it. On the following day, though, the decision as stated in the aide memoire was negative, for the moment. The reasons given were: a) The time was premature; the General did not wish to arouse false hopes when for a long time he might not be able to justify them; b) the expedition would be too dangerous to risk me on,-would be too valuable later when a bridgehead had been established and I could go in on a submarine and taken out on one after a conference with leaders already assembled.

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15. Attached to this memorandum is a copy of the rough memorandum prepared for Colonel Merle-Smith referred to in paragraph eight, above. On Colonel Merle-Smith's c copy of the memorandum I observed that the following notation had been made opposite paragraph two of the "Summary and Request:" "The Dutch have not asked for this assistance" (of the OSS). The notation suggests that consideration might be given to a request for OSS assistance made by the Dutch to General MacArthur.

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SUMMARY AND REQUEST

1. Paragraphs 1-4 of this memorandum set forth basic facts regarding the O.S.S., explain the mission of the representative of the Director of Strategic Services, and contain a statement regarding discussions which have occurred between that representative and General MacArthur and G-2 of G.H.Q., Southwest Pacific Area.

2. Paragraphs 5-6 set forth a plan for implementing the proposal that the specialized intelligence facilities of the Office of Strategic Services should be made available to the representatives of the Netherlands Government in Australia for use in connection with their intelligence activities in the Netherlands East Indies. The essential elements of the plan are:

a. After preliminary discussion of the proposal between G.H.Q., the appropriate Dutch authorities, and the representative of the O.S.S. the latter shall proceed to Washington for conference with Colonel Donovan.

b. Dr. Hayden, or some other representative of the Director of Strategic Services shall return to G.H.Q. accompanied by Dr. Amry Vandenbosch, a member of the O.S.S. who is highly qualified to deal with problems regarding the Netherlands East Indies, and who is well known to Dr. C. O. Van der Plas.

c. At a time deemed expedient by G.H.Q. discussions are to be held for the purpose of ascertaining in detail what assistance, if any, can be rendered to the Dutch by the O.S.S.; and for determining the administrative arrangements in accordance with which any plan agreed upon should be carried out. It would be understood that Dr. Vandenbosch and any other members of the O.S.S. who might be stationed in the Southwest Pacific Area would be under the exclusive direction and control of G.H.Q. Upon the completion of the arrangements mentioned a decision would be reached as to whether the representative of the Director of Strategic Services who accompanied Dr. Vandenbosch to Australia would remain or would return to Washington.

d. If Dr. Vandenbosch were to be assigned by G.H.Q. as an intelligence liaison officer with the Dutch, he might also constitute a connecting link between G.H.Q. and the O.S.S. Some of the services Dr. Vandenbosch might be expected to perform are briefly suggested in paragraph five.

3. Paragraphs 7-12 of the memorandum deal with the broader problem of seeking to establish a useful working relationship between this G.H.Q. and the O.S.S. Reasons are given for the belief that such a relationship would aid the O.S.S. in performing effectively the functions assigned to it, be of advantage to G.H.Q., and further the great interests of the United States in the Pacific Area. Paragraph 13 is a brief conclusion emphasizing that this memorandum is intended as a basis for discussion rather than as presenting an inflexible plan.

4. It is requested that the representative of the O.S.S. be given the privilege of discussing the subject further with the appropriate authority in G.H.Q. with a view to reaching a decision or to determining what further steps might be taken to advance the matter towards a decision. Such a step might be the reference by G.H.Q. of a tentative plan of action to the U. S. Chiefs of Staff. Such a course is suggested by the following paragraph from the message from Colonel Donovan referred to in paragraph two, above:

> "The Chiefs of Staff are being advised of the messages between you the me. In the event General MacArthur should desire us to do something specific or should it be his wish to see some of our group first, request him to communicate with the Chiefs of Staff direct."

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February 21st, 1943.

MEMORANDUM from Joseph R. Hayden, a representative of Colonel W. J. Donovan, Director of Strategic Services, to Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, Assistant G-2, Southwest Pacific Area, upon a proposal to establish a working relationship between G.H.Q., Southwest Pacific Area and the Office of Strategic Services.

* * * * * *

1. The Office of Strategic Services was established by a Military Order of the Commander-in-Chief (the President) dated June 13, 1942. The order provides, in part, that the Office of Strategic Services shall be under the jurisdiction of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and shall, "(a) Collect and analyse such strategic information as may be required by the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and (b) Plan and operate such special services as may be directed by the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff." The first general directive of the Jointed Chiefs of Staff to the O. S. S. provided that the latter organization should undertake no activities within any theatre of operations without the approval of the theatre commander, and that any O.S.S. personnel operating within a given theatre of operations should be subject to the direction and control of the commander thereof. Subsequently, additional general directives were issued which in general terms provide that the O.S.S. is to be in charge of the co-ordination, development and execution of the military program of psychological warfare to be integrated with military operations; and that intelligence for military operations is to be collected, analysed and evaluated by the O.S.S. The O.S.S. possesses additional authority to conduct analysis and research of a more general character.

2. The representative of the Director of Strategic Services was requested by Colonel Donovan to ascertain whether the O.S.S. could perform any useful services within the Southwest Pacific Area. In a message dated February 8, 1943 (Enclosure "A") Colonel Donovan states: "I would like to have you make it clear to General MacArthur that it is not our wish to intrude upon him, but that it is our only hope that this organization of ours may be useful to him; also that it is recognized, of course, that any persons detailed there would be under his orders entirely."

3. On January 15th, General MacArthur stated to the representative of the Director of Strategic Services that he would welcome any assistance that the O.S.S. might give to the representatives of the Netherlands Government in Australia in securing intelligence from the Netherlands Indies. This memorandum discusses, (a) the implementation of this proposal, informally approved in principle by General MacArthur; and (b) the related question of establishing a working relationship between this G.H.Q. and the O.S.S. which might be of value to the former and enable the latter to perform more effectively the missions assigned to it by the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. The conditions under which the O.S.S. might render assistance to the Dutch in connection with intelligence work in the Indies, and the more general problems which would be involved in stationing a member of the O.S.S. within the Southwest Pacific Area have been discussed by the representative of the Director of Strategic Services and G-2. The most serious of these problems seem to be connected with the injection of an additional agency (the O.S.S.) into this theatre of operations. Among them are difficulties which might be caused by :

a. The overlapping or incongruity of functions,
b. Divided loyalty on the part of the members of the O.S.S. stationed within the Area,
c. Administrative difficulties arising out of the relationship between the local members of the O.S.S. with that organization, on the one hand, and G.H.Q. on the other,
d. The complications which might be added to the delicate admin-

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5. Any project for using the facilities of the O.S.S. for increasing, improving, or utilizing more effectively (here or in Washington) intelligence from the Netherlands East Indies should seek to avoid the possible difficulties mentioned in paragraph "4". With this principle in mind, it is suggested that the following steps be taken to implement the proposal that the O.S.S. make its facilities available to the Dutch :

a. At the proper time, G.H.Q. shall inform the appropriate Dutch Authorities, (a) that through G.H.Q. the specialized intelligence material, training and other facilities, and personnel of the O.S.S. will be made available to them, insofar as they care to use them; and (b) that if they are interested in the proposal, Dr. J. R. Hayden of the O.S.S. will be available to discuss the proposal with them informally.

b. If the Dutch Authorities express an interest in the proposal, Dr. Hayden and whomever they may designate shall have a preliminary discussion of the subject. Dr. Hayden shall then proceed to Washington to report to the Director of Strategic Services.

c. As soon as is practicable, Dr. Hayden, or another representative of the Director of Strategic Services, shall return to G.H.Q., accompanied by Dr. Amry Vandenbosch. Dr. Vandenbosch is one of the foremost American authorities on the Netherlands East Indies. He has been on the staff of the O.S.S. since September 1941, has worked very closely with the Netherlands representatives in Washington, and stands high in the esteem of Dr. Ch. O. Van der Plas, Chief Commissioner for the Netherlands Indies in Australia and New Zealand. Dr. Vandenbosch is about 42 years of age and is Chairman of the Department of Political Science in the University of Kentucky. He is of Dutch descent, but is a second or third generation American citizen.

d. After the arrival of the representative of the Director of Strategic Services and Dr. Vandenbosch at G.H.Q. discussions shall be held to ascertain in detail what assistance, if any, the O.S.S. may render the Dutch; and if assistance is to be given the necessary administrative arrangements shall be made. It would be understood that such arrangements might be altered at any time in the discretion of G.H.Q.; and be further understood that Dr. Vandenbosch and any other members of the O.S.S. who might be detailed to this theatre of command would be exclusively subject to the orders of G.H.Q.

e. The functions of Dr. Vandenbosch would of necessity depend in large degree upon the nature of the assistance to be rendered the Dutch and their desires in the matter. In general, however, it is suggested that he might be assigned by G.H.Q. as a liaison officer with the Dutch to work as closely with them as they desired in connection with Netherlands East Indies Intelligence. It is believed that in this capacity he might usefully supplement the work of any other liaison officer whom G.H.Q. might assign for the same general purpose. Specifically, (a) his knowledge of the O.S.S. would enable him to be of service to both the Dutch and G.H.Q. in connection with any assistance which the O.S.S. might render or which it might be proposed that it should render to the Dutch; (b) his knowledge of the Indies and his demonstrated compatibility with the Dutch might be expected to enable him to gain the close confidence of the Netherlands representatives in Australia, especially of Dr. Van der Plas; (c) he would be in a position to consult both with the Dutch and G.H.Q. regarding efforts to procure and utilize effectively intelligence not of immediate operational value, but of broad strategic, economic or political significance, types of intelligence which are greatly desired in Washington; (d) his aid to G.H.Q. in the evaluation of intelligence from the Indies probably would be of value.

f. It is believed that the execution of a plan developed along the lines suggested would reduce to a minimum the difficulties which might result from an effort to determine whether the O.S.S. can aid in securing and utilizing intelligence from the Netherlands East Indies. If upon examination of the proposal by the procedure outlined the project should be found to be impracticable, it would be dropped forthwith. If a plan for aiding the Dutch were put into execution, it could be modified or terminated at a later date should the parties con-

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7. Related to the foregoing proposal that steps be taken to ascertain whether the special resources of the O.S.S. cannot be utilized in connection with Intelligence operations in the Netherlands Indies is the broader question of establishing a useful working relationship between G.H.Q. in the Southwest Pacific Area and the O.S.S. Colonel Donovan has asked that it be made clear to General MacArthur that the O.S.S. does not wish to intrude upon him. The writer of this memorandum feels that General MacArthur will not regard the matter as one of "intrusion", and will welcome a statement of a number of the factors which might properly be considered in reaching a decision upon an important matter of policy.

8. One of these factors is that the O.S.S. cannot perform with full effectiveness some of the functions assigned to it without regular and prompt access to the widest range of intelligence that is compatible with security. This statement is particularly true of its functions in connection with the military program of psychological warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area; and in the collection, analysis and evaluation of intelligence for military operations in that region. Less information is available in the United States concerning this theatre of operations than regarding other areas. Fewer people in or outside of positions of governmental authority are keenly interested in or well informed concerning this area. The O.S.S., therefore, seeks to increase the flow of information reaching it regarding the Southwest Pacific in order that it may more effectively perform its mission concerning the region. However, it is understood that any information sent to the O.S.S. from the Southwest Pacific Area would be dispatched by G.H.Q. and that G.H.Q. would exercise complete control in the matter.

9. However, objectively the O.S.S. may perform the functions assigned to it, the intelligence which it collects, analyzes, interprets and makes available to the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (and sometimes, upon their direction, to other war agencies), and its activities in the field of psychological warfare can scarcely fail to possess military significance. It follows that it is to the public advantage that the O.S.S. should perform its functions in the light of as complete knowledge of the facts concerning the Southwest Pacific Area as is possible, and with a sound understanding of their significance. Also justified seems to be the conclusion that the great interests of the United States in the Pacific would be served by strengthening the relations between the O.S.S. and the military headquarters chiefly charged with meeting American responsibilities in that part of the world. The services of the O.S.S. might be rendered either within the Southwest Pacific Area or in Washington, or both.

10. An additional consideration arises from the facts that a global war demands global intelligence and the O.S.S. is creating a worldwide intelligence organization. Information obtained in China or England may be of value in planning strategy or conducting operations in the Pacific, or vice versa. The facilitation by this G.H.Q. of the operations of the O.S.S. would enable the latter organization to be of greater service both with regard to this area and elsewhere.

11. It is hoped that closer working relations between this G.H.Q. and the O.S.S. would naturally develop from the project which has been suggested for O.S.S. participation in securing intelligence from the Netherlands Indies. Personalities are often determining factors in official relationships, including those of a military character. The personality and professional qualifications of Dr. Amory Vandenbosch leads the O.S.S. to believe that so far as it might turn upon him this particular project would be carried out without embarrassment or friction and that a more general relationship might grow out of it.

12. Other considerations might be mentioned in connection with Dr. Vandenbosch. The United States has very few citizens who are as well qualified as he is to aid in dealing with the problems arising out of American interests in the Netherlands Indies and the other Malayan areas. He was invited by the State Department to join the division which it has created to study post-war problems. The Board of Economic Warfare approached him with a view to adding

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temporary member of the staff of the Army's School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Virginia. Under his direction, the M.I.S. Strategic Study of the N.E.I. has been re-written. The Netherlands Indies is an area of great importance to the United States and will be so for a long time to come. It is to the national advantage that a man such as Dr. Vandenbosch should be kept abreast of the rapidly changing situation there, and there are no conditions under which this could better be done than in the position which it is suggested that he occupy in the Headquarters. Furthermore, it is probable that in certain respects Dr. Vandenbosch would establish a closer contact with the Chief Commissioner for the Netherlands Indies in Australia and New Zealand than any other available American could. Such a contact might prove of value to both the United States and the Netherlands. Finally, Dr. Vandenbosch is vitally concerned with this part of the world. It has been his chief professional pre-occupation for 20 years. He is alive to its immediate and ultimate importance to the United States. His judgment concerning matters connected with the Netherlands East Indies and the Western Pacific Area carries weight. It would seem to be worthwhile for G.H.Q. to make an effort to use such a man in a position where he might be of great value both with reference to operations in this Area and in Washington.

13. In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the proposal outlined in the fifth paragraph of this memorandum is suggested as a basis for discussion and is not regarded as an inflexible plan.

* * * *

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Enclosure A. Excerpts from a paraphrase of a message from Colonel William J. Donovan to J. R. Hayden dated February 8, 1943.

"The directive provides in general terms that we are to be in charge of the coordination, development and execution of the military program of psychological warfare to be integrated with military operations; and that intelligence for military operations is to be collected, analyzed and evaluated by us. We have additional authority to conduct analysis and research. A directive subsequently issues which approves and further implements the first directive interprets clearly our functions and duties, which, from an additional standpoint, include all those means, physical as well as moral, which would break the enemy's will.

I would like to have you make it clear to General MacArthur that it is not our wish to intrude upon him but that it is our only hope that this organization of ours can be useful to him; also, that it is recognized by us, of course, that any persons detailed there would be under his orders entirely.

The Chiefs of Staff are being advised of the messages between you and me. In the event General MacArthur should desire us to do something specific or should it be his wish to see some of our group first, request him to communicate with the Chiefs of Staff direct."

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Enclosure B. Brief statement regarding some of the facilities of the Office of Strategic Services.

1. Research and Analysis Branch. This branch is composed of more than 60 recognized authorities on the several world areas, with appropriate staff. It is organized in geographical sections and in divisions of geography, economics and psychology. The Research and Analysis Branch was worked closely with the M.I.S. and O.N.I. in revising the former's "Strategic Studies" and the latter's "Monographs" (formerly "Sailing Directions"). It has prepared special reports for the President, the Army, Navy, and other branches of the government. Some of these reports are believed to have been of value in connection with planning the general strategy of the war, and in planning and conducting military and naval operations. The Research and Analysis Branch supplies much of the knowledge upon which the participation of the O.S.S. in psychological warfare is based.

2. The Special Activities Branch. This branch is divided into two sections. One deals with intelligence, the other with subservice action. Each has developed a first rate school in its field and an efficient organization for conducting its field operations. Upon the theory that their functions are separate, the two branches are separately organized and staffed, their work being coordinated directly from Colonel Donovan's office. The S.I. School is operated by mixed personnel: Army, Navy, and civilian. Its courses have been developed with the cooperation of the U.S. services and the British intelligence organization, and are given with active Army and Navy cooperation. It is well equipped and it is believed that its training is a thorough and sound as that given in any similar school. Its indoctrination and training is particularly rigid.

3. The S.O. school is operated entirely by Army personnel. Its instruction is of a practical nature and covers every phase of training for subversive action of all types, from the school of the soldier for recruits to practice in landing through the surf and from planes. The work is so organized that almost any section of it can be given to persons who do not need or should not have other sections. Its section for instruction in radio and other means of communication is particularly strong.

4. The personnel of the Special Activities Branch includes a number of former State Department men of outstanding ability (Major David Bruce, Mr. Hugh Wilson and Mr. David Williamson, for example), men of wide experience in business and financial affairs, recognized authorities on the several world geographical areas, (returned business men, lawyers and others), and an important group of Army and Navy officers.

5. Radio communications. The work of the O.S.S. in designing and procuring specialized radio equipment and in training personnel in its use is directed by a vice-president of one of the great electrical equipment companies (a reserve commander in the Navy). Remarkable progress has been made in the development of highly specialized equipment for intelligence operations.

6. Working contact between the O.S.S. and the Army, Navy, State Department and Board of Economic Warfare is maintained by full-time representatives of these organizations who are members of Colonel Donovan's council, as well as through close relationships at lower levels. The O.S.S. maintains a number of foreign offices. Until his appointment at U.S. Commissioner in India, Mr. William Phillips was at the head of the London office. Mr. Whitney Shepardson and Mr. David Williamson are representatives of the Special Activities Branch in the London office. Mr. Allen Dulles is the head of the New York office of the O.S.S.

7. This enclosure [illegible] complete statement of the organization and facilities of the O.S.S., [illegible] those facts most likely to be of use in the consideration of [illegible] Commandant".

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April 15, 1943

From: J. R. Hayden

To: General Donovan

Subject: Memorandum on conferences in Brisbane with General MacArthur, General Willoughby and Colonel Merle-Smith regarding OSS operations in Southwest Pacific Area.

1. My first conference with General MacArthur occurred on Jan. 15. It began about 5:00 and lasted until 6:30 p.m. General MacArthur said that he had not understood that it was I that he had an appointment with and that he was delighted to see me.

2. As instructed, I presented the Southeast Mindanao plan to him. He immediately and definitely ruled it out of consideration, for the following reasons:

a. No white man could be landed in Mindanao, especially in the neighborhood of Davao, secure intelligence and live. The Japanese have at least a division in and around Davao. They had called their Davao subjects into active service, and they and their soldiers had drawn a practically impenetrable cordon around the Davao City area. The Japanese have also offered a reward for every American or hostile Filipino, dead or alive. The natives (apparently meaning both the pagans and the Christians) would be sure to turn any white man in.

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b. General MacArthur stated that he had Mindanao thoroughly covered with his own men. He is in constant touch with active guerilla groups. Has just sent in a party under Major Villamor, an able Filipino air officer who had distinguished himself for courage and resourcefulness in the Philippine fighting. This party had been training for months. They are going to contact others in the field and draw them together. Another party from an outside source would cause duplication and confusion.

c. General MacArthur's chief concern now is to restrain premature guerilla action. A lot of leaders have sprung up and were competing for power. General MacArthur does'nt know what some of them stand for. He does'nt want them to make so much trouble that the Japanese will wipe them out and kill a lot of other people. He does'nt want to put any white men in there until he can properly support them and get them out when the time comes.

d. General MacArthur reacted adversely to Fleischer's name. Stated that he had a distinct impression that Fleischer was "untrustworthy". I sought to check this opinion with [illegible] at Headquarters, but could discover

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no definite basis for it.

3. General MacArthur had made up his mind that he did not wish an OSS party to enter Mindanao at this time and it was obvious that any extended discussion of the subject would be unwelcome to him. I therefore stated that we were in a position to help the Dutch with reference to the Netherlands Indies, and said that we had already discussed the matter with them in Washington. General MacArthur replied: "Tell Bill that anything he can do to help the Dutch get information out of the Indies and inspire them to action will be welcome. We are'nt getting much of anything from there and need information badly. We will welcome and facilitate anything that he can do to help the Dutch." It was then suggested that I had better discuss the matter in detail with G-2. General Willoughby came in and arrangements were made for me to talk with him and Colonel Merle-Smith the following morning.

4. In discussing the Southeast Mindanao plan I mentioned submarine transportation and said that I understood that the Navy was ready to furnish it. This statement was like a match to a powder keg. General MacArthur said that the Navy was ready to use "MY" submarines any way they wished, instead of as he decided. He said that the Navy had run away and left him in the Philippines

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and that the whole story would have been different had they attacked the Japanese invasion force, as they could have done. He also said that the Navy could not be depended upon,-that they would take our people out and then leave them in the lurch when the picking-up time came. Later, General Willoughby told me that the C-in-C was seeking to secure a number of submarines that were outmoded for combat service, but which could be used in intelligence operations.

5. On the following day, February 16, I had a conference with General Willoughby and Colonel Merle-Smith (the greater part with Merle-Smith alone) which lasted for three hours. The details of possible OSS operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, and of the proposed operation with the Dutch, were discussed at length. The mission, organization, and capabilities of the OSS were explained. In the end the message sent by me to Colonel Donovan on January 16 was drafted jointly by Colonel Merle-Smith and myself. The substance of the despatch was that the Philippine project was "out" for the present, but that, with the understanding that the project and all OSS personnel involved in it within the Area should be under the direction of General

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MacArthur's Headquarters, a valuable work might be accomplished with the Dutch. The despatch requested authority to discuss this subject with G.H.Q.

6. While awaiting a reply to this message I continued informal discussions with General Willoughby and Colonel Merle-Smith. Occasions for these discussions arose naturally out of conferences with them regarding Philippine intelligence problems and problems of psychological warfare in the Far East. Colonel Merle-Smith was averse to my talking with Dr. van der Plas, but after consultation with General Sutherland finally agreed that I might do so,"at my own risk." He believed that the Dutch were having serious internal difficulties which could not be settled until after the arrival of Admiral Helferich and felt that discussions with Dr. van der Plas at this time would be premature. Particularly, he feared that the Dutch would view with suspicion any aid proffered by the OSS and that such suspicion might cloud subsequent relations between GHQ and the Dutch.

7. Immediately after this stage of my discussions with GHQ was reached I received Colonel Donovan's despatch dated Jan. 22, directing me defer further discussion until receipt of further instructions. These instructions were received on

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February 9. Meanwhile I had completed a memorandum based upon the questioning of a party which had arrived in Australia from Mindanao and Sulu. The memorandum gave a digest and evaluation of the information received from this party and outlined in some detail an intelligence operation based upon it. During this period I conferred with General Willoughby and Colonel Merle-Smith upon other matters, and did a good deal of work in the Philippine Section of the Inter-Allied Intelligence Bureau of GHQ.

8. Immediately after the receipt of Colonel Donovan's message dated Feb. 8, 1943. it was agreed with Colonel Merle-Smith that I should prepare a memorandum or aide memoire of Staff, to be used by him and the Chief as a basis for further discussions. Colonel Merle-Smith said that he was anxious to get a decision on the whole matter but that the Chief of Staff was so busy that he did'nt know when he could get to it. A draft of this memorandum was handed to Colonel Merle-Smith on Feb. 14. He said that he would let me know when he had read it, and that if I did not hear from him I might call him or his assistant, Captain McVittey.

9. On Feb. 15 I had a conference with General MacArthur which lasted from 11:45 to 1:30. After a pre-

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liminary conversation which largely concerned press reports that a meeting was about to occur between Generals MacArthur and Wavell, I recalled our earlier discussion regarding aid to the Dutch in Australia. General MacArthur inquired what progress had been made with G-2 and how they felt about the project. I replied that that they seemed to feel that we should not enter the Southwest Pacific Area and did not believe that I should discuss the subject with Dr. van der Plas. He inquired why they so felt. I replied that they seemed to fear complications from the entry of another organization into the Area; to be afraid that wires might become crossed if I talked with van der Plas; and to believe that there was nothing that the OSS could do for the Dutch that they could not do for themselves.

I then read the following paragraphs from Colonel Donovan's message dated Feb. 8 to General Mac Arthur:

"I would like to have you make it clear to General MacArthur that it is not our wish to intrude upon him but that it is our only hope that this organization of ours can be useful to him; also that it is recognized by us, of course, that any persons detailed there would be under his orders entirely.

"It is my belief that there has been forwarded

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to the General a plan involving an area best known to you.

"The Chiefs of Staff are being advised of the messages between you and me. In the event that General MacArthur should desire us to do something specific or should it be his wish to see some of our group first, request him to communicate with the Chiefs of Staff direct."

General MacArthur said to tell Colonel Donovan that he had absolutely no feeling about his "intruding" into his area. That was'nt it at all. That so far as the Dutch were concerned, he had'nt been able to get any information out of the Indies and that information from there was "precious." If we could help to get it in any way he wanted us to do so. He had no objections whatever to the Donovan organization coming into this area. It could'nt make trouble because he controlled whatever came in.

General MacArthur further said that he could'nt believe that Willoughby and Merle-Smith were afraid that I would "cross any wires" and that he saw no reason why I should'nt talk with van der Plas. He had talked with van der Plas when the latter was in Brisbane and had recently written him. Van der Plas, he said, is able and active. Recently General MacArthur had suggested that the Dutch move certain people out of some of their

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ports lest the Japanese capture them. Van der Plas had acted instantly.

Dr. van der Plas, General MacArthur said, was "part native," like Quezon and other Filipinos. He knew that type thoroughly and ~~that~~ when he had met van der Plas he had at once made up his mind to put his cards on the table when dealing with him. His kind were born intriguers and no Westerner could fail to lose by trying to play their game with them. General MacArthur added that he did'nt know what van der Plas was doing in this matter, or whether he was doing anything. The Dutch had personnel whom they wished to use, but no equipment.

I recalled to the General that the Dutch had already discussed training and equipment; and that I had discussed the matter with van der Plas himself in Washington and that he had since conferred with Colonel Donovan on the subject. I also informed him that Indonesian personnel by arrangement with the Dutch in London and Washington was already in training in the United States.

General MacArthur was also informed that I had breakfasted and had a long conversation with Dr. Van der Plas, but that in deference to the Wishes of Colonel Merle-Smith I had not discussed the OSS project with him. I also said that I feared that unless someone here took up with

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him the question of our collaboration, arrangements might reach the point at which it would be difficult to bring us in. General MacArthur replied that he could'nt see why I should not talk with van der Plas and that he would discuss the matter with Willoughby and Merle-Smith and let me know.

10. On the following morning, by request, I conferred with General Willoughby and Colonel Merle-Smith in the latter's office. The latter said that between the time that the C-in-C had talked with me on the preceding day (between 12:30 and a considerable time before 4:00) he had thought the matter over and had changed his mind about some of the things that he had said to me. He said that the General had already made up his mind before he and Willoughby had gone in, and that they were glad that I had talked to the C-in-C because the results showed that independently the latter had reached the same decisions that they had. These decisions, he said, MacArthur had asked Willoughby and himself to communicate to me, emphasizing that they were not for all time, but that for the moment the matter was settled and that General MacArthur did not wish to take it up again.

General Willoughby and Colonel Merle-Smith then

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informed me of what the C-in-C's decisions had been, referring to an aide memoire of their conference with him and afterwards giving it to me to read. In substance, General MacArthur's decisions were as follows:

a. That it would not be advisable for the OSS to enter the SWP Area at the present time, (1) because of the complications and possible difficulties which might arise from the entrance of an agency outside of the military forces; (2) because the OSS at present could not do anything for the Dutch which could not be as well done by GHQ; (3) that at some future time GHQ might be glad to use the personnel and some of the facilities of the OSS and if so General MacArthur would ask for them. These statements were written down from memory immediately after the interview, and I believe that they are correct in substance. In substance they are 100 per cent different from [redacted] what General MacArthur had said to me during our two conferences, and in verbiage and substance are what General Willoughby and Colonel Merle-Smith had said during our many discussions of the subject.

b. Regarding the Sulu project, General MacArthur had read my memo and had decided against it for the time being. This project will be discussed below.

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11. Colonel Merle-Smith said that the C-in-C had told General Willoughby and himself that ordinarily he did'nt approve of by-passing his staff, but that he had talked with me because he had known me for a long time and because of our friendly personal relations. I explained to them that there had not been the slightest intention of by-passing the staff and explained the specific reasons which had led me to go to General MacArthur at that time. They stated that they had no feeling in the matter, and understood my position perfectly. Further, they said that they greatly appreciated the work that I had done for G-2 while in Brisbane. They then went into the old arguments why it would'nt do to bring in the OSS at the moment. I said that the decision having been made there was nothing more that could profitably be said, except that I was sure that Colonel Donovan would appreciate the careful consideration that had been given to the question of OSS participation in the SWP Area and their courtesy to me.

12. During this phase of the conversation two matters were brought up by General Willoughby which might be mentioned as of possible interest.

a. General Willoughby said that it was all right to agree that the representatives of another

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agency operating with the SWP Area were under MacArthur's orders, but that the experience of ~~MX~~ GHQ was that the representatives of such an agency often did as they pleased and then it was too late. Colonel Merle-Smith said that with a certain British agency there had been great difficulty and that it had gone almost to the point of insubordination. He added that "outside" agencies were a terribly "sore point around here right now."

b. General Willoughby also asked in a pointed manner, whether formerly the OSS had not had some people in North Africa, and how had things gone there. Further, he said that Colonel Clear had given the Donovan organization a bad name throughout the Far East.

13. During the discussion I asked if I might not have a copy of the aide memoir which has been mentioned. Colonel Merle-Smith said no, that it had been prepared for their own use. I then suggested that perhaps the C-in-C might wish to write a brief note to Colonel Donovan, stating the decisions made; or that General Willoughby might wish to give me a brief memo on the subject. They said no, that they were sure that I could convey what was in their minds; and that Colonel Donovan had not written to General MacArthur. After Colonel Merle-Smith had left General Willoughby very confidentially intimated that

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if might be a good thing if Colonel Donovan would write to the C-in-C.

14. The S.I. operation in the Sulu Archipelago which was referred to in paragraph seven above was an exposition of the existing situation in Sulu based upon information obtained from a small party which had recently arrived in Australia from Mindanao and Sulu, and upon other information in G-2's files, and of a plan for an S.I. operation in that area. In my last conversation with General MacArthur I explained this plan to him and stated that I believed myself to be better qualified then anyone else available to head an operation in Sulu. The General evinced enthusiastic interest in the project and I felt at the time that there was an excellent chance of his accepting it. On the following day, though, the decision as stated in the aide memoire was negative, for the moment. The reasons given were: a) The time was premature; the General did not wish to arouse false hopes when for a long time he might not be able to justify them; b) the expedition would be too dangerous to risk me on,-would be too valuable later when a bridgehead had been established and I could go in on a submarine and taken out on one after a conference with leaders already assembled.

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15. Attached to this memorandum is a copy of the rough memorandum prepared for Colonel Merle-Smith referred to in paragraph eight, above. On Colonel Merle-Smith's copy of the memorandum I observed that the following notation had been made opposite paragraph two of the "Summary and Request:" "The Dutch have not asked for this assistance" (of the CSS). The notation suggests that consideration might be given to a request for CSS assistance made by the Dutch to General MacArthur.

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SECRET

SUMMARY AND REQUEST

1. Paragraphs 1-4 of this memorandum set forth basic facts regarding the O.S.S., explain the mission of the representative of the Director of Strategic Services, and contain a statement regarding discussions which have occurred between that representative and General MacArthur and G-2 of G.H.Q., Southwest Pacific Area.

2. Paragraphs 5-6 set forth a plan for implementing the proposal that the specialized intelligence facilities of the Office of Strategic Services should be made available to the representatives of the Netherlands Government in Australia for use in connection with their intelligence activities in the Netherlands East Indies. The essential elements of the plan are:

a. After preliminary discussion of the proposal between G.H.Q., the appropriate Dutch authorities, and the representative of the O.S.S. the latter shall proceed to Washington for conference with Colonel Donovan.

b. Dr. Hayden, or some other representative of the Director of Strategic Services shall return to G.H.Q. accompanied by Dr. Amry Vandenbosch, a member of the O.S.S. who is highly qualified to deal with problems regarding the Netherlands East Indies, and who is well known to Dr. C. O. Van der Plas.

c. At a time deemed expedient by G.H.Q., discussions are to be held for the purpose of ascertaining in detail what assistance, if any, can be rendered to the Dutch by the O.S.S.; and for determining the administrative arrangements in accordance with which any plan agreed upon should be carried out. It would be understood that Dr. Vandenbosch and any other members of the O.S.S. who might be stationed in the Southwest Pacific Area would be under the exclusive direction and control of G.H.Q. Upon the completion of the arrangements mentioned a decision would be reached as to whether the representative of the Director of Strategic Services who accompanied Dr. Vandenbosch to Australia would remain or would return to Washington.

d. If Dr. Vandenbosch were to be assigned by G.H.Q. as an intelligence liaison officer with the Dutch, he might also constitute a connecting link between G.H.Q. and the O.S.S. Some of the services Dr. Vandenbosch might be expected to perform are briefly suggested in paragraph five.

3. Paragraphs 7-12 of the memorandum deal with the broader problem of seeking to establish a useful working relationship between this G.H.Q. and the O.S.S. Reasons are given for the belief that such a relationship would aid the O.S.S. in performing effectively the functions assigned to it, be of advantage to G.H.Q., and further the great interests of the United States in the Pacific Area. Paragraph 13 is a brief conclusion emphasizing that this memorandum is intended as a basis for discussion rather than as presenting an inflexible plan.

4. It is requested that the representative of the O.S.S. be given the privilege of discussing the subject further with the appropriate authority in G.H.Q. with a view to reaching a decision or to determining what further steps might be taken to advance the matter towards a decision. Such a step might be the reference by G.H.Q. of a tentative plan of action to the U. S. Chiefs of Staff. Such a course is suggested by the following paragraph from the message from Colonel Donovan referred to in paragraph two, above:

"The Chiefs of Staff are being advised of the messages between you and me. In the event General MacArthur should desire us to do something specific or should it be his wish to see some of our

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February 21st, 1943.

MEMORANDUM from Joseph R. Hayden, a representative of Colonel W. J. Donovan, Director of Strategic Services, to Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, Assistant G-2, Southwest Pacific Area, upon a proposal to establish a working relationship between G.H.Q., Southwest Pacific Area and the Office of Strategic Services.

* * * * * *

1. The Office of Strategic Services was established by a Military Order of the Commander-in-Chief (the President) dated June 13, 1942. The order provides, in part, that the Office of Strategic Services shall be under the jurisdiction of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and shall, "(a) Collect and analyze such strategic information as may be required by the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and (b) Plan and operate such special services as may be directed by the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff." The first general directive of the Jointed Chiefs of Staff to the O. S. S. provided that the latter organization should undertake no activities within any theatre of operations without the approval of the theatre commander, and that any O.S.S. personnel operating within a given theatre of operations should be subject to the direction and control of the commander thereof. Subsequently, additional general directives were issued which in general terms provide that the O.S.S. is to be in charge of the co-ordination, development and execution of the military program of psychological warfare to be integrated with military operations; and that intelligence for military operations is to be collected, analyzed and evaluated by the O.S.S. The O.S.S. possesses additional authority to conduct analysis and research of a more general character.

2. The representative of the Director of Strategic Services was requested by Colonel Donovan to ascertain whether the O.S.S. could perform any useful services within the Southwest Pacific Area. In a message dated February 8, 1943 (Enclosure "A") Colonel Donovan states: "I would like to have you make it clear to General MacArthur that it is not our wish to intrude upon him, but that it is our only hope that this organization of ours may be useful to him; also that it is recognized, of course, that any persons detailed there would be under his orders entirely."

3. On January 15th, General MacArthur stated to the representative of the Director of Strategic Services that he would welcome any assistance that the O.S.S. might give to the representatives of the Netherlands Government in Australia in securing intelligence from the Netherlands Indies. This memorandum discusses, (a) the implementation of this proposal, informally approved in principle by General MacArthur; and (b) the related question of establishing a working relationship between this G.H.Q. and the O.S.S. which might be of value to the former and enable the latter to perform more effectively the missions assigned to it by the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. The conditions under which the O.S.S. might render assistance to the Dutch in connection with intelligence work in the Indies, and the more general problems which would be involved in stationing a member of the O.S.S. within the Southwest Pacific Area have been discussed by the representative of the Director of Strategic Services and G-2. The most serious of these problems seem to be connected with the injection of an additional agency (the O.S.S.) into this theatre of operations. Among them are difficulties which might be caused by :

a. The overlapping or incongruity of functions.
b. Divided loyalty on the part of the members of the O.S.S. stationed within the Area.
c. Administrative difficulties arising out of the relationship between the local members of the O.SS. with that organization, [illegible] and G.H.Q. on the other

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5. Any project for using the facilities of the O.S.S. for increasing, improving, or utilizing more effectively (here or in Washington) intelligence from the Netherlands East Indies should seek to avoid the possible difficulties mentioned in paragraph "4". With this principle in mind, it is suggested that the following steps be taken to implement the proposal that the O.S.S. make its facilities available to the Dutch :

a. At the proper time, G.H.Q. shall inform the appropriate Dutch Authorities, (a) that through G.H.Q. the specialized intelligence material, training and other facilities, and personnel of the O.S.S. will be made available to them, insofar as they care to use them; and (b) that if they are interested in the proposal, Dr. J. R. Hayden of the O.S.S. will be available to discuss the proposal with them informally.

b. If the Dutch Authorities express an interest in the proposal, Dr. Hayden and whomever they may designate shall have a preliminary discussion of the subject. Dr. Hayden shall then proceed to Washington to report to the Director of Strategic Services.

c. As soon as is practicable, Dr. Hayden, or another representative of the Director of Strategic Services, shall return to G.H.Q., accompanied by Dr. Amry Vandenbosch. Dr. Vandenbosch is one of the foremost American authorities on the Netherlands East Indies. He has been on the staff of the O.S.S. since September 1941, has worked very closely with the Netherlands representatives in Washington, and stands high in the esteem of Dr. Ch. O. Van der Plas, Chief Commissioner for the Netherlands Indies in Australia and New Zealand. Dr. Vandenbosch is about 40 years of age and is Chairman of the Department of Political Science in the University of Kentucky. He is of Dutch descent, but is a second or third generation American citizen.

d. After the arrival of the representative of the Director of Strategic Services and Dr. Vandenbosch at G.H.Q. discussions shall be held to ascertain in detail what assistance, if any, the O.S.S. may render the Dutch; and if assistance is to be given the necessary administrative arrangements shall be made. It would be understood that such arrangements might be altered at any time in the discretion of G.H.Q.; and be further understood that Dr. Vandenbosch and any other members of the O.S.S. who might be detailed to this theatre of command would be exclusively subject to the orders of G.H.Q.

e. The functions of Dr. Vandenbosch would of necessity depend in large degree upon the nature of the assistance to be rendered the Dutch and their desires in the matter. In general, however, it is suggested that he might be assigned by G.H.Q. as a liaison officer with the Dutch to work as closely with them as they desired in connection with Netherlands East Indies intelligence. It is believed that in this capacity he might usefully supplement the work of any other liaison officer whom G.H.Q. might assign for the same general purpose. Specifically, (a) his knowledge of the O.S.S. would enable him to be of service to both the Dutch and G.H.Q. in connection with any assistance which the O.S.S. might render or which it might be proposed that it should render to the Dutch; (b) his knowledge of the Indies and his demonstrated compatibility with the Dutch might be expected to enable him to gain the close confidence of the Netherlands representatives in Australia, especially of Dr. Van der Plas; (c) he would be in a position to consult both with the Dutch and G.H.Q. regarding efforts to procure and utilize effectively intelligence not of immediate operational value, but of broad strategic, economic or political significance, type of intelligence which are greatly desired in Washington; (d) his aid to G.H.Q. in the evaluation of intelligence from the Indies probably would be of value.

f. It is believed that the execution of a plan developed along the lines suggested would reduce to a minimum the difficulties which might result from an effort to determine whether the O.S.S. can aid in acquiring and utilizing intelligence from the Netherlands East Indies. If upon completion of the proposal by the procedure outlined the project should be found to be impracticable, it could be dropped forthwith. If a plan for aiding the Dutch were put into operation, it could be modified or terminated at a later date should the parties concerned so desire. The proposal set forth in paragraph "5" is intended to afford a definite basis for discussion only

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7. Related to the foregoing proposal that steps be taken to ascertain whether the special resources of the O.S.S. cannot be utilized in connection with Intelligence operations in the Netherlands Indies is the broader question of establishing a useful working relationship between G.H.Q. in the Southwest Pacific Area and the O.S.S. Colonel Donovan has asked that it be made clear to General MacArthur that the O.S.S. does not wish to intrude upon him. The writer of this memorandum feels that General MacArthur will not regard the matter as one of "intrusion", and will welcome a statement of a number of the factors which might properly be considered in reaching a decision upon an important matter of policy.

8. One of those factors is that the O.S.S. cannot perform with full effectiveness some of the functions assigned to it without regular and prompt access to the widest range of intelligence that is compatible with security. This statement is particularly true of its functions in connection with the military program of psychological warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area; and in the collection, analysis and evaluation of intelligence for military operations in that region. Less information is available in the United States concerning this theatre of operations than regarding other areas. Fewer people in or outside of positions of governmental authority are keenly interested in or well informed concerning this area. The O.S.S., therefore, seeks to increase the flow of information reaching it regarding the Southwest Pacific in order that it may more effectively perform its mission concerning the region. However, it is understood that any information sent to the O.S.S. from the Southwest Pacific Area would be dispatched by G.H.Q. and that G.H.Q. would exercise complete control in the matter.

9. However, objectively the O.S.S. may perform the functions assigned to it, the intelligence which it collects, analyzes, interprets and makes available to the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (and sometimes, upon their direction, to other war agencies), and its activities in the field of psychological warfare can scarcely fail to possess military significance. It follows that it is to the public advantage that the O.S.S. should perform its functions in the light of as complete knowledge of the facts concerning the Southwest Pacific Area as is possible, and with a sound understanding of their significance. Also justified seems to be the conclusion that the great interests of the United States in the Pacific would be served by strengthening the relations between the O.S.S. and the military headquarters chiefly charged with meeting American responsibilities in that part of the world. The services of the O.S.S. might be rendered either within the Southwest Pacific Area or in Washington, or both.

10. An additional consideration arises from the facts that a global war demands global intelligence and the O.S.S. is creating a world-wide intelligence organization. Information obtained in China or England may be of value in planning strategy or conducting operations in the Pacific, or vice versa. The facilitation by this G.H.Q. of the operations of the O.S.S. would enable the latter organization to be of greater service both with regard to this area and elsewhere.

11. It is hoped that closer working relations between this G.H.Q. and the O.S.S. would naturally develop from the project which has been suggested for O.S.S. participation in securing intelligence from the Netherlands Indies. Personalities are often determining factors in official relationships, including those of a military character. The personality and professional qualifications of Dr. Amory Vandenbosch leads the O.S.S. to believe that so far as it might turn upon him this particular project would be carried out without embarrassment or friction and that a more general relationship might grow out of it.

12. Other considerations might be mentioned in connection with Dr. Vandenbosch. The United States has very few citizens who are as well qualified as he is to aid in dealing with the problems arising out of American interests in the Netherlands Indies and the other Malayan areas. He was invited by the State Department to join the division which it has created to study post-war problems. The Board of Economic Warfare approached him with a view to adding him to their staff, and has [illegible]

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temporary member of the staff of the Army's School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Virginia. Under his direction, the M.I.3. Strategic Study of the N.E.I. has been re-written. The Netherlands Indies is an area of great importance to the United States and will be so for a long time to come. It is to the national advantage that a man such as Dr. Vandenbosch should be kept abreast of the rapidly changing situation there, and there are no conditions under which this could better be done than in the position which it is suggested that he occupy in the Headquarters. Furthermore, it is probable that in certain respects Dr. Vandenbosch would establish a closer contact with the Chief Commissioner for the Netherlands Indies in Australia and New Zealand than any other available American could. Such a contact might prove of value to both the United States and the Netherlands. Finally, Dr. Vandenbosch is vitally concerned with this part of the world. It has been his chief professional pre-occupation for 20 years. He is alive to its immediate and ultimate importance to the United States. His judgment concerning matters connected with the Netherlands East Indies and the Western Pacific Area carries weight. It would seem to be worthwhile for G.H.Q. to make an effort to use such a man in a position where he might be of great value both with reference to operations in this Area and in Washington.

13. In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the proposal outlined in the fifth paragraph of this memorandum is suggested as a basis for discussion only and is not regarded as an inflexible plan.

* * * *

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Enclosure A. Excerpts from a paraphrase of a message from Colonel William J. Donovan to J. R. Haydon dated February 8, 1943.

"The directive provides in general terms that we are to be in charge of the coordination, development and execution of the military program of psychological warfare to be integrated with military operations; and that intelligence for military operations is to be collected, analyzed and evaluated by us. We have additional authority to conduct analysis and research. A directive subsequently issues which approves and further implements the first directive interprets clearly our functions and duties, which, from an additional standpoint, include all those means, physical as well as moral, which would break the enemy's will.

I would like to have you make it clear to General MacArthur that it is not our wish to intrude upon him but that it is our only hope that this organization of ours can be useful to him; also, that it is recognized by us, of course, that any persons detailed there would be under his orders entirely.

The Chiefs of Staff are being advised of the messages between you and me. In the event General MacArthur should desire us to do something specific or should it be his wish to see some of our group first, request him to communicate with the Chiefs of Staff direct."

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Enclosure B. Brief statement regarding some of the facilities of the Office of Strategic Services.

1. Research and Analysis Branch. This branch is composed of more than 60 recognized authorities on the several world areas, with appropriate staff. It is organized in geographical sections and in divisions of geography, economics and psychology. The Research and Analysis Branch was worked closely with the M.I.S. and O.N.I. in revising the former's "Strategic Studies" and the latter's "Monographs" (formerly "Sailing Directions"). It has prepared special reports for the President, the Army, Navy, and other branches of the government. Some of these reports are believed to have been of value in connection with planning the general strategy of the war, and in planning and conducting military and naval operations. The Research and Analysis Branch supplies much of the knowledge upon which the participation of the O.S.S. in psychological warfare is based.

2. The Special Activities Branch. This branch is divided into two sections. One deals with intelligence, the other with subservice action. Each has developed a first rate school in its field and an efficient organization for conducting its field operations. Upon the theory that their functions are separate, the two branches are separately organized and staffed, their work being coordinated directly from Colonel Donovan's office. The S.I. School is operated by mixed personnel: Army, Navy, and civilian. Its courses have been developed with the cooperation of the U.S. services and the British intelligence organization, and are given with active Army and Navy cooperation. It is well equipped and it is believed that its training is a thorough and sound as that given in any similar school. Its indoctrination and training is particularly rigid.

3. The S.O. school is operated entirely by Army personnel. Its instruction is of a practical nature and covers every phase of training for subversive action of all types, from the school of the soldier for recruits to practice in landing through the surf and from planes. The work is so organized that almost any section of it can be given to persons who do not need or should not have other sections. Its section for instruction in radio and other means of communication is particularly strong.

4. The personnel of the Special Activities Branch includes a number of former State Department men of outstanding ability (Major David Bruce, Mr. Hugh Wilson and Mr. David Williamson, for example), men of wide experience in business and financial affairs, recognized authorities on the several world geographical areas, (returned business men, lawyers and others), and an important group of Army and Navy officers.

5. Radio communications. The work of the O.S.S. in designing and procuring specialized radio equipment and in training personnel in its use is directed by a vice-president of one of the great electrical equipment companies (a reserve commander in the Navy). Remarkable progress has been made in the development of highly specialized equipment for intelligence operations.

6. Working contact between the O.S.S. and the Army, Navy, State Department and Board of Economic Warfare is maintained by full-time representatives of those organizations who are members of Colonel Donovan's council, as well as through close relationships at lower levels. The O.S.S. maintains a number of foreign offices. Until his appointment at U.S. Commissioner in India, Mr. William Phillips was at the head of the London office. Mr. [illegible] Shepardson and Mr. David Williamson are representatives of the Special Activities Branch in the London office. Mr. Allen Dulles is the head of the New York office of the O.S.S.

7. This enclosure is not a complete statement of the organization and facilities of the O.S.S., but mentions those facts most likely to be of use in the consideration of this memorandum".

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Hayden
Jan 1813

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: WILLIAM A. KIMBEL DATE: SEPTEMBER 21 1942

TO: COLONEL DONOVAN

SUBJECT:

The State Department expressed its regret concerning a delay in transmitting the following cable: Donovan from Hayden, sent September 12th from New Delhi, received at State September 13th. My paraphrase of this cable reads as follows:

"RECEIVED GALE CABLE. AM GOING FORWARD TOMORROW WITHOUT STOPPING AT CALCUTTA."

W. A. K.

cc: Message Center

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Copies have been sent to:

Mr. Opsata
Mr. Stacy
Dr. Langer
Mr. Woodring

JJK

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ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Hayden 7812
& Morris
per vehicle

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
FA 103.91802/758

September 12. 1942

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Director of the Office of Strategic Services and acknowledges the receipt of a letter of August 20, 1942 concerning the sending of Mr. Joseph R. Hayden, member of the Board of Analysts, to Chungking, China, to assist in conducting the activities of the Office of Strategic Services there.

The Department of State is pleased to advise that the American Embassy at Chungking has been authorized to honor vouchers covering payments due Mr. Hayden from the Office of Strategic Services provided they are approved by Mr. Clyde Sargent in his capacity as authorized certifying officer of the Office of Strategic Services. Such payments will be charged in the regular accounts of the Embassy for reimbursement by the Office of Strategic Services upon the presentation of appropriate adjustment vouchers by the Department of State.

The Embassy has been advised that salary payments made to Mr. Hayden at Chungking will be at the rate of $150 per month without retirement deductions, commencing September 1.

FOR VICTORY
BUY
UNITED STATES DEFENSE BONDS AND STAMPS

Hall

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Hayden 7813
x Mission
x China

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

August 20, 1942.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director,
Office of Strategic Services:

Subject: Dragon Plan.

On July 23, 1942, the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff informed the American Mission in China that the Office of Strategic Services was sending Dr. Joseph R. Hayden to China to outline the above plan personally to General Stilwell. Apparently Dr. Hayden has not yet left the United States. Since implementation of the Dragon Plan depends upon General Stilwell's recommendation, it is desired by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff that Dr. Hayden proceed to China as soon as possible, and this is your authority to make the necessary arrangements.

W. B. SMITH,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Secretary.

SECRET

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X M635 e02
China

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

August 20, 1942

Honorable G. Howland Shaw
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Shaw:

This office is dispatching Joseph R. Hayden, Member of the Board of Analysts, to Chungking, China to assist in conducting the activities of the Office of Strategic Services at that location.

Mr. Hayden will be paid a salary of $6,000 per annum and it is requested that $150 per month of his salary be paid to him through the American Embassy at Chungking, China. The payment of the $150 per month should become effective as of September 1, 1942. The remainder of Mr. Hayden's salary will be paid by the Office of Strategic Services in Washington, D. C. The retirement deduction of five percent will be effected in Washington by this office.

In addition to his salary, Mr. Hayden will be allowed traveling expenses as follows:

$5 within the continental limits of the United States
$7 outside the continental limits of the United States
$3 aboard ship where meals are included in the cost of transportation

For your information a copy of Travel Order No. 393-42 outlining the conditions of Mr. Hayden's travel is attached.

The $150 per month of Mr. Hayden's salary, which is to be paid to him through the State Department's facilities at Chungking, China, and the amounts due him for reimbursement for travel expenses may be paid by the Embassy at Chungking upon the presentation of vouchers certified by either Clyde Sargent or John K. Fairbank. These individuals are headed as certifying officers and accordingly are authorized to present vouchers to disbursing officers for payment.

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The Office of Strategic Services will reimburse the Department of State for all payments made on behalf of Joseph E. Hayden in connection with his activities at Chungking, China.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

Attachment

KEWoodring:mab

cc Mr. Opsata
Mr. Barnes
Mr. Stacy
Dr. Langer

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Hayden 7813
Mission
China

August 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Dr. Joseph R. Hayden, Member of the Board of Analysts

SUBJECT: Mission In China

In pursuance of arrangements made with the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff I have designated you as my representative for the purpose of conferring with the Commanding General, United States Forces in China, upon the subject of a certain project now pending before the Joint Intelligence Committee and the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

You are instructed to proceed to China to report to the Commanding General, United States Forces in China, and to carry out the mission mentioned above. You are also instructed to report, if possible, to all other theater commanders located in areas through which you may pass.

In addition you are instructed, so far as may be compatible with the above mission, to obtain in China and in India, while en route to and from China such information as may promote the fulfillment of your duties as a member of the Board of analysts in the Office of Strategic Services.

Your travel orders from Washington to Chungking and return have been provided separately. Any travel in China or India which may be essential to the fulfillment of these orders is hereby authorized.

William J. Donovan
Director

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Hayden 78/3
x Mission
x China

August 19, 1942

Lieutenant General Joseph A. Stilwell
Commanding General, United States
forces in China
Chungking, China

My dear General Stilwell:

This letter will introduce Dr. Joseph R. Hayden, a member of the Board of Analysts in the Office of Strategic Services, whom I have designated as my representative to confer with you regarding the proposal which is the subject of the attached letter and the cable previously sent you by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have confidence in Dr. Hayden's judgment in matters concerning the Far East. He has had an extended first-hand experience with the affairs of that area, and during 1933-35 served with success as Vice-Governor and Acting Governor-General of the Philippine Islands.

In accordance with instructions from the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have requested Dr. Hayden to explain to you the details of this project as it has been approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee, subject to your acceptance of it. I have instructed Dr. Hayden to make it clear to you that in this proposal our purpose is to serve your intelligence needs as well as those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Whatever modification of the plan as we have conceived it, may in your judgment be desirable will be made. If you approve the initiation of the project it will be executed under your control, to the end that your operations may be facilitated and that you may not

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be embarrassed by our activities within the area of your command. I am confident that the potentialities of this project warrent your according Dr. Hayden full opportunity to present this plan to you and to discuss it with any of the officers of your staff whom you may designate for this purpose.

I have followed with the keenest interest your operations during the past months. The courage and tenacity with which you have carried on under adverse conditions have thrilled the American people. Our soldiers have always responded to such leadership. I would regard it as an honor to make any contribution, however small, to the work which you are doing.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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I have followed with the keenest interest your operations during the past months. The courage and tenacity with which you have carried on under adverse conditions have thrilled the American people. Our soldiers have always responded to such leadership. I would regard it as an honor to make any contribution, however small, to the work which you are doing.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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~~I have confidence in Dr. Hayden's judgment~~

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Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, U.S. Army
Commanding General, etc.
Chungking, China.

My dear General S—

This letter will introduce Dr. Joseph R. Hayden, a member of the Board of Analysts in the Office of Strategic Services, whom I have designated as my representative to confer with you regarding the proposal which is the subject of the attached letter, ~~and the~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff~~. In accordance with instructions from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have requested Dr. Hayden to explain to you the details of this project ~~[illegible]~~ as it has been approved by the Joint Ext. Committee ~~Chiefs of Staff~~, subject to your acceptance of it. I have instructed Dr. Hayden to make it clear to you that in this ~~[illegible]~~ proposal ~~[illegible]~~ our purpose is to serve your intelligence needs as well as ~~and~~ those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Whatever modifications of the plan as we have conceived it, may in your judgment be desirable will be made ~~and~~ if you approve the initiation of the project and will be executed under your control, to the end that your operations may be facilitated and that you may not be embarrassed by ~~the activities~~ ~~[illegible]~~ our activities within the area of your command. I am confident that the potentiality of this project will warrant your according ~~you will agree~~ Dr. Hayden full opportunity to present this plan to you and to discuss it with any of the officers ~~whom~~ of your staff whom you may desequate for this purpose.

Cable previously sent you by the Sec of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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~~I have~~

~~In common with all other Americans~~ I have followed with the keenest interest your operations ~~in the~~ during the past months. ~~[illegible]~~ ~~which~~ ~~and [illegible]~~ courage and tenacity with which you have ~~[illegible]~~ carried on under adverse conditions have thrilled the American people. ~~Under such leadership American soldiers [illegible]~~ Our soldiers have always responded to such leadership. ~~[illegible]~~ I would regard it as an honor to ~~make~~ make any contribution, however small, to the work which you are doing.

Very truly yours

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Hayden 7813
x Mission
x China

By Hand

August 19, 1942

Brigadier General St. Clair Streett
War Department
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Streett:

In June of this year a plan was submitted by this office to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for obtaining intelligence from Japan and Japanese-occupied territories. On June 16 (JIC 23/1) the plan was referred by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Joint Intelligence Committee for comment and recommendation. The Joint Intelligence Committee recommended that the plan be approved in principle, and that it be subject to the approval and subsequent coordination of the Commanding General, United States Forces in China and to the acquiescence of the Generalissimo to be obtained by him. It was also recommended that a representative of the Office of Strategic Services be sent to explain the project to General Stilwell, secure the required approval and make the necessary arrangements. On June 30th (JIC 24th meeting) the Joint Intelligence Committee recommended that further consideration of the project be held in abeyance pending the outcome of conversations to be held in Chungking by our representative.

We have now completed arrangements for sending our representative, Dr. Joseph R. Hayden, Head of our Far Eastern Division, ti discuss the project with General Stilwell and other theater commanders concerned. Dr. Hayden plans to leave by air August 19th at three o'clock P.M. I discussed with Colonel Holmes, of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff today the question of obtaining

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proper letters to General Stilwell and to all theater commanders. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff have cabled General Stilwell that Dr. Hayden will call upon him, it is felt that a letter from you to General Stilwell and to other theater commanders concerned, along the lines of the attached drafts, would be of great aid in the proper carrying out of Dr. Hayden's mission.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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Draft of letter to theater Commanders

August 19, 1942

Upon the recommandation of the Joint Intelligence Committee and with the approval of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the bearer, Dr. Joseph R. Hayden, is being sent by and as a representative of the Office of Strategic Services to Chungking and India for the purpose of holding conversations with General Stilwell and other theater commanders, in connection with a certain project now pending before the Joint Intelligence Committee and the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Office of Strategic Service was created by military of the President dated June 13, 1942, placing that office under the jurisdiction of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

All aid and assistance should be given Dr. Hayden in facilitating the accomplishment of his mission.

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Draft of letter to General Stilwell

August 19, 1942

Dr. Joseph R. Hayden, representing the Office of Strategic Services, is being sent to Chungking to hold conversations with you, for the purpose of discussing a certain project now pending before the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff. The proposed plan has been approved in principle by the Joint Intelligence Committee, which committee recommended that it be subject to the approval and subsequent coordination of the Commanding General U. S. Forces in China and to the acquiescence of the Generalissimo to be obtained by you. Upon the completion of his discussions with you he will hold conversations with other theater commanders concerned with the project, and will return for report to the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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BY AUTHORITY OF A.C. OF S, OPD

Date

OPD 334.8 OSS (8-19-42) August 19, 1942.

Lieut. General Joseph Stilwell,
Commanding General,
United States Army Forces, China-India-Burma,
Chungking, China.

My dear General Stilwell:

Dr. Joseph R. Hayden, representing the Office of Strategic Services, is being sent to Chungking to hold conversations with you, and for the purpose of discussing a certain project now pending before the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff. The proposed plan has been approved in principle by the Joint Intelligence Committee, which Committee recommended that it be subject to the approval and subsequent coordination of the Commanding General, United States Forces in China, and to the acquiescence of the Generalissimo to be obtained by you. Upon the completion of his discussions with you he will hold conversations with other theater commanders concerned with the project, and will return for report to the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Sincerely yours,

ST. CLAIR STREETT,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

TO ACCOMPANY

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Hayden 7813
X Mission
X China

August 15, 1940

General S. W. Fitzgerald
U. S. Air Transport Command
Accra, Gold Coast
Africa

My dear General Fitzgerald:

This letter will introduce to you Mr. Joseph R. Hayden, who is travelling on an important mission for this organization. He will be glad to tell you where he is going.

Will you be kind enough to help him to get to Cairo by air at the earliest opportunity. Mr. Hayden's work is essential in connection with the war effort, and he is needed at his destination at the earliest possible moment.

Your assistance in sending this man forward will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan,
Director

[illegible]

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Hayden 7813
x Mission
x China

August 11, 1942

The Honorable G. Howland Shaw
Assistant Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Shaw:

It is my intention to send Dr. Joseph R. Hayden to China on a mission of urgency and importance. He will go as the personal representative of the Director of the Office of Strategic Services. To expedite the fulfillment of his mission, I should appreciate it if he could be granted a special passport. A brief biography outlining Dr. Hayden's career accompanies this letter.

Yours very truly,

William J. Donovan

Enclosure (1)

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11,423
11,423 A
Hayden. J.R.

China (Friendship
McCarthy [illegible]

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Hayden. J.R.

China (Friendship)
Lee Arthur. SLOP.

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Hayden
China-Australia Mission

APPENDIX B-I

Office of Strategic Services Intelligence
Operations in China

I. Discussions with General Stilwell and Commander M.E. Miles.

1. On September 13 in Allahabad I received telegraphic instructions from Colonel Donovan stating that plans for Chungking were being altered and directing me to await further instructions before beginning talks there. On September 25, the day following my arrival in Chungking I called upon General Stilwell, presented the letter addressed to him by the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff, stated the general nature of my mission, and explained that inasmuch as the China plan was undergoing alterations I had been instructed not to discuss the matter with him until further instructions had been received from OSS.

2. General Stilwell assured me that I was welcome and that I would be regarded as a member of his "outfit" in the matters of transportation, medical care if necessary, and so forth. I suggested that pending the receipt of further instructions it might be advantageous for me to be informed of the type of intelligence being received by his G-2 and the general sources from which it came. The General agreed, gave me a card to General Thomas G. Hearn,

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Hayden
China-Australia Mission

APPENDIX B-I

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his chief of staff, and said that Lt. Col. Edward J. McNally, his Chungking G-2, would be informed.

3. In this interview General Stilwell gave me the impression that he felt that he should have been kept more fully informed concerning intelligence and subversive action plans for China; also that he was skeptical about the desirability or success of any O.S.S. operation for securing intelligence in China. (Note: This account of my initial conversation with General Stilwell is written from memory, as for security reasons I made no notes on it. Subsequently, I decided that secret material deposited in the O.S.S. office safe would be secure and made notes immediately after my later formal discussions with General Stilwell.)

4. Following this conversation with General Stilwell I at once got into touch with General Hearn and Lt. Col. McNally. With the latter I had a number of discussions and also had opportunities for examining some of the intelligence reports which he was preparing and some of the material which went into them. A note on American intelligence activities in China other than the "Friendship Plan", and on Chinese intelligence is attached as Appendix B-I-a.

5. On October 14 Mr. Alghan R. Lusey (accompanied by Mr. S. A. Schreiner, Jr.) arrived in Chungking. Mr. Lusey delivered to me new instructions from Colonel Donovan dated September 21. These instructions explained in general terms the modification of

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the plans for OSS intelligence activities in China and stated that Commander M. E. Miles had been designated as the head of all OSS activities in that area. I was instructed to advise General Stilwell regarding the change in plan and to seek to obtain his consent and that of the Generalissimo to the carrying on of OSS activities as now proposed. Mr. Lusey explained somewhat more fully the new plan referred to in the instructions.

6. On October 16 I visited "Friendship Heights" in company with Mr. Lusey. Subsequently I had frequent conferences with Commander Miles at the OSS offices in Chungking. I kept him fully informed of my discussions with General Stilwell. On the sixteenth Commander Miles explained the "Friendship Plan" in some detail and we discussed the subject at length. I was then in a position to talk with General Stilwell, but was unable to do so because early the following morning the General departed for India. Within a short time Commander Miles proceeded to India in connection with supplies. He hoped to see General Stilwell while he was there and suggested that if I wished I might accompany him so that we might talk with the General together. I feared, however, that he would not be able to make contact with the General (this proved to be the case), and decided to remain in Chungking.

7. General Stilwell returned from India the afternoon of November 1. On the morning of the fourth I had a long conference with him. The summary of my notes of this discussion, made imme-

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diately thereafter, is quoted, as follows:

"1. In this interview and my initial one I received the impression that General Stilwell feels that he has not been sufficiently consulted and kept in touch: first, by Gale, who never took his project up with the General; second, by the War Department; third, by Miles. He seemed to feel fairly well satisfied as to the War Department after I recalled the nature of my mission and the word that he had received from the Joint Intelligence Committee regarding it.

"2. General Stilwell is skeptical as to whether the results to be obtained from the project will justify the air freight space which it will require. He does not want to be under pressure from Washington to grant more space than he deems desirable. I believe that I convinced him of the potential value of the project and that it should be given a trial.

"3. He asked some searching questions about Lusey. I gave him what information I have regarding Lusey's background and informed him of the careful security check which was made before he was employed.

"4. He is unconvinced as to the extent to which Miles really has the confidence of the Chinese. Those with whom Miles has dealt perhaps regard him as having access to money and materiél. How do we know that they will give us well as receive?

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"5. General Stilwell believes that it is in the interest of all concerned that he should make certain that in principle the project has the approval of the Generalissimo.

My notes of this conference with General Stilwell are attached as Appendix B-1-b.

3. On November 10 I had another long conference with General Stilwell. In summary his chief points were:

a. Weather information might be important, but he doubted whether other intelligence which might be gathered by OSS would be of much use to him. When land operations got under way aerial reconnaissance would get him the information that he needed for operations. He was skeptical about the value of air intelligence which might be gathered; and about the usefulness of any secret intelligence net.

b. General Stilwell reiterated his opinion that the results obtainable from OSS Navy project would not be worth the air freight space which would be required and his disinclination to be under pressure from Washington to give better priorities than he deemed wise.

c. General Stilwell again stated that the project should be directly cleared by him with the Generalissimo. He said that to his surprise he had found that Colonel Chao, who usually handled such matters for the Generalissimo knew nothing about it.

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He hoped for an early clearance. (Note: Commander Miles' interpretation of General Stilwell's statement was that it was evidence that the General did not possess the Generalissimo's confidence.)

General Stilwell's points and my replies to them are more fully stated in my contemporary notes, which are attached as Appendix B-I-c.

9. On or about November 14, having returned from India on the preceding day, Commander Miles informed me that he had explained his plan in detail to General Stilwell. The net results, he stated, were:

a. General Stilwell had no objections to Commander Miles proceeding with his operation.

b. The General would assist, (1) by furnishing him with crews for transport planes to operate between Calcutta and China, should Miles secure the planes from Washington; (2) by giving him certain air assistance in China.

c. In view of his other responsibilities General Stilwell could not furnish much of the kind of aid which Miles needed most - air transportation.

Commander Miles expressed the opinion that it was not

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necessary for General Stilwell to secure any assurances from the Generalissimo. He stated that he believed that the General was of the same opinion.

Commander Miles also declared that he doubted whether Colonel Donovan could furnish him with anything that he needed at that time, except money, which he could not spend.

10. On November 15 I visited "Friendship Heights" in company with Mr. Lusey.

11. On November 16 I had another long conference with General Stilwell. Much of the ground covered in previous conversations was gone over again. After I had urged him strongly to notify the War Department that he approved the execution of the plan, he said:

"I don't think that the project is worth a damn. I don't think that it will advance the war any. But they want it and I'll play along with them." Later in the discussion he modified this statement by saying that he thought that the weather reporting proposed might be very useful.

General Stilwell agreed to send a message to General Marshall at once saying that he approved the continuation of the work in accordance with the present plans and under present conditions, and that he would express the hope that the planes for the Calcutta-China run which Commander Miles had requested be furnished. He stated that I might see his message before it was despatched.

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General Stilwell said that he had greater confidence in Commander Miles since his conversation with him.

He also agreed that nothing could be accomplished in any other way than that being followed, and said that he would render the project any assistance compatible with his other responsibilities.

On the afternoon of the same day I saw the message which had been prepared for General Marshall. General Stilwell approved the continuation of the project "pending the approval of the Generalissimo." The substance of his message was at once despatched to Colonel Donovan.

12. On November 30 I had a final conversation with General Stilwell. The General was seriously concerned because the Generalissimo had not given to him formal approval of the OSS-Navy operation. He felt that in the absence of such approval the Generalissimo might disclaim all knowledge of the operation, should it suit his convenience to do so. He even felt it possible that the Generalissimo possessed no detailed information concerning the plan. General Tai Li might be using Commander Miles for his own purposes. Unless recognition of the Tai-Miles arrangement came from higher up than General Tai - from the Generalissimo in fact - and was expressed to General Stilwell as the theatre commander, Commander Miles would be in an extremely dangerous position and events might occur which would be

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embarrassing to the American position in China. General Stilwell would continue to seek to clear the matter with the Generalissimo, and stated that in the meantime he would not interfere with the continued operation of the plan.

General Stilwell felt that the approval of the Generalissimo might not be obtained within an indefinite period, and that I could accomplish nothing further by remaining in Chungking. I therefore stated that I would depart as soon as transportation was available. In this connection, it should be recalled that the letter which I carried from the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff to General Stilwell provided that the latter should clear the project with the Generalissimo, if possible. So far as I know, General Stilwell had received no further communications from the Joint Chiefs or the War Department upon the subject before my departure.

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II. Conclusions and Observations Regarding the "Friendship Plan".

A. The following conclusions and observations are as of December 3, 1943. Since my departure from Chungking I have received very little information regarding the operation of the "Friendship Plan."

B. Conclusions.

1. Despite the difficulties and risks which may be involved, I believe that OSS should continue to participate in the "Friendship Plan." The chief reasons for this belief were:

a. Risks are inherent in war and particularly in the position of OSS and the work which we are doing. On the whole I am convinced that the "Friendship Plan" has an excellent chance of strengthening our ally, China, and weakening our enemy, Japan. The project may produce valuable intelligence.

b. At present the "Friendship Plan", under the direction of Captain Miles, is probably the only means by which OSS can participate with any chance of success in SI and SO operations directed against the enemy from China.

C. Observations.

1. Assuming that the necessary material is made available, the chief products of the plan will probably be:

a. Weather reports, which will be of value to the U.S. Army and Navy.

b. Locations of enemy vessels, which will be of

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value to the U.S. Army and Navy, especially when our air force can operate in conjunction with the Navy off the China coast.

c. Mine laying and other destructive operations against enemy shipping along the China coast and in Chinese harbors, of sufficient value to justify their being undertaken.

d. An intercepts service capable of producing much valuable information from Japanese radio traffic up and down the China coast.

e. Aid to the Chinese, (1) through the training and equipment of General Tai Li's guerilla forces; and (2) the training, equipment and to a certain extent the direction of Tai Li's intelligence organization. If Captain Miles' plans for training and equipping Tai Li's guerillas can be carried out, a substantial contribution to their effectiveness can be made.

f. The "Friendship Plan" should produce an indeterminate amount of intelligence of value to General Stilwell's command and to intelligence agencies in Washington. I believe that the project may increase the quantity, improve the quality, and decrease the time lag in the transmission of Tai Li's intelligence. In my opinion, however, Tai Li's intelligence operations will continue to be typically Chinese in character. Even General Tai's military intelligence will be collected and handled with reference to internal politics and personal or factional interests when these interests are affected by the military situations

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under observation. Of the more strictly military intelligence which is collected either within Japan proper, occupied China, or other territories under Japanese occupation, Captain Miles will be given only such as General Tai Li and the Generalissimo's personal headquarters wish him to have; and what he does receive will be subject to whatever coloration they believe will best forward the Chinese cause, the Generalissimo's interests, or the interests of Tai-Li. Even under these limitations, there should be an increase in the amount and value of intelligence concerning the Japanese ultimately received by the United States from Chinese sources. There is the possibility of developing a military intelligence net which would produce information of the highest operational value, especially to the U.S. Air Forces. General Claire L. Chennault expressed to me a keen interest in the development of an intelligence net such as is contemplated and stated that it might be of great value to his operations.

g. Good will of the Chinese. The amount of friendly feeling towards the United States which the "Friendship Plan" may be expected to generate among "the Chinese" and the value of whatever good feeling it does produce is difficult to assess. Presumably, General Tai Li will be grateful for the aid, material and otherwise, which is extended to him. Presumably he and those of his associates

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with whom Captain Miles and his group are working will appreciate the spirit of friendliness, confidence and equality which is the keystone of Captain Miles' relations with them. Other Chinese, however, among them those who envy, hate, or fear Tai Li (and there are many of them) may not understand this intimate participation of an official foreign group in the activities of what is almost universally regarded as the Chinese "Gestapo". If, in general, American-Chinese relations are on the up-grade during the next two years and the "Friendship Plan" is a success, it probably will make some contribution towards further improving those relations. If the relations between the two peoples are deteriorating, it may be seized upon by anti-Americans to make them even worse. In my opinion, the "good will" aspects of the plan constitute a gamble in which the forces which will decide whether we shall win or lose are beyond our control, and probably in many instances our knowledge.

2. I believe that the "Friendship Plan" will be executed primarily as a Navy operation, with the OSS having only an incidental connection with it.

a. Captain Miles personally is 100 per cent Navy and 00 per cent OSS. It would be a mistake to underestimate the effect of this fact upon the manner in which he will direct this operation.

b. The personnel of the project is almost entirely

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Navy and will be entirely subject to Navy control.

c. By direct statements Captain Miles many times made it plain to me that he would tolerate no "interference" from OSS in the operation of the "Friendship Plan." He stated that he would accept no personnel not selected by himself and act upon no directives which he did not deem wise. If this position were not accepted he would at once sever all connection with OSS. There was very little that it could do for him anyway. Captain Miles also stated that he would ask to be relieved of this duty and sent to sea if the Navy should attempt to tell him in detail what to do or send him personnel which he did not want.

d. Implicit in Captina Miles' attitude is his belief that because of his relations with General Tai Li neither the Army, Navy, OSS, nor any other American organization can operate an intelligence network in China except through him. This position was often explicitly stated by Mr. Lusey. It is probably sound as long as Captain Miles is in the picture. Should he withdraw, his organization would still be a Navy outfit and probably would have to be directed by a Navy officer. I believe that it would be possible for the Navy to find another officer competent to direct the "Friendship Plan" who at the same time would be acceptable to Tai Li. It is not a romantic personal attachment for Captain Miles that has caused Tai Li to work with him. It is personal confidence in him

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plus the belief that Captain Miles is in a position to render him valuable material and other assistance.

3. In my opinion the relations between Captain Miles and General Stilwell are far from satisfactory. Captain Miles is as independent in his attitude towards General Stilwell as he is towards OSS. He feels that in any difficulty with General Stilwell he and not the General would be backed by the Generalissimo and that the General dare not "interfere" with anything he may do. In my opinion General Stilwell senses this attitude and reacts accordingly. I say this even though I recall that Captain Miles in general terms explained his operations to General Stilwell and the General assented to their continuation. Many Chinese must know of this relationship. It creates the sort of situation which the Chinese are adept at exploiting - a situation which weakens General Stilwell's already difficult position and reduces still further the lack of unity which exists within the higher American representation in China.

It is possible that the attitude of Captain Miles is in part a reflection of the bad feeling which exists in many quarters between the Army and the Navy. It would be unfortunate if OSS should become involved in an Army-Navy row.

4. Although Captain Miles may carry his "independence" of Washington direction to an extreme, I believe that the principle

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upon which his position rests is sound. The responsible local chief of any SI-SO operation in China must have the widest freedom of action that is compatible with the necessity of keeping the operation out of conflict with the broad military and political interests and policies of the United States in that country.

5. This report deals primarily with aspects of the "Friendship Plan" which came to my attention in Chungking. Serious problems seem to exist, however, in establishing satisfactory operating relationships between the "Friendship Plan" and other units of the OSS in the Washington headquarters.

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Hayden
China-Australia

APPENDIX B-I-b.

Notes on conversation with General Stilwell, November 4, 1942. Appointment at 9:00. Arrived back at office at 10:20. Notes made immediately thereafter.

General Stilwell returned from India Sunday afternoon. On Monday I requested an appointment, which was set for this morning at 9:00 at General Stilwell's residence.

After preliminary conversation, I explained connection between Lusey and Miles - how it arose and what their relations now are. General Stilwell said that he had not heard of Lusey and knew nothing about him. Questioned me about his background, training, etc.

I then asked General Stilwell to read Colonel Donovan's letter of instructions to me dated September 21. He read it slowly and then went through it again.

The General then asked me just what the plan was. I explained the plan as it had been explained to me by Miles. Also told the General what I know of the relations between Miles and the Chinese official with whom he is working.

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General Stilwell questioned whether the proposed organization could do anything that is not being done by the Chinese already. They have agents, radio sets, etc., behind the Japanese lines; I cited better equipment, training and direction. Shortcomings of Chinese agents as observers and reporters. Weather reports and intersections upon Japanese shipping.

The General said that so far as sabotage in most of the coastal ports was concerned, it couldn't do the Japs much damage. Foochow, Amoy, Swatow could be wiped out and it would make very little difference to the Japs. Their shipping to the south goes down via Formosa. Only a few small vessels in intermediate Chinese harbors. Hong Kong a different matter. I pointed out possibility of speedy communication of plane and ship arrivals and departures. He agreed that this and the weather would be important.

As to a station near Lhasa, General Stilwell said that it would be "romantic but unnecessary." The British have weather stations in Tibet already and we can use them. I emphasized the station as a part of a general weather system and a part of a system for locating enemy ships in the Bay of Bengal and south thereof.

The General showed some dissatisfaction that he had not been more fully informed or consulted about Miles and his work and project. I recalled to him that the OSS and the Joint Chiefs had sent me out here, after notification to him, for the precise

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purpose of acquainting him with plans for operations in China, to discuss the matter with him, explain the set-up in Washington, and to work out with him any adjustments which he desired. This statement seemed to soften his attitude.

General Stilwell asked what basis there was for being sure that the Chinese had great confidence in Miles and Lusey. I cited the close relationship between Miles and General Tai Li, the manner in which they had already worked together, and the statement of Lusey that in Washington T. V. Soong had endorsed the arrangement and was prepared to support it here. Stilwell suggested that the Chinese had a great nose for money and that to them Miles probably looked like he had lots of it. The intimation was that the Chinese might be attempting to "use" Miles and that they had not given him their confidence to the extent which he believed they had.

As for the sanction of the Gissimo, perhaps he had not actually assented to this particular project as it is now proposed. General Stilwell and I agreed that for the safety of all concerned, he should take the matter up directly with the Gissimo. This he said he would do at the earliest opportunity. He added that it might take time. "He tries to do everything himself and often moves slowly." Also, it is not improbable that he will want to consult Tai and others before he gives the green light to Stilwell.

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General Stilwell seemed to be concerned over the possibility of Washington pressure to make a larger allotment of air freight to this work than he deemed wise. Already, they said, they had asked for 30,000 (?) pounds per month. He only had twenty transports and this would take a considerable proportion of their space. I said that as American Theatre Commander he undoubtedly have the last word as to air priorities. He agreed, but it was evident that he dreaded more pressures being added to those already in operation. Dealing with them kept him busy. Only recently one American had come to Kunming and found out that war was dangerous and had sent back an hysterical message demanding that we get out of it here. He (Stilwell) tried to get in his story first and hoped for the best.

The General also wondered why this sort of thing was not done through the M.A.'s office. I recalled that it was not the policy of the government to have work of the proposed type done through that agency and pointed out that OSS has been directed to set up a world-wide system in a global war. He said that when he had been M.A. he had employed Chinese agents. I pointed out that sabotage is a different matter.

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Hayden
China-Australia

APPENDIX B-I-c.

Notes on conversation with General Stilwell, his office (residence) at 8:30 A.M., November 10, 1942.

General Stilwell discussed the Miles plan as I had set it forth in general terms during our conversation of November 4. In summary his points were:

1. The weather might be important, but he doubted whether the intelligence would be of much actual use to him. He is trying to get the Chinese Army into condition to hit the Japs, to conduct land operations against them. When these got under way aerial reconnaisance would get him the information he needed for operations. "Suppose 27 planes do land at a given point at five o'clock in the afternoon and I get the information at 7:00. Shall we attack them at dawn? If we go down there at dawn they may be gone, or they may be sitting up in the air ready to get us."

General Stilwell is skeptical concerning the usefulness of any secret intelligence net. The information comes too late, or is unreliable, or may be faked. Cited the story of information concerning the first German use of gas during the World War - spy net received the information, but through a series of accidents it

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didn't reach England until two days after the Germans had made their gas attack (Vimy Ridge ?). He didn't know of any useful information coming in from secret sources while he was in France.

During this phase of the discussion I replied that secret intelligence would not exclude aerial reconnaissance or any other means of securing information which he might use - it would supplement such means; also that as he approached the coast he would be able to bomb enemy ships at sea on information furnished by Miles; that a great deal of information concerning enemy movements, plans, and conditions could be received by agents and intercepts; that trained agents and speedy communications would increase both the quality and the quantity of information received from behind enemy lines. Particularly, I pointed out that the JIC and the entities represented on it needed this flow of information as a part of a world system of intelligence; that the plan had two aspects, the China one and the one that was a part of global intelligence in Washington. Also emphasized the importance of occupied China as a reservoir of relatively untapped information regarding Japan. Explained interest of JIC in putting plan through.

2. General Stilwell returned to the main point of our last discussion: his doubt whether results would be worth the air freight space that would be required, and his disinclination to

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be under pressure from Washington to give better priorities than he deemed wise. "They asked for twenty-five tons per month. Then they upped it to thirty." When I asked him whom he meant by "They", he said the request came from Miles via the Navy Department, and the War Department. I asked him whether he had received any instructions as to the amount of space to be granted and he said the War Department had simply transmitted the request. I judged, however, that he felt that it would have been better if the request had been made to him on the ground instead of through Washington. He said that Miles had come to him and given the impression that Admiral King had felt that this project was urgent and wanted high priority for the material needed for it. But he (Stilwell) had never heard from King on it. This statement applied to the mines project.

(During this phase of the discussion General Stilwell pointed out the well-nigh insoluble problems connected with supplying an Army over great distances by air. The trouble is that the planes use so much gas that the proportion of gas to pay load increases with geometrical progression. If it requires three planes to fly a given amount of gas (freight) from Dinjan to Kunming, ten will be required to carry the same amount to Kweilin. Before long no pay load will be possible. "We have got to get down out of the air and onto the ground. That means get the Burma Road opened up." Figures

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re Chinese troops in India. The opening of the Mediterranean would save 75 per cent of cargo space to Middle East.)

3. Regarding the Chinese angle, General Stilwell said that to his surprise Shao (the Gissimo's go-between with foreigners) knew nothing about the matter. I suggested that because of its nature it might have been taken up directly with the Gissimo, but he thought that unlikely. More probable that it was a venture into which Tai Li had entered on his own, hoping to get a lot of materiel out of it. The General hoped to get further word from Shao, perhaps today. I said that I had thought that I might ask him whether it would be wise for me to visit Chengtu while the matter was under consideration between him and the Gissimo, but in view of what he had said I had decided that I should remain right here. He agreed and said that he hoped to get a decision soon.

I left at 9:19, upon arrival of Chinese military group. General Stilwell said that he didn't see why Miles should be in India all this time. That he (General Stilwell) could get his stuff moved as well as Miles could. I suggested, however, that if you really wanted to make progress on a job like that you went yourself.

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Hayden J.R. 10-097
x Australia
x MacArthur
x J.C.S.

February 19, 1943

Brigadier General John R. Deane,
Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff,
Public Health Building,
Washington, D.C.

My dear General Deane:

You will recall that I advised you of certain dispatches sent by me to Hayden in Australia. Today I received the following wire from him:

> "I have had with MacArthur and his staff extended discussions, and they have decided that collaboration is not desirable at the present time. I propose to proceed to Washington within the next few days unless I receive instructions from you to the contrary."

I have cabled him that he is to return at once.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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Hayden J.R. 10,095
X Australia

CONFIDENTIAL

February 6, 1943

Lt. Col. T.W. Hammond, Jr.,
Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff,
Public Health Building,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Hammond:

Following is a cable from Dr. Hayden and copy of my reply. In that reply I have left out the paragraph referring to the terms of the directive:

"To Donovan from Hayden

"This is for your information. I was received very cordially by MacArthur. I was told by him to tell you that our cooperation with the people referred to in my first Brisbane dispatch would be welcomed and facilitated by him. Approach was discussed formally with General Headquarters staff but pending your instructions, action was deferred. The situation is delicate within this group. Contact has been renewed but no business with the gentleman by whom our office was visited. I am doing extensive work with the General Headquarters concerning the area which is best known to me. My messages to you receive the collaboration of General Headquarters."

"To Hayden from Donovan.

"Thank you very much for your cable. My only reason for asking you to defer action was that the substance of our new directive was being sent to GHQ and I wanted for your sake as well as our

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own for them to be aware of our position before you talked with them.

"I wish you would make clear to General MacArthur that we have no wish to intrude upon him but that we only hope our organization can be of some use to him, and of course we recognize that any people sent there would be entirely under his orders.

"I think that a plan involving an area best known to you has been forwarded for approval to the General.

"I am advising the Chiefs of Staff of the messages between us and in the event that General MacArthur wishes us to do something specific or would first desire to see some of our group ask him please to communicate directly to the Chiefs of Staff.

"Thank you for your work, and I hope we can be of service."

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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Hayden J.R. 10,097
+ Australia

January 23, 1943

Lieutenant Colonel T. W. Hammond, Jr.
Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff
Public Health Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Hammond:

I am attaching copy of a message received through the War Department from Dr. Hayden at Brisbane on January 16th, together with a copy of my reply which was sent on January 20th. I understand that Commander McDonnell had also telephoned about this matter. On the same subject you might be interested in reading the enclosed copy of a letter which came from Dr. Hayden on yesterday.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

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Hayden, S.R. 10,047
X Australia

January 22, 1943

Colonel J. K. Woolnough
Room 3-E-780 Pentagon Building
Arlington, Virginia

Dear Colonel Woolnough:

Yesterday we were speaking of Dr. Hayden. Here is a copy of a letter we received from him dated January 4th.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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Hayden, J. R., 10,097
X Australia

COPY

January 4, 1943 **SECRET**

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I have been in Perth a number of days and have made a good start towards getting my bearings on the situation in this theatre. Admiral Loockwood has been entirely cooperative, and I think that I am safe in saying that in principle he would welcome our collaboration, subject of course to the approval of the naval and military high command in Brisbane. I believe that his attitude and appreciation of what we can accomplish will help secure that approval.

I have also talked cautiously with the Dutch naval officer in charge here. From what he says it is apparent that we could be of great assistance to them. He has indicated the proper people to see on the East Coast. I shall begin with C. O. van der Plass, who visited us in Washington.

The type of work in which we are interested is already well developed here. Our job is to fit into it. We shall be able to make a valuable contribution, if given the opportunity. The final answer must come from General MacArthur. By the time I reach him I should have a reasonably specific plan of organization and action to suggest.

You may have received some definite report from me by radio before this letter reaches you, but it seems worth while to make this rather inadequate effort to keep in touch, despite the limitations imposed by time (distance) and other factors.

Perth is a clean, attractive, modern city in a beautiful location. Much of it reminds me of some of the newer parts of Seattle. The days are clear and sunshiney, warm but at the moment not too hot because of the "Freemantle Doctor", the breeze from the sea. Two blankets at night, lots of bathing, tennis, golf, cricket, bowling and riding. This club would be a credit to London. I had no expectation of finding such a place in Western Australia. Our relations with the local people seem to be excellent.

Best regards to you and Ned Buxton and the others.

Sincerely,

(Signed) J. R. HAYDEN

Our Foreign Service people both in India and Colombo and here have been most cordial and helpful.

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Secret

WELD CLUB PERTH W.A.

January 9, 1943.

Dear Colonel Donovan -

I have been in Perth a number of days and have made a good start towards getting my bearings on the situation in this theatre. Admiral Helfrich has been entirely cooperative. I think that I am safe in saying that in principle he would welcome our collaboration, subject of course to the approval of the naval and military high command in Brisbane. I believe that his attitude and appreciation of what we can accomplish will help secure that approval.

I have also talked cautiously with the Dutch naval officer in charge here. From what he says it is apparent that we could be of great assistance to them. He has indicated the proper people to see on the east coast. I shall begin with C. O. van der Plaas, who visited us in Washington.

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Best regards to you and Ted Baxter and the others.

Sincerely

W. J. Donovan.

Colonel W. J. Donovan,
Director of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

P.S. Our Foreign Service people both in India & Colombo & here have been most cordial & helpful.

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1930 HILL STREET
ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN

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1530 HILL STREET
ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN

To General Donovan.

With my sincere thanks for your thoughts of me — which is a tribute from him to his family.

Yours sincerely
Elizabeth O. Hayden.

June 7, 1945.

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Hayden, J. S.

PLEASE HOLD FOR GENERAL DONOVAN

May 22, 1945

Mrs. Joseph R. Hayden
Washtenaw Avenue & Hill St
Ann Arbor, Michigan

My dear Mrs. Hayden:

On behalf of General Donovan who is now out of the country let me express the sorrow which the General and all of Joe's friends now feel at the news of his most untimely loss.

We, all of us, are aware of the great confidence placed in him by General MacArthur and the President of the Philippine Republic.

I do not know how his knowledge, character and personality can be replaced in so critical a time.

Speaking as one of the little group who worked closely with him in the early days of COI, please let me say how deeply I miss his passing and this termination of the warm friendship which existed between us.

Only last week he was planning with me to visit this office and talk at our morning meeting concerning current problems in the Pacific.

With deep sympathy, I am,

Most sincerely,

GRR FS

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CONFIDENTIAL

Date: March 16 1944

To: General William J. Donovan

Attached file -letter from Mr. Hayden

You asked for my comments.

I think Joe Hayden's advice sounds good and I presume you will follow his general recommendation.

Specifically, I think it would be a good plan to take one of Lovell's men with you to demonstrate his equipment.

Stanley reported at the Staff Meeting this morning that the first tests of Beano exceeded expectations; that the explosion had more the effect of a shell than of a hand grenade. Stanley believes that it opens up new fields for the tactical use of this weapon.

GEB

G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

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General -

I am holding the McGovern report for you
M.B.D.

For Mrs
Proxton comment
D.

Director's Office

(9900)

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Miami COLONIAL Hotel

Hayden Joseph R.S.748

10 March 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear General Donovan:

You will recall the coats off session you had in your office with my friend of the Budget Bureau, J. Weldon Jones, on a hot day last August --- you twitching your sleeves up now and then and almost making a pass at him. Yesterday I had a note from Jones, who is sitting with the Budget Board of Review in which he said: "We sent up the appropriations for War Production Board yesterday --- 14,000 employees; Donovan's went up day before yesterday. A change in our personnel on OSS seems to have worked a miracle. A Texan (Jones) with a little horse sense and with his fingers crossed on any ideology --- surely no bias against prominent names and families --- has established the best of relations with the ex-colonel. If I am right, then the hour we had together last spring was a blow for liberty!"

I hope that this bodes well for the OSS budget and your relations with the Budget Bureau. Jones is a great fellow.

My friend here wants to confer longer than I thought he would and I may not be back in Washington until after the time set for your departure. I shall be sorry if this is the case. Fahs told me that he was getting up S. W. P. C. material for you and I arranged to go over it with him. If I should not get back, may I make the following suggestions:

1. Take along the McGovern report. It proceeds along the right lines and the acceptance of its suggestions was recommended by Gen. Willoughby and turned down by the Chief of Staff.

2. In talking with MacArthur emphasize that the personnel suggested are, (a) to be entirely under his control; (b) primarily to demonstrate what OSS has and can do for the F. E. I. C. --- that our facilities and funds are available to develop what they want if we do not already have it; and (c) that if MacArthur prefers, they can come for temporary duty only.

3. I believe that M. O. could do something for them. So far as I know, O. W. I. (F. W. Marquardt, formerly of the Philippines Free Press arrived to take over from the

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incumbent O. W. I. no. 1 a few days before I left) has no plans along that line.

4. Gen. Willoughby is much interested in obtaining some portable printing or mimeography outfits --- but O. W. I. may be arranging to furnish those.

5. A letter inquiring about certain items of special S. O. equipment is on file in your office. This letter should be checked against the reply sent out to O. W. P. C., and any of the items then under production which are now available should be brought to Gen. Willoughby's attention. Commander Charles Parsons (under Col. Whitney, head of Phil. Regional Section in the Allied Intelligence Bureau) is immensely interested. Col. Roberts, Australian, is the head of the Allied Intelligence Bureau. The relationship between C. I. B. and P. R. B. and Gen. Willoughby (G-2) is not altogether clear and the personnel relations are bad.

For your confidential information, relations between Quezon and Elmer Davis are close.

I will phone your office as soon as I return to Washington. This should be sometime next week.

Sincerely,

J. R. Hayden

1530 Hill Street
Ann Arbor, Michigan

COPY

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

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Hayden, Joseph R. 8.748

COLONIAL ORANGE COURT
ORLANDO, FLORIDA
PLAZA APARTMENT HOTEL
HOUSTON, TEXAS
FORT SUMTER HOTEL
CHARLESTON, S. C.

WALTER CHANDLER
GENERAL MANAGER

MIAMI COLONIAL HOTEL
146 BISCAYNE BOULEVARD ★ SWEPT BY OCEAN BREEZES

MIAMI 31, FLORIDA 10 March, 1944

Confidential

Dear General Donovan -

You will recall the coats off session you had in your office with my friend of the Budget Bureau, J Weldon Jones, on a hot day last August — you twitching your sleeves up now and then and almost making a pass at him. Yesterday I had a note from Jones, who is sitting on the Budget Board of Review in which he said: "We sent up the appropriations for War Production Board yesterday --- 14,000 employees; --- Donovan's went up day before yesterday. A change in our personnel on OSS seems to have worked a miracle. A Texan [Jones] with a little horse sense and with his fingers crossed on any ideaology — surely no bias against prominent names and families --- has established the best of relations with the ex-Colonel. If I am right, then the hour we had together last

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COLONIAL ORANGE COURT
ORLANDO, FLORIDA
PLAZA APARTMENT HOTEL
HOUSTON, TEXAS
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CHARLESTON, S. C.

WALTER CHANDLER
GENERAL MANAGER

MIAMI COLONIAL HOTEL

146 BISCAYNE BOULEVARD ★ SWEPT BY OCEAN BREEZER

MIAMI 31, FLORIDA

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

MIAMI'S OUTSTANDING BAY FRONT HOTEL

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COLONIAL ORANGE COURT
ORLANDO, FLORIDA
PLAZA APARTMENT HOTEL
HOUSTON, TEXAS
FORT SUMTER HOTEL
CHARLESTON, S. C.

WALTER CHANDLER
GENERAL MANAGER

MIAMI COLONIAL HOTEL
146 BISCAYNE BOULEVARD ★ SWEPT BY OCEAN BREEZES
MIAMI 31, FLORIDA

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4. Gen. Willoughby is much interested in obtaining some portable printing or mimeographing outfits — but O.W.I. may be arranging to furnish these.

5. A letter inquiring about certain



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COLONIAL ORANGE COURT
ORLANDO, FLORIDA
PLAZA APARTMENT HOTEL
HOUSTON, TEXAS
FORT SUMTER HOTEL
CHARLESTON, S. C.

WALTER CHANDLER
GENERAL MANAGER

MIAMI COLONIAL HOTEL
146 BISCAYNE BOULEVARD ★ SWEPT BY OCEAN BREEZES
MIAMI 31, FLORIDA

items of special S.O. equipment is on file in your office. This letter should be checked against the reply sent to S.W.P.A., and any of the items then under production which are now available should be brought to Gen. Willoughby's attention. Commander Charles Parsons (under Col. Whitney, head of Phil. Regional Section, in the Allied Intelligence Bureau) is immediately interested. Col. Roberts, Australian, is the head of the Allied Intelligence Bureau. The relations between U.I.B. and P.R.S. and Gen. Willoughby (G-2) are not altogether clear, and the personal relations are bad.

For your confidential information, relations between Quezon and Elmer Davis are close.

I will phone your office as soon as I return to Washington. This should be some time next week.

Sincerely,

J. H. Wayden



MIAMI'S OUTSTANDING BAY FRONT HOTEL

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Hayden 8/1/78

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mr. Murphy

DATE: October 21, 1942

FROM: Lt. Colonel Huntington

SUBJECT: Far East - Letter from Dr. Hayden

I am returning herewith Dr. Hayden's letter of October 6th which was passed along to me by David Bruce with instructions to return it to you.

Hillery C. Huntington, Jr.
Lt. Colonel, AUS

Attachment

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SECRET

COPY

Chungking, October 6, 1942

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I am availing myself of Joe Barnes's kindness to write you more quickly and securely than probably will be possible at any other time while I am in China. You will, I presume, want to pass the letter on to David Bruce.

Following your instructions, I have postponed discussions with General Stilwell until the receipt of additional instructions from you. I called upon the General immediately upon arrival and explained the situation. He was entirely cordial, discussed some of his own problems with apparent frankness, welcomed me as a member of his "team", and generally indicated that he would give our proposal thorough consideration. I have the impression, however, that he is not predisposed in favor of what we have in mind. I should guess that General Hearn, his chief of staff, and his local G2 (the No. 1 man is in New Delhi, and I believe is a more imaginative officer) were even less so.

The Ambassador, Mr. Gauss, has been personally most cordial. His views with reference to the possibility of carrying on our work in China are quite definite. "It can't be done;" and it won't be attempted by anyone connected with his office. However, he did weaken enough to say that Lusey and his naval friend seemed to be getting something, and added that if anything else were attempted only one or two or three additional people should be sent out. In this I believe that Mr. Gauss is right, so far as the next move is concerned. In general matters I am confident that Mr. Gauss will be cooperative and helpful.

A few days ago I spent the night with Col. Cooper at General Chennault's headquarters, some 30 miles from Chungking. Chennault already knew something of our project and I added enough so that in general terms he knew what it is. He definitely said that he was interested and indicated how extremely valuable quick information concerning enemy air and sea movements up and down the coast would be. For instance, if he could know that ten enemy planes had landed on a field near Hanoi this afternoon he could pounce on them before they took

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SECRET

off tomorrow morning. I am absolutely confident that with the equipment we have lined up we could give him much information of the highest military value. Chennault's idea is that from his position on the flank and rear, he can strike at everything the Japs send down to the McArthur-Ghormley area,-or could, if he had more planes in China and better intelligence. He also says that the Japs have to keep planes in China and he can keep on destroying them and their crews (which he believes to be the bottleneck for the Japs). He says that he will destroy 5 to 1, and actually make it 10 to 1, or thereabouts. Chennault may be our best entry into this game. All of this letter is highly confidential, but the following observation is especially so: I have gathered the impression that the more "regular" of the Army outfit both here and in Washington are "horsing" Chennault around a bit,-cramping his style with regulations made without reference to conditions here and without full knowledge of war as it is now being conducted. In my opinion General Chennault should be supported to the limit. He has fought the Japs more successfully and dealt with the Chinese far more successfully than any other American.

I have made it a point not to discuss or even mention our project with any one except the persons and to the extent indicated above. There is a definite lack of confidence between General Stilwell and the Ambassador. Both of them clearly showed it, and Stilwell specifically warned me not to "open my heart" to Col. McHugh, the Naval Attache'. McHugh is generally believed to be very closely tied up with the British,-lives with Keswick's successor (more or less) and another British Embassy man, along with Petro. How far Lusey is tied up with them, I do not know. Petro has informed me that he is going to Washington to join the OSS and that he wishes to return with me. This is the last thing that I would wish. I doubt whether his association with us would help us with the Chinese, but will express a definite opinion upon this subject later. From all of this and other things you know, you will gather that the situation here is a delicate one.

I am renewing many acquaintanceships and some friendships with Chinese officials and others. About thirty of my former students are in Chungking, some of them in very important positions. With their (unconscious) help I am establishing myself as on an observation trip

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SECRET

not unlike my previous ones to China. Of course, I am, with something besides. It may be that a little later I shall have a very unusual opportunity to make a trip into the northwest (now of great political importance) with a Chinese friend. If so, and if my main job has been accomplished by that time, I shall telegraph asking your O.K. I also hope to go to some places that are somewhat nearer.

Fairbank is sending in detailed reports, so I shall make only this brief observation on his work: he is displaying energy, tact, judgment and imagination. A better man could not have been sent.

Fisher is an A1 man. Our cooperation is complete, and both of us hope that some arrangement can be worked out that will permit our outfits to remain in the same offices and quarters. There would be many advantages to such an arrangement. Whether it will be practicable so far as any SI men who may be sent out remains to be seen.

If the "representative" to whom you referred in your telegram to await further instructions is not bringing out detailed information regarding the radio equipment available, will you please wire the essential facts in guarded terms through Army communications? It may be that that will be thing that they will wish most to have.

Fairbank and I will be much obliged if you will mail the enclosed letters to our respecting wives. My regards to all of you.

Sincerely,

/s/ J. R. Hayden

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Cairo, September 1, 1942.

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Donovan -

This letter is not an official report, but I am sending a copy of it to David Bruce.

Aside from the marvel of a transportation system which links three continents in four days, the most impressive feature of the flight out here was the work which has been accomplished by the Pan-American Airways and the Army. I know of no American war achievement which is more dramatic, in the large and in detail. The air base at Ascension Island is almost unbelieveable,-a runway some three hundred feet wide and several thousand feet long through the top of a mountain and an extensive airport created in the face of difficulties that the British regarded as insurmountable. The men there have faced, and in lesser degree are still facing real hardship: hungre (no longer true), thirst, heat ceaseless wind carrying cutting dust, and isolation. The route along the African coast and across the continent is almost as spectacular. John Ford could make a story out of this that would thrill the American people (when it could be released), and visualize the problem to officials who cannot understand it fully without seeing it, and be a great historical record.

I have had three visits with General Maxwell and this morning he took me over the repair base that he is building near Cairo. The job is being done on a large scaleand is strictly American from the desert up. General Maxwell's theory is that he is in a British area and that he is here to work withthem. He undertakes to do only those things which they have not the resources todo and which they ask him to take on. He has, however, complete directionand control over his projects. His men and efforts are not scattered around among a lot of British undertakings. His policy in this matter seems to me to be entirely sound, as is his attitude towards the British. He is accomplishing great things,-doing work that is of great immediate value to the British and which will render an American army effective from the start if it ever comes in here, and save the lives of many thousands of our soldiers.

I shall say nothing about our own work here, except that it seems to me that excellent results can be produced, once channels are cleared.

The letter which you gave me to General Fitzgerald has been helpful. Personally in Accra and through his representative here the General has done evrything possible to facilitate our journey and our work. It was great to see Tom Barly. He is carrying on with his usual vigour and doing a job which is well above his captain's rank.

I have talked to a good many people here, including Mr. Kirk and Joseph E. Jacobs, his extremely capable second. From the Cairo situation I believe that I have learned a good deal that will be useful in the job I have to do. The task of adjustment is not going to be easy, but we have something so valuable to offer that I do not believe that it will be refused.

Sincerely,

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To: Col Huntington

Have by me
read the
attached & return

S.

Director's Office

(9308)

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Hayden, J.R. 78/3
* China
* Report

COPY

SECRET

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Calcutta, December 6, 1942

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I am taking advantage of an opportunity to send a letter to you by a friend to report in a way that I wished to avoid when sending messages through either of the means available to me in Chungking. Although, as I previously reported, General Stilwell informed General Marshall that he approved the continuation of the operation, he did so "pending the formal approval of the Generalissimo," I omitted this qualifying phrase from my message at Lusey's request; and because I believed that in any event you would see the Stilwell-Marshall telegram. When I talked with Stilwell the day before I left Chungking, he again stated that he had been unable to discover through the Generalissimo's right hand man in such matters that Chiang knew anything about the plan or the people in question. He believes it to be highly important to secure the Generalissimo's approval and will continue to press for it. At the same time, he agreed that it might take six months for approval to be forthcoming, and that in the meantime the work should go on. Stilwell's feeling (and it is strong) is that the operation would be on a much <u>safer</u> basis if it had the formal recognition of the Generalissimo.

Miles expects to receive such recognition, and may have it before this letter reaches you. His position is that he is working with Tai Lee; that he and Tai trust each other, and that the Generalissimo trusts Tai. As for Stilwell, while he should be kept informed in a general way, the operation is practically beyond his jurisdiction. Miles also states that he will have to have an absolutely free hand so far as Washington is concerned. Otherwise he will sever his OSS connection, as he has a Navy job that is big enough for any man. He is especially vigorous in declaring that he will not stand for any unrequested personnel.

My own reactions to the existing situation are as follows:

1. While I agree with General Stilwell that the Generalissimo's formal recognition would be highly desirable, I believe that the operation should be fully supported from Washington even without it. There may be some risk in it, Miles being so completely in Tai's hands, but it would be better to take the risk than abandon the

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operation or execute it in a half-hearted way. I am convinced that as things stand now we must work in China through Miles and Tai or not at all.

2. On the whole, I feel that Miles' demand for complete independence of action is reasonable. At any rate, he is in a position to exact it.

3. I am somewhat disturbed at Miles' attitude re Stilwell. It reminds me of the attitude that Admiral Plunkett had toward the Army in France, - and that led to plenty of trouble. However, I have done all that I can do in this matter.

4. I am satisfied that if given sufficient materiel, Miles will be of tremendous assistance to the Chinese in fighting the Japanese. That's what we want to do; and if we have to do it on the terms of the Chinese and without any immediate and definite quid pro quo in the way of intelligence, we should operate on that basis.

5. Our military forces in China are receiving almost no intelligence that isn't handed to them, by the Chines Army. I believe that Miles' operation will increase the quantity and improve the quality of the intelligence received by us both in China and in Washington; and that above all Miles operation will greatly increase the speed with which intelligence secured in enemy territory is made available.

I arrived in Calcutta night before last, and am leaving for Colombo tomorrow to try to catch an unusually favorable sailing that Consul General Patton has located for me. How long the passage will be - do not know. All information regarding routes, the names of ships, etc, is very closely guarded. The Calcutta papers carry news of a number of sinkings within recent weeks. When I reach my destination I shall make every effort to see General MacArthur as well as to talk with the Dutch and to study the general situation with reference to our work.

I understand from Lusey that OWI discussed with you the possibility of my doing a survey in India for them. Smith had previously wired me about it, but for various reasons I replied that I had another assignment that perhaps would take precedence and that he had better look for some one whose availability was more certain.

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Sincerely,

/s/ J.R. Hayden

P.S. One or two observations regarding the situation in China:

1. China has the strongest government in its history. The Generalissimo possesses sufficient military, political and police force to crush any war lord or combination of war lords and politicians who might seek to overthrow him. This position will be maintained after the war is over. The Kuomintang is constantly strengthening its hold on the country and Chiang is strengthening his control within the Kuomintang. On the other hand, due to the large number of matters which the Generalissimo personally controls and the difficulties of administration in China, Chiang's decisions are not always carried out at the lower where action must take place.

2. China will remain in the war to the finish. She will not, however, prosecute an aggressive war without artillery and planes from the outside. As the Chief of Ordnance said to me, "We could do it, but it would not be decent to sent our men into a modern offensive armed with rifles, grenades and machine guns."

3. China's greatest danger is inflation. Dr. Arthur N. Young, Financial Adviser to the Ministry of Finance stated to me confidentially that prices are now 40 times what they were in 1937; by spring, unless the trend is checked they will be 100 times; then China would be on the toboggan financially, with serious political results. There is danger that internal control will be ineffective. The answer is a speedy reconquest of Burma and an opening of the country to outside aid before administration disintegrates.

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Secret & Confidential

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C
O
P
Y

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON

August 20, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
Office of Strategic Services

SUBJECT: Dragon Plan

On July 23, 1942, the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff informed the American Mission in China that the Office of Strategic Services was sending Dr. Joseph R. Hayden to China to outline the above plan personally to General Stilwell. Apparently Dr. Hayden has not yet left the United States. Since implementation of the Dragon Plan depends upon General Stilwell's recommendation, it is desired by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff that Dr. Hayden proceed to China as soon as possible, and this is your authority to make the necessary arrangements.

(Signed)
W. B. SMITH
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Secretary

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

HOTEL ST FRANCIS
ONE OF THE WORLD'S GREAT HOTELS
SAN FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA

7 May 1943

My dear General Donovan.

Just a short note to express my very deep appreciation for the very fine spirit that prompted you to make Joe Hayden available to help me here on the coast prior to my undertaking my mission to the West

We were able to explore many phases of possible future developments. The expression of his view and his counsel has been most helpful and, if I be given the ultimate responsibility I seek, shall prove a great public service

Your cooperative attitude and his in this matter have been characteristic of you both and I assure you is deeply appreciated by me. More of just that same attitude on the part of leading public officials

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Hawaii 14,738

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan.

DATE: 7 July 1944.

FROM: Colonel E. F. Connely.

SUBJECT: Nisei Recruiting in the Hawaiian Islands.

Upon my return from your office yesterday, I found the attached letter from Commander Halliwell waiting for me. It was in reply to my recent airmail letter to him on the subject.

It would appear that the suggestion that we got from G-3 is unworkable as far as trying to earmark the Nisei who are being inducted in the Islands is concerned, because the well-qualified ones are selected for Camp Savage, G-2, and it would appear that Admiral Nimitz does not favor any other recruiting activity in Hawaii.

It seems, therefore, that we must try to apprehend the arrival of these people at reception centers on the coast. I am taking this phase of the question up with Colonel Gregory, and will report to you later.

E. F. C.

EFC:GLM

Attachment

file in Hawaii file

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
HONOLULU 1, T. H.

INTEROFFICE MEMO

E. F. Connely, Colg., FSA, Chief, DATE: 30 June 1944
Personnel Procurement Branch via Acting Assistant Director
[illegible] Davis Halliwell, Comdr., USNR - OSS

Nisei Recruiting in the Hawaiian Islands

1. This acknowledges receipt of your letter of 22nd June 1944. It is regretted that we can not be very optimistic on this subject.

2. There is no indication that the Theatre Commander will give his approval to our recruiting Nisei for use in combat activities.

3. As far as we can discover, all inductees from this group, whether foreign or Island born, showing promise of any outstanding talents are being taken into the army and are being sent to Camp Savage (See our despatch 157, 5 May 44) where it is believed they are being trained for somewhat limited and special usage, such as combat interrogation, etc., rather than the more conventional "combat" use. At Selby, Mississippi, as you know, is a Japanese camp where, we understand, the training is more general.

4. The only strictly combat use that is being made of Nisei from this area is, as far as we know, in the North African theatre (100th Infantry). Possibly you will see fit to explore the availability of these troops, including the reclassified groups from these units, altho there is no indication here that they could be used in this area or would be permitted to re-enter the area.

5. In connection with this matter, your attention is requested to the subject matter of our despatch 157, 9 June 44, for the attention of Col. Buxton only -- we feel sure he will make this available to you, if he has not already done so. Also, we believe the attached extracts from Dr. Tozzer's letter of 7 October 43 to Dr. Ledger will be of interest because, as far as we can tell, there is no official change in the attitude of Admiral Nimitz or the War Department in this respect. It is also suggested that a more complete picture of this situation as it developed can be derived from the following letters to and

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E. F. Connely, Col., F.A. - 2 - 20 June 1944

From this office to Washington:

From Major Little, MO,		to Dr. Tozzer		3 Sept. 43
" " "		" " "		11 Sept. 43
" Mr. John Wilson, RSA,		" " "		13 Sept. 43
" Dr. Tozzer		" Major Little		6 Oct. 43
" " "		" Mr. Wilson		20 Sept. 43
" " "		" Dr. Tozzer		21 Sept. 43

6. It is our understanding that the Navy is also hard pressed for people of this type and, as they are of the opinion that they cannot use Nisei except in exceptional cases (which are almost impossible to discover), they are training large groups of young American officers at Boulder, Colorado, and elsewhere, and groups from these schools are arriving here frequently.

7. My personal reaction to recruiting combat Nisei in this area is best expressed by stating that the ground has been pretty well "picked over" and my belief is that what remains is of pretty poor quality, from a functional point of view, and it is very doubtful in regard to what would be found from the viewpoint of security or loyalty.

8. In respect to Nisei for non-combat purposes, in your paragraph 1-a, the information already given on Camp Savage covers this point. They are all in the Army and will not, we believe, be released to another organization. See Tozzer's letter.

9. There is a possibility of obtaining Hawaiian-born Japanese women for interpreters, etc. We have a list of 27 of these, provided by Major Blake of MID for Col. Fielder of G-2, and we feel sure some of these might be available.

10. To sum up: There are two main difficulties in any recruiting of Hawaiian-Japanese here:-

(a) We cannot get the permission of the Theatre Commander to do this.

(b) The supply is very strictly limited. Hence we recommend combing this field in the mainland.

11. In respect to your query as to "how recruiting should be handled in the islands," apparently the only recruiting that can be done will be confined to some small group of civilians for office

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use in Honolulu, as interpreters, and, in addition, there may be some chance of discovering a few people who could be creative artists, research people, etc., etc. It would appear that branch heads who will be sent here and have a specific knowledge of what they desire could expect some measure of success in securing personnel locally for some specific jobs.

The branch heads can be assisted by various officers of ONI, MID, etc., and by some of Dr. Tolman's civilian friends with leads and advice.

18. It is not believed, however, that what remains unemployed is very large in quantity or particularly good in quality. All governmental agencies, such as those cited above plus FBI, FCC and Censorship, have skimmed the best quality available wherever security checks would permit their use in general or restricted employment.

19. Sorry our report cannot be more cheerful.

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October 7, 1945

Dear Langer:

I have just returned from lunching with Admiral Nimitz and discussed the whole situation regarding the request of OSS to recruit Hawaiian-Japanese here in the Islands.

You have already heard his answer and my cable of yesterday told the same thing. You have also his reasons for the refusal, which, perhaps, I had better repeat as part of my record.

The decision was made after consulting with a committee of Army and Navy officials, several of whom I know.

There are two reasons: first, the question of security; and second, the question of supply.

The first point is covered in the two paragraphs,(No.1), in my letter to you of September 21. It should be added that several in MID and FBI still do not feel there is a danger, but Commander Burr in his talk with me on September 21 reflected the opinion of ONI and of the Army Command.

On the question of supply: as I said to Major Little in my letter of October 6, the "cream" of the Hawaiian-Japanese young men (27: to be precise) are learning to be interpreters, teachers, translators of Japanese, etc., at Camp Savage, Minnesota. They are in the Army and one of the high Army men told me yesterday, "They will remain in the Army", and hence will not be available for the work required in Project X. To my argument, if they are "unsafe" for us, why not unsafe for you? the answer is: in the work for which they are preparing themselves, they will always be around Headquarters and for Project X they would probably work singly and in advanced and very dangerous positions.

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Lt. Col. Donald M. Gregory. 7 July 1944.

Colonel E. F. Connoly,

Hawaii Recruiting.

A friendly tip that we got from G-3 suggests the idea that the Hawaiians who are being shipped to the reception centers of the Pacific Coast might be worth looking over.

As you know, OSS is interested in getting qualified Nisei for various jobs. If there are any who have had either an adequate education or linguistic background to fit into R & A, they would be useful to that Branch. If there are any that could be used in MO activities, that would be of interest. Perhaps there are even some who could be trained as organizers and leaders of guerilla bands.

Will you take steps to learn when these shipments arrive and have either Small or Howard investigate the possibilities at the reception centers? No commitments can or should be made. The initial purpose will be to find out just what the possibilities are.

I am attaching a copy of a letter received from Commander Halliwell, which explains the situation as it exists in the Islands.

E. F. C.

EFC:OLM

Attachment

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

MICRONESIA AND HAWAIIAN BRANCH
HONOLULU OFFICE

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: The Director

DATE: 31 August 1944

FROM: Alfred E. Tenner

SUBJECT: Contents of Army Air Pouch OB-9

1. Letter to E. Davis Halliwell, Comdr., USNR

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH
HONOLULU OFFICE

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: 31 August 1944

TO: The Director

FROM: Alfred W. Tessar

SUBJECT: Contents of Army Air Pouch OS-7

1. Letter to P. Davis Halliwell, Condr., USNR

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH

HONOLULU OFFICE

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: 31 August 1944

TO: R. Davis Halliwell, Comdr., USNR
Via The Director, Washington, D.C.

FROM: A.F. Tozzer

SUBJECT: Office in Alsup Clinic Building.

The above office is in fairly good shape with the following exceptions:

(1) The lighting system is not adequate, especially in the rooms designated General Office Space "A" (where the switchboard is located) and "B". We have had the Hawaiian Electric Co. make a survey and they have recommended the installation of fluorescent lights - primarily because this type of light does not give off heat. They have given an estimate of $1057. for materials plus $500 to $600 for labor. The cost appears to be high, but this is brought about by the fact that in order to secure the proper amount of current it is necessary to install additional circuits because the present wiring cannot carry the load.

(2) If we are to have six or more women employees, plus an equal number or more men, the present toilet facilities (consisting of one toilet) would not seem to be adequate. We have gone over the matter with Dr. Alsup and Mr. Kawagoushi and their recommendation is that we use either room No. 8 which is over a rest room on the second floor, or room No. 8, which is next to the existing toilet. If you approve of our going ahead and having such a room provided, which room would you suggest we use, or shall we use the one involving the least expense.

The switchboard has been installed and service is in. We have not, however, finally installed the phones although each room has a phone located in it ready for use. General Office Space "A" calls for three phones - we have not been installed at all because we have no plan showing just where you wish them located.

Use the following furniture in the building:

1 [illegible] safe (secured from the Castle estate)
[illegible] safes (secured from Metal Equipment Co.)
[illegible] safes (secured from the Army)
Stenographer Desks
[illegible] Desks
Filing Cabinets (wood)
" " (steel) - very poor condition

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

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[illegible]

[illegible] engineer [illegible] appear to be [illegible]

[illegible] 14" carriage [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] fans, 2 large fans
[illegible] desk
[illegible] desk

[illegible] Stenographer desks, executive type
[illegible] Executive desk
[illegible] Executive chairs
[illegible] Stenographer [illegible]

[illegible] the large amount of furniture and other equipment [illegible] from Mr. Stoddard Hancock on 16 August 1964, which [illegible]

[illegible] if you could cable the following information: [illegible] (1) Shall we go ahead and install lighting [illegible] cost of $1000 to $1600? Answer yes or no. (2) Shall [illegible] other toilet? Answer yes or no. If yes, number of [illegible]

[illegible] about coming to work for you but we have put [illegible] for Stenographic positions, a Miss Nemeth [illegible] They have agreed to wait until your return for an answer.

* * *

[illegible] up to here. As I see the Friedman situation, [illegible] would, after our experience with her and learning [illegible] for all. This may be entirely gratuitous [illegible] it is the thing to do. It might be a note from your [illegible] put her off, I think.

[illegible] that Pehe is making a trip. What about it?

[illegible] your room to you. I do hope the delay in your [illegible] of adverse circumstances; if so, may they decrease.

[illegible]

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PROGRESS REPORT
ON
OPERATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

Type (Japanese): Refusal for additional fonts. Specifications & costs in few days.

Housing: Two pieces in mind -- upper floor of Doctors' Clinic and a vacant house which might have to be bought.

Dr. Emery: His services & training in field techniques assured.

Scientific Personnel: 10 names suggested.

Forense Bibliography: All anthropological and geographical periodical literature to be searched. To be provided by Peabody Museum Library, Harvard University.

Chinese & Japanese Personnel: Interviews begun.

A. M. Tozzer
Director, Honolulu Office
OSS

April 1[illegible], 1944

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Hawaii 1283

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x Relationship
x R&A-
x ONI

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

Secaloo -
Adams T.F.M. 9947, a, 3 to

October 25, 1943

TO: Lt. William J. Casey, Secretariat

FROM: John D. Wilson

SUBJECT: Relationship Between R&A and ONI in Honolulu, T. H.

The Research & Analysis Branch has had a representative in Honolulu since the spring of 1942. Mr. Warren Delano was the first representative of R&A. He was succeeded in December 1942 by Dr. Alfred Tozzer.

Both Delano and Tozzer had excellent connections in Honolulu and have made contacts with Army and Navy representatives, including Admiral Nimitz and his staff.

When R&A first began work in Honolulu, the Intelligence Center of the Pacific Ocean Area (ICPOA) was only being organized by Admiral Nimitz. I believe the organization of this unit was undertaken partly at the suggestion of Major Jones, who was the first representative of the Coordinator of Information to visit Honolulu. R&A was asked to contribute personnel to ICPOA. However, R&A was only then being organized here on a large scale, and it was impossible to earmark appropriate personnel for ICPOA. Some months later when Dr. Baxter (then Director of R&A) suggested we furnish personnel for ICPOA, we were informed none was needed.

As a result, our work in Honolulu has largely been of a liaison nature. Several women assistants are attached to Dr. Tozzer's office, and among other things, they maintain the only index file of information from monitored radio broadcasts (white broadcasts) that is available in the Islands. This file is used a great deal by R&A in Washington and by the various intelligence units in Honolulu. In addition, R&A furnishes a flow of material to Honolulu, copies of which are sent to ICPOA for their files.

The dominant influence in ICPOA (which is a joint Army and Navy organization) is ONI. Our relationship with ICPOA has always been friendly. Dr. Tozzer receives their principal reports and forwards these reports to us. He formerly got these reports from the

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RATEGIC SERVICES

GTON, D. C.

2 -

membership in IOPOA. However, some three or four months ago he
ified us that ONI, Washington, had indicated that reports were to
given to OSS only through ONI in Washington. Neither Dr. Tozzer
we felt this to be a desirable arrangement, since ONI does not
tribute to us any information on an automatic basis and we have
no way of ascertaining what is available. For this reason Dr. Tos-
zer made arrangements to receive the IOPOA material through the Army
representatives. This was satisfactory to everyone concerned in
Honolulu, and we have said nothing about the matter here.

Our relationship with IOPOA in Honolulu has been satisfactory.
R&A would not like to have any formal representations made to ONI
which would disturb the situation that now exists.

Dr. Tozzer was concerned in his letter with the attitude of
ONI toward OSS' recruiting Japanese-American civilians. According
to Dr. Tozzer, ONI was unwilling to allow OSS even to contact
Japanese-Americans unless clearance were obtained through appro-
priate ONI channels in Washington. It is my understanding that
neither General Donovan nor Major Little wishes to contact ONI in
Washington on this matter at the present time. Moreover, since
Fleet Commander approval for the transportation to Honolulu of
Mr. Adams (who was to interview the Japanese-Americans for MO) has
been cancelled, Dr. Tozzer has been instructed to drop the whole pro-
ject for the time being.

I should like to repeat that in the eyes of R&A it is undesir-
able to approach ONI in Washington to obtain anymore complete ex-
change of information as between Dr. Tozzer and the Intelligence
Officer stationed in Honolulu. R&A is satisfied for the time being with
the present arrangements. We believe that if formal representation
were made to ONI, nothing would be accomplished and the present ar-
rangement Dr. Tozzer has with the Army would be upset.

John D. Wilson

John D. Wilson, Ensign USNR
Special Assistant to Director R&A

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel C. Edward Buxton

FROM: Philip Bastedo

DATE: October 8, 1943

SUBJECT: Liaison with ONI in Hawaii

The attached letter from Tresser to Dr. Langer brings up the question of the relationship between R&A and ONI in Hawaii which at the present time appears to be far from satisfactory. It may be mentioned that the recruiting referred to in the letter is being done by Tresser for ND and has no connection with his regular work.

The matter of commencing negotiations to improve the situation in Hawaii involves so much background of which I am ignorant and so many matters of high policy I am referring it to you for decision what the next step should be.

Attachment

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Dr. Langer

a copy of

this was sent

to Major Little.

WJD

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
HONOLULU, T. H.

September 21, 1945

SECRET

Dr. William L. Langer, Director
Branch of Research and Analysis
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear Langer:

Yesterday I sent you a long letter and a cable about the [illegible] of the delay in recommending an organizer for the project [illegible] outlined in recent letters from Wilson, MacDonald and Major Little.

Today I sent a cable regarding our relations with ONI. I have been lunching once a week with Lt. Commander Carr and Lieutenant Maxon, the former the head of the translation department of ONI and a Professor at the University of Hawaii. These [illegible] have furnished me with information regarding men under consideration. Three names were up for comment. FBI and MID strongly recommended one of them, but this man was turned down informally by Carr and Maxon.

Lt. Commander H. S. Burr, the head of ONI then stepped decidedly into the picture and reprimanded these men "for giving an opinion without his permission".

I am just back from an entirely pleasant and frank [illegible] with Burr. He made the following points, some of which are included in my cable:

(1) Speaking off the record and informally," he would not recommend any of the three men on my list of candidates for organizer. In fact, he would not think it expedient to employ any Hawaiian-Japanese in any project which would take them out of the country and into areas west of here. They all know, as we all do, far too much of the internal situation here so far as preparations for and the [illegible] of the war are concerned, and, if captured, couldn't, [illegible] at least, be relied upon. He recommends recruiting [illegible] Japanese. It should be pointed out that it is very [illegible] to identify Hawaiian-Japanese by their accent.

[illegible] already shown, MID and FBI do not feel this way about [illegible] Japanese. In passing, it might be noted that the "[illegible]" [illegible] are not in school at Camp Savage, Minnesota. Masaji Marumoto, [illegible] very keen about, who was recommended by MID and FBI is in [illegible] I had planned to suggest that he be interviewed there [illegible] Washington.

[illegible] one experience then this recommendation of recruits is

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[illegible]

Sincerely,

[illegible]

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Hawaii 10,913
x Census, Bureau of

October 31, 1942

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of the Census
Washington

Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940
x Population

Series HA, No. 2

POPULATION

POPULATION BY AGE, RACE, AND SEX FOR THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII AND FOR HILO AND HONOLULU CITIES: 1940

Race. More than one-third (37.5 percent) of the population of Hawaii was of the Japanese race, according to returns from the 1940 Census of Population released today by Director J. C. Capt of the Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce. Persons of other major Oriental races (Chinese, Filipinos, and Koreans) numbered 88,194, or 20.8 percent of the total population. In 1940, only 14,375, or 3.4 percent of the population, were pure Hawaiians, as compared with 4.1 percent in 1930 and 9.3 percent in 1920. The decrease of 9,348 in the number of pure Hawaiians was more than offset by the increase of 31,908 in the number of part-Hawaiians, between 1920 and 1940. This trend is indicative of much intermarriage between pure Hawaiians and persons of other races. The white (Caucasian) population of the Territory increased from 49,140, or 19.2 percent of the total, in 1920, to 78,708, or 20.0 percent, in 1930, and to 103,791, or 24.5 percent, in 1940.

In the 1940 Census, several revisions were made in the race classification for the Territory of Hawaii. "Portuguese," "Spanish," and "Other Caucasian" were combined into one group, "Caucasian." Puerto Ricans were classified as a separate group. All persons of Hawaiian blood were classified either as "Hawaiian" or "Part-Hawaiian." However, these changes have only slightly influenced the intercensus comparisons for the several racial groups.

Sex. The number of males greatly exceeded the number of females in the Territory in 1940, there being 137.6 males for every 100 females. This ratio ranged from 346.3 males for every 100 females among the Filipinos, to 109.5 for Hawaiians and 97.5 for part-Hawaiians. The number of males per 100 females in 1940 was appreciably below the corresponding number, 152.8 in 1930. This decrease is due in large part to the considerable decline in the number of male Filipinos between 1930 and 1940. Table 1 shows the population of the Territory and of Hilo and Honolulu cities by race and sex from 1920 to 1940.

Age. The population of Hawaii was older on the average in 1940 than in 1930. The median ages for the two dates were 23.2 and 22.0 respectively. (The median age is that age which divides the population into two equal groups--one-half being older, and one-half younger, than the median.) A declining birth rate is reflected in the fact that in each of the two youngest age groups (under 5 and 5 to 9) there were fewer persons in 1940 than in 1930 in spite of the increase in the total population during the decade. In the age groups 65 to 74 years and 75 years and over, on the other hand, the number of persons was much greater in 1940 than in 1930, the increase in each of these age groups amounting to more than 50 percent.

The proportion of the population under 15 years of age was higher for Hawaii than for continental United States--30.9 percent as compared with 25.0 percent. The proportion of persons under 15 was highest for part-Hawaiians (50.6 percent), and lowest for Caucasians (19.1 percent).

Table 2 shows the population of Hawaii by age, race, and sex in 1940 and 1930 and of Hilo and Honolulu cities in 1940. Table 3 shows the population of the counties of the Territory by race and sex, and table 4 shows the population of counties by age and sex.

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TABLE 1. POPULATION BY RACE AND SEX FOR THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII AND FOR HILO AND HONOLULU CITIES: 1920 TO 1940

(Percent not shown where less than 0.1; number of males per 100 females not shown where base is less than 100)

AREA AND RACE	BOTH SEXES Number 1940	Number 1930	Number 1920	Percent 1940	Percent 1930	Percent 1920	1940 Male	1940 Female	1930 Male	1930 Female	1920 Male	1920 Female	NUMBER OF MALES PER 100 FEMALES 1940	1930	1920
THE TERRITORY...	423,330	368,336	255,912	100.0	100.0	100.0	248,183	175,132	202,140	165,696	151,146	104,766	137.6	152.8	144.5
Hawaiian...	14,375	22,636	23,723	3.4	6.1	9.3	7,413	6,962	11,311	11,325	11,990	11,733	106.5	99.9	102.2
Part-Hawaiian...	49,935	28,224	18,027	11.8	7.7	7.0	24,650	25,285	14,046	14,178	9,048	8,979	97.5	99.0	100.8
Caucasian...	103,791	73,702	49,140	24.5	20.0	19.2	64,478	39,313	44,071	29,631	27,876	21,264	164.0	148.4	131.1
Chinese...	28,774	27,179	23,507	6.8	7.4	9.2	16,181	12,593	16,861	10,318	16,197	7,310	128.6	163.4	221.6
Filipino...	52,569	63,052	21,031	12.4	17.1	8.2	40,791	11,778	52,566	10,486	16,851	4,180	346.3	501.3	403.1
Japanese...	157,905	139,631	109,274	37.3	37.9	42.7	82,580	75,325	75,008	64,623	62,644	46,630	109.6	116.1	134.3
Korean...	6,851	6,461	4,950	1.6	1.8	1.9	3,985	2,866	3,999	2,462	3,498	1,452	139.0	162.4	240.9
Negro...	255	563	348	0.1	0.2	0.1	172	83	322	241	218	130	-	133.6	167.7
Puerto Rican...	8,296	6,671	5,602	2.0	1.8	2.2	4,467	3,829	3,635	3,036	3,133	2,469	116.6	119.7	126.9
Other races...	579	217	310	0.1	0.1	0.1	313	266	125	92	191	119	117.7	-	160.5
HILO CITY...	23,353	19,468	10,431	100.0	100.0	100.0	12,425	10,928	10,709	8,759	5,811	4,620	113.6	122.3	125.8
Hawaiian...	919	1,155	709	3.9	5.9	7.3	469	450	595	560	355	354	104.2	106.2	100.3
Part-Hawaiian...	3,329	1,881	830	13.8	9.7	8.0	1,664	1,665	980	981	405	425	94.0	91.7	95.3
Caucasian...	4,256	3,545	2,543	18.2	18.7	24.8	2,177	2,079	1,875	1,776	1,300	1,253	104.7	105.6	103.8
Chinese...	816	857	668	3.5	4.4	6.3	530	380	377	360	456	206	139.5	130.2	221.6
Filipino...	2,132	2,005	485	9.2	10.3	4.6	1,609	531	1,389	516	372	113	302.6	270.8	329.2
Japanese...	11,409	9,835	4,847	48.9	49.1	46.5	5,859	5,540	4,938	4,897	2,700	2,151	106.0	115.8	125.6
Korean...	337	333	98	1.4	1.5	0.9	189	148	187	151	66	37	131.5	128.0	-
Negro...	7	34	1	-	0.1	-	6	1	19	11	1	-	-	-	-
Puerto Rican...	294	150	128	1.3	0.8	1.2	176	118	80	70	68	60	100.4	-	-
Other races...	4	8	19	-	-	0.2	4	-	4	4	9	9	-	-	-
HONOLULU CITY...	179,358	137,582	83,327	100.0	100.0	100.0	94,784	84,574	74,454	63,128	46,577	36,750	112.0	117.9	126.7
Hawaiian...	5,407	9,675	8,463	3.0	7.0	10.2	2,778	2,879	4,790	4,985	4,190	4,263	108.7	96.0	98.1
Part-Hawaiian...	25,582	14,348	9,078	14.3	10.4	10.9	13,422	12,161	6,918	7,580	4,470	4,608	94.4	94.5	97.1
Caucasian...	60,358	36,848	22,866	33.6	26.8	27.9	34,544	25,940	20,584	16,608	12,463	10,419	118.8	125.9	128.8
Chinese...	22,445	19,334	13,383	12.5	14.1	16.1	12,304	10,141	11,146	8,188	8,430	4,986	121.3	136.1	170.1
Filipino...	6,887	4,776	2,113	3.8	3.5	2.5	5,108	1,788	3,337	1,439	1,550	483	285.6	231.9	326.4
Japanese...	60,595	47,468	24,522	33.8	34.5	29.4	31,388	29,271	24,958	22,515	13,490	11,032	107.2	110.8	122.3
Korean...	3,425	2,604	1,319	1.9	1.9	1.6	1,988	1,468	1,442	1,162	848	474	133.6	124.1	177.1
Negro...	180	322	198	0.1	0.2	0.2	96	84	178	144	100	98	-	123.6	-
Puerto Rican...	3,366	2,311	941	1.9	1.6	1.0	1,777	1,589	1,160	1,081	480	411	111.8	110.4	104.6
Other races...	284	118	186	0.2	0.1	0.2	158	181	64	54	91	95	84.3	-	-

TABLE 2. POPULATION BY AGE, RACE, AND SEX FOR THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII, 1940 AND 1930, AND FOR HILO AND HONOLULU CITIES, 1940

(Percent not shown where less than 0.1)

AREA, AGE, AND SEX	NUMBER All classes	Hawaiian	Part-Hawaiian	Caucasian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Korean	Puerto Rican, Negro, and other races	PERCENT DISTRIBUTION All classes	Hawaiian	Part-Hawaiian	Caucasian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Korean	Puerto Rican, Negro, and other races
THE TERRITORY - 1940																		
Total...	423,330	14,375	49,935	103,791	28,774	52,569	157,905	6,851	9,130	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5 years	40,680	1,079	9,385	6,996	2,169	4,449	14,416	420	1,169	9.6	9.6	18.8	6.5	9.5	8.8	9.1	6.8	12.8
5 to 9 years	43,681	1,045	8,806	6,808	2,785	4,720	17,904	612	1,301	10.3	8.7	15.9	6.8	9.7	9.0	11.3	8.9	14.3
10 to 14 years	47,894	1,438	9,450	6,846	3,374	4,042	25,167	861	1,381	11.3	10.0	18.1	6.6	12.4	7.7	14.0	12.6	14.8
15 to 19 years	40,838	1,373	6,186	10,838	3,880	2,450	18,820	1,049	1,080	11.4	9.9	12.4	10.1	13.5	4.6	14.1	15.3	11.8
20 to 24 years	41,077	1,374	4,743	20,860	3,048	1,644	18,119	798	830	10.1	8.9	9.5	19.4	10.6	3.5	11.5	11.6	9.1
25 to 29 years	41,852	1,620	3,611	18,818	3,419	3,326	18,681	808	795	10.0	8.5	7.2	18.1	11.9	6.3	11.8	11.4	8.7
30 to 34 years	35,885	1,079	2,669	9,853	1,861	3,861	8,068	889	688	5.9	7.5	5.3	9.5	6.5	7.3	5.1	9.1	7.5
35 to 39 years	30,660	1,464	2,145	9,085	1,974	9,818	7,918	880	614	6.8	9.1	4.3	8.8	6.9	17.1	5.0	8.8	6.7
40 to 44 years	25,111	989	1,493	6,919	1,725	4,800	6,708	666	598	5.3	6.9	3.0	6.7	6.0	18.0	4.2	8.9	6.5
45 to 49 years	17,684	635	1,375	4,986	1,318	4,130	5,378	181	519	4.1	4.4	2.8	4.8	4.6	8.0	3.4	2.6	5.7
50 to 54 years	16,174	753	898	3,683	869	2,871	7,165	884	481	3.8	5.2	1.8	3.5	3.0	5.5	4.5	12.9	5.3
55 to 64 years	20,918	1,079	1,046	4,464	1,850	974	6,449	654	481	4.9	7.5	2.1	4.3	6.4	1.9	4.1	9.5	5.3
65 to 74 years	10,115	458	694	2,679	1,607	179	4,400	441	378	2.4	3.2	1.4	2.6	5.6	0.3	2.8	6.4	4.1
75 years and over	3,660	358	168	866	841	82	788	88	108	0.9	2.5	0.3	0.8	2.9	0.2	0.5	1.3	1.2
Not reported	188	19	12	85	18	60	35	-	4	-	0.1	-	0.1	0.1	0.1	-	-	-
Under 1 year	9,419	918	2,089	1,493	858	881	3,814	40	258	2.2	1.8	4.1	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.2	2.8
21 years and over	252,240	9,401	19,440	68,006	18,077	33,818	75,077	8,098	4,196	58.0	65.4	38.9	65.5	62.8	64.3	47.5	76.4	46.0
Male...	248,183	7,413	24,650	64,478	16,181	40,791	82,580	3,985	4,898	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5 years	20,411	556	4,689	3,564	1,116	2,491	7,397	234	587	8.2	7.5	19.0	5.5	6.9	6.1	9.0	5.9	12.0
5 to 9 years	21,981	541	4,500	3,551	1,409	2,384	8,467	205	644	9.0	7.3	18.3	5.5	8.7	5.8	10.3	5.1	13.1
10 to 14 years	23,136	904	4,580	3,566	1,840	1,996	11,441	444	681	9.3	12.2	18.6	5.5	11.4	4.9	13.9	11.1	13.9
15 to 19 years	20,889	687	3,071	9,197	1,809	1,980	11,961	681	603	10.6	9.3	12.5	14.3	11.2	4.9	14.5	17.1	12.3
20 to 24 years	25,681	658	2,423	16,640	1,851	2,131	9,193	697	496	10.3	8.9	9.8	25.8	11.4	5.2	11.1	17.5	10.1
25 to 29 years	29,113	848	1,778	9,711	1,557	7,866	8,474	169	497	11.1	11.4	7.2	15.1	9.6	19.3	10.3	4.2	10.1
30 to 34 years	21,571	888	1,328	5,640	978	7,866	4,588	169	344	8.6	12.0	5.4	8.7	6.0	19.3	5.6	4.2	7.0
35 to 44 years	17,844	677	1,091	4,547	1,061	6,449	4,086	90	314	7.2	9.1	4.4	7.1	6.6	15.8	4.9	2.3	6.4
45 to 54 years	13,868	659	718	3,868	1,088	6,181	3,673	88	184	5.6	8.9	2.9	6.0	6.7	15.2	4.4	2.2	3.8
55 to 59 years	9,432	580	631	2,948	759	4,379	1,978	78	148	3.8	7.8	2.6	4.6	4.7	10.7	2.4	2.0	3.0
60 to 64 years	9,453	582	488	2,611	881	1,913	1,619	807	188	3.8	7.9	2.0	4.0	5.4	4.7	2.0	20.3	3.8
65 to 74 years	12,811	897	480	2,581	1,137	480	4,900	876	278	5.2	12.1	1.9	4.0	7.0	1.2	5.9	22.0	5.7
75 years and over	6,355	294	178	1,564	1,281	180	3,059	168	209	2.6	4.0	0.7	2.4	7.9	0.4	3.7	4.2	4.3
Not reported	1,884	107	48	358	878	48	424	64	49	0.8	1.4	0.2	0.6	5.4	0.1	0.5	1.6	1.0
Under 1 year	103	8	3	5	-	30	83	-	1	-	0.1	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	-	-
21 years and over	4,588	410	1,080	758	410	808	1,425	48	128									
[illegible]	162,665	4,858	6,588	48,481	9,848	35,880	41,481	8,898	2,306									

TABLE 3.

AREA, AGE, AND SEX	All classes
THE TERRITORY - 1940 - Con.	
Female...	175,195
Under 5 years	19,574
5 to 9 years	21,480
10 to 14 years	23,384
15 to 19 years	21,979
20 to 24 years	19,889
25 to 29 years	13,218
30 to 34 years	11,313
35 to 39 years	10,019
40 to 44 years	8,168
45 to 49 years	5,089
50 to 54 years	5,626
55 to 64 years	7,607
65 to 74 years	3,845
75 years and over	1,010
Not reported	88
Under 1 year	4,052
21 years and over	87,605
THE TERRITORY - 1930	
Total...	368,336
Under 5 years	40,180
5 to 9 years	47,119
10 to 14 years	39,648
15 to 19 years	33,490
20 to 24 years	42,767
25 to 29 years	36,671
30 to 34 years	27,474
35 to 44 years	41,007
45 to 54 years	29,077
55 to 64 years	16,748
65 to 74 years	6,091
75 years and over	1,767
Not reported	108
Under 1 year	8,578
21 years and over	193,808
Male...	222,640
Under 5 years	20,830
5 to 9 years	23,594
10 to 14 years	19,886
15 to 19 years	19,284
20 to 24 years	31,778
25 to 29 years	25,483
30 to 34 years	17,248
35 to 44 years	24,986
45 to 54 years	19,045
55 to 64 years	11,846
65 to 74 years	4,289
75 years and over	1,115
Not reported	68
Under 1 year	4,391
21 years and over	129,898
Female...	145,696
Under 5 years	20,650
5 to 9 years	23,525
10 to 14 years	19,807
15 to 19 years	14,166
20 to 24 years	10,989
25 to 29 years	11,388
30 to 34 years	10,214
35 to 44 years	16,031
45 to 54 years	10,032
55 to 64 years	4,980
65 to 74 years	1,884
75 years and over	498
Not reported	41
Under 1 year	4,488
21 years and over	63,910
HILO CITY - 1940	
Total...	23,353
Under 5 years	2,349
5 to 9 years	2,544
10 to 14 years	2,974
15 to 19 years	2,790
20 to 24 years	2,326
25 to 29 years	2,089
30 to 34 years	1,880
35 to 39 years	1,460
40 to 44 years	1,188
45 to 49 years	863
50 to 54 years	844
55 to 64 years	1,393
65 to 74 years	740
75 years and over	208
Not reported	16
Under 1 year	490
21 years and over	13,080

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TABLE 8. POPULATION BY AGE, RACE, AND SEX FOR THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII, 1940 AND 1950, AND FOR HILO AND HONOLULU CITIES, 1940-Con.

Area, age, and sex	Number: All classes	Hawaiian	Part-Hawaiian	Caucasian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Korean	Puerto Rican, Negro, and other races	Percent distribution: All classes	Hawaiian	Part-Hawaiian	Caucasian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Korean	Puerto Rican, Negro, and other races
THE TERRITORY - 1940 Con.																		
Female	178,395	6,962	28,835	30,818	10,649	11,978	78,069	6,806	4,180	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5 years	19,676	388	4,049	2,878	1,042	2,288	7,139	694	681	11.0	7.8	16.6	6.8	8.8	19.0	9.4	7.8	16.7
5 to 9 years	21,480	614	6,147	2,897	1,097	2,404	8,899	837	655	12.1	8.8	16.6	8.8	11.0	19.8	11.8	10.6	15.2
10 to 14 years	22,244	786	4,898	2,858	1,704	2,196	10,680	448	680	12.1	10.8	14.6	8.8	15.7	17.4	14.6	16.0	14.8
15 to 19 years	21,979	801	4,098	2,848	1,741	1,506	10,956	548	495	12.8	9.1	10.8	8.8	16.0	10.8	14.6	16.1	11.7
20 to 24 years	19,688	586	3,814	3,865	1,580	710	9,987	654	492	10.7	8.8	9.9	10.1	15.1	6.1	11.9	16.0	9.8
25 to 29 years	15,614	507	1,458	4,884	1,180	482	6,619	149	393	8.6	8.4	7.8	11.8	9.1	4.8	8.0	5.6	7.4
30 to 34 years	11,816	589	1,885	4,610	904	487	8,718	107	297	6.6	7.8	8.5	10.7	7.8	8.7	6.0	8.7	7.0
35 to 39 years	10,919	347	1,111	3,816	898	871	8,831	180	300	6.1	7.0	4.4	8.4	7.1	7.4	8.1	8.8	4.7
40 to 44 years	9,168	457	779	2,867	459	494	8,780	211	111	5.1	6.6	3.1	6.9	8.8	4.9	8.0	7.8	4.8
45 to 49 years	7,889	477	701	2,198	493	888	8,460	86	190	4.4	6.0	2.8	5.6	8.8	8.0	6.7	8.0	3.8
50 to 54 years	8,696	866	440	1,649	819	189	2,587	87	94	4.8	8.8	1.9	4.8	8.8	1.8	8.4	8.0	3.8
55 to 64 years	7,667	841	644	1,189	488	195	3,865	118	189	4.8	9.8	2.8	5.4	8.0	1.1	4.8	4.1	8.0
65 to 74 years	8,849	898	260	1,066	869	85	1,896	88	70	1.9	4.8	0.0	8.6	8.1	0.8	1.9	1.8	1.9
75 years and over	1,016	118	80	478	48	8	196	88	44	0.6	1.7	0.8	1.8	0.8	0.1	0.8	0.8	1.3
Not reported	58	8	8	84	5	1	14	-	8	-	-	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	0.1
Under 1 year	4,058	118	1,081	797	184	485	1,480	44	94	2.8	1.8	4.1	1.8	1.8	8.6	1.9	1.8	8.2
21 years and over	67,868	4,848	9,871	26,569	6,658	8,628	25,865	3,984	1,011	49.8	68.4	38.9	64.9	60.9	88.4	47.1	48.8	48.7
THE TERRITORY - 1950																		
Total	466,688	28,886	29,884	78,760	27,196	48,088	179,481	6,461	7,461	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5 years	48,100	2,473	6,884	6,481	3,078	6,718	21,785	780	1,161	18.1	10.9	23.4	8.7	18.4	9.1	18.8	10.8	18.6
5 to 9 years	47,116	3,481	5,848	6,741	3,069	3,619	23,089	1,000	1,110	18.6	10.7	18.0	9.1	18.1	8.9	16.9	16.1	14.9
10 to 14 years	38,648	3,088	4,809	6,189	3,110	1,888	19,894	808	918	10.8	10.8	14.9	8.6	11.4	8.0	18.8	10.8	12.8
15 to 19 years	35,490	3,168	4,818	7,177	3,078	3,074	19,187	898	838	9.1	9.7	11.4	8.7	9.8	8.1	9.1	8.8	11.9
20 to 24 years	48,767	1,608	4,877	10,714	3,010	14,688	8,119	641	789	11.0	8.8	8.1	17.8	7.4	28.0	6.0	8.7	9.8
25 to 29 years	36,671	1,475	3,981	8,890	1,988	19,448	8,806	298	447	10.0	9.4	8.1	18.1	7.8	31.8	8.9	8.8	6.6
30 to 34 years	37,494	1,882	3,880	8,087	1,050	8,788	7,409	590	899	7.8	8.7	4.5	8.8	6.9	18.9	7.8	4.5	4.8
35 to 44 years	41,007	2,078	3,471	9,168	3,108	8,078	18,084	488	707	11.1	18.1	7.0	18.4	7.8	18.6	10.0	7.8	9.8
45 to 54 years	33,077	3,001	3,076	8,478	3,808	8,108	18,989	1,861	814	7.9	10.8	8.9	7.6	8.5	8.9	10.0	10.4	8.8
55 to 64 years	14,760	1,588	497	3,780	2,084	488	7,898	688	847	4.6	6.8	1.8	8.8	9.7	0.7	5.7	9.8	6.7
65 to 74 years	8,891	729	881	1,444	1,841	101	1,708	148	170	1.6	8.8	0.6	8.0	4.6	0.8	1.8	8.8	8.0
75 years and over	1,967	308	86	491	484	88	187	83	60	0.5	1.6	0.8	0.9	1.8	-	0.1	0.8	0.8
Not reported	108	89	8	88	10	9	84	1	4	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1
Under 1 year	9,878	811	1,880	1,874	65	1,580	4,061	188	838	8.6	8.8	4.8	1.7	8.4	8.1	8.9	8.8	8.1
21 years and over	198,808	12,781	8,867	44,928	14,189	48,040	80,889	2,848	8,809	88.8	86.8	80.8	61.0	88.0	71.4	48.8	80.8	48.1
Male	262,840	11,811	14,843	46,071	16,881	38,544	98,808	8,869	4,098	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5 years	24,600	1,847	8,249	3,248	1,788	3,884	11,146	464	855	11.0	11.0	23.1	7.8	10.8	8.4	14.0	11.8	18.8
5 to 9 years	23,894	1,680	8,082	3,486	1,868	1,885	11,596	580	681	10.9	16.0	19.1	7.7	10.9	8.5	18.7	18.8	16.8
10 to 14 years	19,896	1,161	2,119	3,078	1,547	986	9,488	481	498	8.6	10.2	18.0	8.8	9.8	1.8	10.6	10.0	18.8
15 to 19 years	19,864	1,167	1,817	4,886	1,804	3,208	8,782	288	480	8.7	10.9	11.5	10.0	8.9	6.8	9.0	8.8	11.8
20 to 24 years	21,724	958	1,876	10,189	1,378	18,088	4,888	185	888	14.3	8.4	7.7	22.6	8.8	28.1	8.8	8.8	9.4
25 to 29 years	24,889	960	814	6,158	1,078	12,087	4,198	78	384	11.4	8.7	8.8	13.4	8.9	28.9	8.8	1.9	8.8
30 to 34 years	17,888	928	819	8,478	1,184	7,611	8,169	88	178	8.8	4.4	4.6	7.7	7.4	15.0	4.8	1.4	4.8
35 to 44 years	24,568	1,057	869	6,171	1,889	9,206	8,798	287	418	11.8	10.9	5.7	11.8	10.8	14.8	10.4	8.8	10.8
45 to 54 years	19,243	1,114	888	8,077	1,789	1,845	9,189	1,118	418	8.5	10.8	8.8	6.8	18.8	8.8	18.8	27.9	10.8
55 to 64 years	11,449	887	841	1,887	2,608	162	8,788	880	846	6.8	7.4	1.7	8.4	8.8	0.8	7.8	14.0	8.0
65 to 74 years	4,687	619	180	844	1,148	59	1,491	111	185	1.8	8.7	0.9	1.9	8.4	0.3	1.9	8.8	8.8
75 years and over	1,116	197	66	887	808	18	150	17	80	0.5	1.7	0.8	0.7	-	-	0.1	0.4	0.7
Not reported	88	18	8	15	8	8	15	3	8	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1
Under 1 year	4,891	389	780	864	810	868	8,067	91	119	2.8	8.8	8.1	1.8	1.8	1.8	8.8	1.8	8.8
21 years and over	137,808	8,861	4,148	30,916	9,884	31,860	64,840	8,898	1,983	58.1	86.8	89.8	64.8	80.8	99.7	48.8	89.1	47.8
Female	145,848	11,885	14,188	88,681	16,615	10,464	84,888	8,468	8,889	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5 years	28,650	1,889	3,609	3,168	1,819	3,888	10,888	486	808	16.8	10.8	21.8	11.0	15.8	27.8	16.8	10.8	18.0
5 to 9 years	28,868	1,801	3,884	3,878	1,759	1,795	11,474	889	889	18.9	10.6	18.7	11.4	16.6	17.1	17.8	20.7	16.0
10 to 14 years	18,607	1,868	3,058	3,061	1,888	940	9,111	407	417	10.9	10.8	14.8	10.7	14.7	8.9	14.1	16.8	18.0
15 to 19 years	18,146	1,871	1,889	8,898	1,819	846	8,448	176	458	9.7	9.8	11.8	9.8	11.8	8.4	10.0	7.1	18.0
20 to 24 years	18,900	1,881	1,868	8,878	980	798	8,888	181	848	7.8	9.1	8.8	9.0	8.8	7.8	6.8	4.9	10.8
25 to 29 years	11,888	815	617	8,787	877	1,780	8,169	188	888	7.8	9.1	6.8	9.4	8.8	10.8	6.4	8.8	8.8
30 to 34 years	10,811	784	688	8,868	761	889	8,888	888	184	7.0	7.0	4.7	9.0	7.0	8.1	6.6	9.8	8.7
35 to 44 years	16,064	1,016	1,868	8,081	899	946	7,888	181	880	11.0	10.4	7.8	14.9	8.4	9.8	11.8	8.8	8.8
45 to 54 years	10,668	1,148	868	8,808	880	889	4,798	180	188	8.9	10.1	8.8	9.4	8.8	8.8	7.4	8.8	8.7
55 to 64 years	4,589	658	884	1,848	889	86	8,188	98	101	8.4	6.1	1.8	4.8	8.1	0.8	8.8	8.0	8.0
65 to 74 years	1,854	880	181	880	74	18	888	41	84	1.1	8.8	0.7	8.1	0.9	0.8	0.8	1.8	1.8
75 years and over	888	166	86	864	91	6	67	8	80	0.4	1.8	0.8	1.8	0.8	0.1	-	0.8	0.7
Not reported	41	19	1	10	8	1	7	-	1	-	0.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Under 1 year	4,860	891	880	810	860	458	1,994	94	116	8.8	8.0	4.4	8.1	8.8	8.8	8.1	8.8	8.4
21 years and over	68,510	8,893	4,448	16,618	4,888	4,158	88,689	888	1,878	48.4	88.4	81.8	88.8	48.8	88.8	40.8	84.0	87.7
HILO CITY - 1950																		
Total	27,888	919	3,584	4,888	910	2,188	11,887	849	888	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5 years	3,887	87	888	881	58	460	1,088	88	88	10.1	8.8	10.8	8.8	8.8	9.8	9.1	8.9	11.8
5 to 9 years	3,848	78	888	878	78	888	1,888	88	81	11.8	8.8	17.1	8.8	8.4	10.7	11.8	10.1	10.8
10 to 14 years	3,878	108	888	888	80	818	1,868	88	88	10.9	11.8	10.8	9.9	9.9	9.8	11.8	14.0	11.7
15 to 19 years	2,789	98	888	488	188	188	1,881	88	88	11.9	10.8	10.8	10.9	11.8	9.1	10.8	10.5	8.7
20 to 24 years	2,884	81	871	488	88	88	1,881	88	81	10.0	8.8	8.4	10.8	10.8	8.8	10.8	9.8	16.0
25 to 29 years	2,808	71	888	488	181	878	888	11	88	8.9	9.9	9.8	10.8	11.1	10.0	11.4	8.8	10.8
30 to 34 years	2,888	76	377	488	88	888	888	8	18	7.1	8.8	8.8	8.8	7.0	10.8	8.8	8.8	8.9
35 to 44 years	1,888	88	188	881	84	871	888	18	18	8.8	8.8	8.8	9.1	8.9	18.7	8.7	8.8	8.0
45 to 54 years	1,888	88	188	886	88	188	881	17	18	8.8	8.0	8.8	8.0	8.7	9.7	8.4	8.8	8.0
55 to 64 years	868	88	78	888	88	180	888	8	18	8.8	8.8	8.8	8.8	8.0	7.8	8.0	4.4	8.0
65 to 74 years	888	88	81	187	86	88	888	18	8	8.7	8.8	1.8	8.8	8.0	8.8	8.0	1.8	8.0
75 years and over	1,888	78	88	418	88	88	888	87	17	8.8	8.1	8.8	8.1	8.9	8.8	8.1	14.7	8.9
Not reported	18	3	1	8	8	1	8	-	-	0.1	0.1	-	0.1	0.8	0.1	-	-	-
Under 1 year	880	18	188	88	31	88	818	8	8	8.1	1.1	4.1	1.0	1.8	1.0	1.0	1.6	1.0
21 years and over	18,880	888	1,108	8,888	888	1,878	8,888	881	188	81.7	81.0	34.0	60.0	88.8	44.0	47.8	51.7	88.0

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TABLE 2. POPULATION BY AGE, RACE, AND SEX FOR THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII, 1940 AND 1930, AND FOR HILO AND HONOLULU CITIES, 1940—Con.

AREA, AGE, AND SEX	NUMBER: All classes	Hawaiian	Part-Hawaiian	Caucasian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Korean	Puerto Rican, Negro, and other races	PERCENT DISTRIBUTION: All classes	Hawaiian	Part-Hawaiian	Caucasian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Korean	Puerto Rican, Negro, and other races
HILO CITY - 1940—Con.																		
Male	12,423	453	1,584	2,177	830	1,807	5,488	280	188	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5 years	1,207	23	304	183	36	108	584	10	21	9.7	4.9	19.6	8.4	4.3	6.5	9.4	4.2	11.2
5 to 9 years	1,293	44	258	184	30	128	596	32	27	10.4	9.4	16.5	8.5	7.4	7.8	10.9	9.2	14.4
10 to 14 years	1,508	52	272	250	46	93	754	39	23	12.1	11.1	17.4	10.9	9.1	5.8	13.4	12.1	12.8
15 to 19 years	1,345	40	180	246	85	89	716	35	14	10.8	8.5	11.5	11.3	10.4	5.7	12.7	14.6	7.7
20 to 24 years	1,118	41	118	228	42	84	606	20	13	9.0	8.7	7.5	10.2	7.9	5.4	10.7	8.4	8.8
25 to 29 years	1,159	38	112	228	63	255	444	6	16	9.3	8.3	7.2	10.5	10.0	15.9	7.8	2.2	8.7
30 to 34 years	975	44	87	180	31	249	348	8	7	7.9	9.4	5.6	8.3	5.8	16.7	6.2	3.1	3.8
35 to 39 years	830	29	69	146	36	242	297	2	7	6.8	6.2	3.8	6.7	5.5	16.1	5.4	0.8	3.8
40 to 44 years	620	21	63	132	31	149	213	-	13	5.0	4.5	4.2	6.1	3.8	9.9	3.8	-	7.1
45 to 49 years	452	27	85	107	12	135	127	3	7	3.6	5.8	2.1	4.9	2.2	8.4	2.2	1.2	3.8
50 to 54 years	525	39	33	92	11	68	277	11	8	4.2	8.3	2.1	4.2	2.1	4.0	4.9	4.6	4.4
55 to 64 years	757	40	34	118	42	43	415	52	13	6.1	8.5	2.2	5.4	7.9	2.7	7.3	21.8	7.1
65 to 74 years	505	24	7	70	86	9	287	36	7	4.1	5.1	0.4	3.2	16.2	0.6	4.7	15.1	3.8
75 years and over	124	7	-	33	23	2	46	8	5	1.0	1.5	-	1.5	4.3	0.1	0.8	3.3	2.7
Not reported	6	-	-	1	1	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.1	0.1	-	-
Under 1 year	259	5	73	43	4	20	110	1	3	2.1	1.1	4.7	2.0	0.8	1.2	1.9	0.4	1.6
21 years and over	6,827	299	519	1,290	355	1,217	2,918	137	97	54.9	63.8	33.3	59.3	67.0	75.7	51.8	57.8	50.0
Female	10,925	450	1,663	2,079	280	541	5,548	148	125	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5 years	1,140	34	292	179	27	95	486	13	14	10.4	7.6	17.6	8.6	7.1	17.9	8.8	8.8	11.1
5 to 9 years	1,349	32	294	192	37	103	660	17	14	12.3	7.1	17.7	9.2	9.7	19.4	11.9	11.5	11.1
10 to 14 years	1,465	52	237	183	42	119	794	25	13	13.4	11.6	14.3	8.8	11.1	22.4	14.3	16.9	10.3
15 to 19 years	1,443	52	215	216	50	49	836	24	16	13.2	11.6	12.5	10.4	13.2	9.2	14.9	16.2	12.9
20 to 24 years	1,204	40	133	209	54	40	673	18	16	11.0	8.9	8.2	10.1	14.2	7.5	12.2	12.2	12.7
25 to 29 years	934	32	132	216	48	24	441	5	16	8.5	7.1	7.9	10.4	12.6	4.5	8.2	3.4	12.7
30 to 34 years	674	30	90	196	33	27	236	4	8	6.2	6.7	5.4	9.4	8.7	5.1	5.5	2.7	6.3
35 to 39 years	633	30	76	156	25	28	302	8	8	5.8	6.7	4.6	7.5	6.6	5.3	5.4	5.4	6.3
40 to 44 years	507	34	43	122	21	16	240	17	5	4.6	7.6	2.6	5.9	5.5	3.0	4.3	11.5	4.0
45 to 49 years	437	25	42	118	13	15	214	4	5	4.0	5.8	2.5	5.7	3.4	2.8	3.9	2.7	4.0
50 to 54 years	328	21	28	95	9	4	166	4	1	3.0	4.7	1.7	4.6	2.4	0.8	3.0	2.7	0.8
55 to 64 years	475	34	39	100	11	10	273	5	4	4.4	7.6	2.3	4.8	2.9	1.9	4.9	3.4	3.2
65 to 74 years	234	18	19	53	7	-	131	2	4	2.1	4.0	1.1	2.5	1.8	-	2.4	1.4	3.2
75 years and over	84	14	4	25	2	1	34	2	2	0.8	3.1	0.5	1.7	0.5	0.2	0.4	1.4	1.6
Not reported	10	1	1	5	1	-	2	-	-	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.3	-	-	-	-
Under 1 year	231	5	60	37	7	12	105	5	-	2.1	1.1	3.6	1.8	1.8	2.2	1.9	3.4	-
21 years and over	5,253	270	590	1,262	211	159	2,631	64	66	48.	60.0	35.5	60.7	55.5	29.9	47.4	43.2	52.4
HONOLULU CITY - 1940																		
Total	179,326	5,457	25,352	50,892	22,445	6,887	60,593	3,536	3,884	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5 years	16,947	350	4,479	3,670	1,727	725	5,260	246	481	9.5	6.4	17.6	7.2	7.7	10.5	8.7	6.2	12.5
5 to 9 years	17,919	412	4,058	3,505	2,194	655	6,260	311	524	10.0	7.5	15.9	6.9	9.8	9.5	10.3	8.8	13.7
10 to 14 years	19,658	479	3,715	3,456	2,830	541	7,557	500	529	10.9	8.8	14.5	6.8	12.6	7.9	12.5	13.9	13.8
15 to 19 years	20,293	472	3,073	4,238	2,891	443	8,252	542	392	11.3	8.6	12.0	8.3	12.9	6.4	13.6	15.5	10.2
20 to 24 years	21,342	506	2,641	6,416	2,503	406	8,008	478	384	11.9	9.3	10.3	12.6	11.2	5.9	13.2	13.1	10.0
25 to 29 years	18,163	519	2,071	6,152	1,911	1,146	5,802	246	336	10.1	9.5	8.1	12.0	8.5	16.6	9.6	6.8	8.8
30 to 34 years	14,069	456	1,568	5,420	1,516	931	3,688	170	300	7.8	8.4	6.1	10.7	6.8	13.5	6.1	4.7	7.8
35 to 39 years	12,360	435	1,226	4,523	1,617	735	3,469	126	180	6.9	8.0	4.8	8.9	7.2	11.6	5.7	3.5	4.7
40 to 44 years	9,571	424	781	3,535	1,401	499	2,662	144	145	5.3	7.8	3.0	6.9	6.2	7.2	4.4	4.0	3.8
45 to 49 years	7,645	402	728	2,866	1,011	420	2,008	91	130	4.3	7.4	2.8	5.6	4.5	6.1	3.3	2.5	3.4
50 to 54 years	6,045	310	442	2,265	530	153	2,612	124	104	3.6	5.8	1.7	4.5	2.4	2.2	4.3	3.4	2.7
55 to 64 years	9,077	375	548	2,891	1,146	122	3,391	429	175	5.1	6.9	2.1	5.7	5.1	1.8	5.6	11.8	4.6
65 to 74 years	4,755	229	195	1,397	861	20	1,336	167	100	2.4	4.2	0.8	2.7	3.9	0.3	2.2	4.6	2.7
75 years and over	1,291	78	70	563	278	5	220	42	35	0.7	1.4	0.3	1.1	1.2	0.1	0.4	1.2	0.9
Not reported	73	6	5	30	9	4	17	-	2	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	-	0.1
Under 1 year	5,420	66	1,025	825	314	150	1,090	51	106	3.0	1.2	4.0	1.6	1.4	2.2	1.8	1.4	2.8
21 years and over	100,114	3,623	9,671	34,660	12,278	4,447	31,491	1,900	1,836	55.8	66.3	37.8	68.5	54.7	64.5	52.0	52.8	47.3
Male	94,734	2,778	12,422	26,944	12,304	5,102	31,222	1,952	2,008	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5 years	8,649	184	2,228	1,949	908	396	2,630	119	241	9.1	6.6	17.9	7.2	7.4	7.6	8.4	6.1	12.0
5 to 9 years	9,062	214	2,054	1,760	1,093	345	3,178	159	268	9.6	7.7	16.5	6.5	8.9	6.8	10.2	8.1	13.1
10 to 14 years	9,984	239	1,857	1,785	1,446	273	3,926	246	262	10.5	8.6	14.9	6.4	11.8	5.4	10.6	12.6	13.0
15 to 19 years	10,423	236	1,497	2,428	1,471	224	4,130	240	196	11.0	8.5	12.1	9.0	12.0	4.4	13.2	12.3	9.8
20 to 24 years	11,207	269	1,194	3,972	1,255	236	3,858	230	193	11.8	9.7	9.6	14.7	10.2	4.6	12.4	11.8	9.6
25 to 29 years	9,712	258	1,026	3,206	1,011	1,018	2,908	125	160	10.3	9.3	8.3	11.9	8.2	20.0	9.3	6.5	8.0
30 to 34 years	7,530	231	753	2,669	734	874	1,952	95	163	7.9	8.3	6.1	9.9	6.5	17.1	6.3	4.9	8.1
35 to 39 years	6,729	204	589	2,356	890	685	1,865	48	89	7.1	7.3	4.7	8.7	7.2	13.4	6.0	2.3	4.4
40 to 44 years	5,083	222	347	1,822	871	432	1,264	34	91	5.4	8.0	2.8	6.8	7.1	8.5	4.0	1.7	4.5
45 to 49 years	3,930	206	348	1,489	616	367	761	42	71	4.1	7.4	2.8	5.5	5.0	7.2	2.5	2.2	3.5
50 to 54 years	3,804	166	193	1,208	380	130	1,673	86	68	4.0	6.0	1.6	4.5	3.2	2.5	5.4	4.4	3.4
55 to 64 years	6,231	196	233	1,447	770	100	2,068	355	122	6.6	7.1	1.9	5.4	6.3	2.0	6.6	18.2	6.1
65 to 74 years	3,038	116	79	663	664	18	864	129	73	3.7	4.2	0.6	2.5	5.4	0.4	2.7	6.6	3.6
75 years and over	717	32	19	223	228	4	159	30	17	0.8	1.2	0.2	0.8	1.9	0.1	0.5	1.5	0.8
Not reported	49	5	5	17	8	4	18	-	1	0.-	0.2	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	-	-
Under 1 year	1,843	30	506	427	172	81	532	36	61	1.9	1.0	4.1	1.6	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.8	3.0
21 years and over	54,242	1,839	4,537	18,279	7,099	3,828	16,546	1,116	1,003	57.3	66.2	36.4	67.8	57.7	75.0	53.0	57.1	50.2
Female	84,593	2,679	12,141	23,948	10,141	1,785	29,371	1,583	1,884	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5 years	8,299	166	2,251	1,721	819	336	2,628	127	240	9.8	6.2	17.1	7.2	8.1	18.8	9.0	7.8	12.2
5 to 9 years	8,857	182	2,004	1,740	1,099	310	3,066	152	261	10.5	7.4	16.2	7.3	10.6	17.4	10.5	9.0	14.3
10 to 14 years	9,672	237	1,858	1,721	1,384	268	3,631	254	267	11.4	8.9	14.1	7.2	13.6	15.0	12.5	15.1	14.6
15 to 19 years	9,864	236	1,576	1,720	1,420	217	4,122	302	196	11.7	8.8	12.0	7.2	14.0	12.2	14.1	17.9	10.7
20 to 24 years	10,135	237	1,447	2,444	1,248	170	4,150	240	191	12.0	8.8	11.0	10.2	12.3	9.5	14.1	14.7	10.5
25 to 29 years	8,452	261	1,045	2,936	900	128	2,894	120	170	10.0	9.7	7.9	12.3	8.9	7.2	9.9	7.1	9.3
30 to 34 years	6,529	225	815	2,751	782	77	1,736	75	138	7.7	3.4	6.2	11.5	7.1	4.3	5.9	4.5	7.6
35 to 39 years	5,630	231	637	2,182	727	111	1,597	84	91	6.7	8.6	4.8	9.1	7.2	6.2	5.4	5.0	5.0
40 to 44 years	4,429	202	414	1,713	530	67	1,398	110	54	5.2	7.5	3.1	7.2	5.2	3.8	4.6	6.5	3.0
45 to 49 years	3,745	196	380	1,377	395	53	1,237	49	59	4.4	7.3	2.9	5.7	3.9	3.0	4.2	2.9	3.7
50 to 54 years	2,741	149	249	1,057	250	23	939	38	36	3.2	5.4	1.9	4.4	2.5	1.3	3.2	2.3	2.0
55 to 64 years	2,786	179	310	1,444	376	22	1,323	74	53	4.5	6.7	2.4	6.0	3.7	1.2	4.5	4.4	2.9
65 to 74 years	1,707	113	119	734	217	2	506	38	33	2.1	4.2	0.9	3.1	2.1	0.1	1.7	2.2	1.8
75 years and over	574	44	51	340	90	1	61	12	18	0.7	1.7	0.4	1.4	0.8	0.1	0.3	0.7	1.0
Not reported	24	1	-	13	4	-	5	-	1	-	-	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	0.1
Under 1 year	1,237	30	519	391	142	69	558	30	45	2.1	1.4	3.9	1.6	1.4	3.9	1.9	1.8	2.5
21 years and over	45,872	1,784	5,144	16,381	5,179	617	14,945	784	833	54.2	67.0	39.1	69.3	51.1	34.6	50.9	49.5	44.4

3-36819

TABLE 3. PO…

RACE	HAWAI… Total	Mal…
All classes	73,276	42,2…
Hawaiian	3,461	1,7…
Part-Hawaiian	7,901	3,…
Caucasian	9,821	
Chinese	1,832	
Filipino	12,845	10…
Japanese	34,865	18,…
Korean	820	
Negro	10	
Puerto Rican	1,715	
Other races	16	

TABLE 4.

AGE	H… Total
All ages, total	73,276
Under 5 years	7,418
5 to 9 years	8,343
10 to 14 years	9,274
15 to 19 years	8,323
20 to 24 years	6,128
25 to 29 years	6,406
30 to 34 years	5,664
35 to 39 years	4,868
40 to 44 years	3,775
45 to 49 years	3,074
50 to 54 years	2,899
55 to 64 years	4,140
65 to 74 years	2,352
75 years and over	584
Not reported	33
Under 1 year	1,491
21 years and over	38,547

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TABLE 3. POPULATION OF THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII, BY RACE AND SEX, BY COUNTIES: 1940

RACE	HAWAII			HONOLULU			KAUAI			MAUI		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
All classes..	73,276	42,269	31,007	258,256	149,042	109,214	35,818	21,626	14,192	55,980	32,198	23,782
Hawaiian.....	3,451	1,744	1,707	7,090	3,634	3,456	888	467	421	2,945	1,548	1,397
Part-Hawaiian....	7,901	3,904	3,997	31,453	15,401	16,052	2,666	1,352	1,314	7,915	3,999	3,922
Caucasian.....	9,821	5,145	4,676	82,515	53,470	29,046	4,465	2,340	2,125	6,961	3,518	3,471
Chinese.....	1,832	1,064	768	24,567	13,576	10,991	862	588	274	1,512	906	610
Filipino.....	12,845	10,594	2,251	19,066	13,984	5,082	10,149	8,025	2,124	10,609	8,188	2,421
Japanese.....	34,865	18,271	16,594	83,387	43,477	39,910	15,470	8,132	7,338	24,183	12,940	11,243
Korean.....	820	572	248	5,091	2,781	2,310	301	187	114	639	425	214
Negro.....	10	9	1	209	145	64	3	2	1	33	16	17
Puerto Rican.....	1,715	956	759	4,346	2,289	2,057	990	520	470	1,345	648	608
Other races.....	16	10	6	531	285	246	24	13	11	8	5	3

TABLE 4. POPULATION OF THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII, BY AGE AND SEX, BY COUNTIES. 1940

AGE	HAWAII			HONOLULU			KAUAI			MAUI		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
All ages, total	73,276	42,269	31,007	258,256	149,042	109,214	35,818	21,626	14,192	55,980	32,198	23,782
Under 5 years....	7,418	3,762	3,656	22,938	11,770	11,168	3,456	1,722	1,734	6,373	3,157	3,116
5 to 9 years.....	8,343	4,119	4,224	24,571	12,437	12,134	3,840	1,967	1,873	6,677	3,436	3,241
10 to 14 years...	9,274	4,712	4,562	26,794	13,620	13,174	4,180	2,119	2,061	7,246	3,659	3,587
15 to 19 years...	8,323	4,221	4,102	29,753	16,892	12,861	3,912	1,950	1,962	6,350	3,296	3,054
20 to 24 years...	6,128	3,196	2,932	36,996	24,582	12,414	2,960	1,585	1,375	4,993	2,681	2,312
25 to 29 years...	6,406	4,209	2,197	27,374	17,035	10,339	3,678	2,635	1,053	4,871	3,245	1,626
30 to 34 years...	5,664	3,997	1,667	20,257	12,188	8,069	3,268	2,479	789	4,198	2,907	1,291
35 to 39 years...	4,863	3,240	1,623	17,333	10,336	7,217	2,680	1,904	776	3,792	2,499	1,293
40 to 44 years...	3,775	2,328	1,447	13,321	7,476	5,845	2,071	1,379	692	2,944	1,780	1,164
45 to 49 years...	3,074	1,741	1,333	10,636	5,702	4,934	1,488	939	549	2,289	1,266	1,023
50 to 54 years...	2,899	1,863	1,036	8,883	5,348	3,535	1,301	882	419	2,033	1,329	704
55 to 64 years...	4,140	2,762	1,378	11,983	7,228	4,755	1,739	1,157	582	2,676	1,764	912
65 to 74 years...	2,352	1,694	658	5,554	3,463	2,091	957	707	250	1,249	903	346
75 years and over	884	406	178	1,563	899	664	278	203	75	377	284	93
Not reported.....	33	19	14	100	66	34	10	8	2	12	10	2
Under 1 year.....	1,491	789	702	4,810	2,451	2,359	705	361	344	1,807	657	650
21 years and over	38,547	24,763	13,784	146,047	88,708	57,343	19,767	13,515	6,252	28,289	18,065	10,224

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: June 24, 1942

To: Col. C. Edward Buxton

From: N. K. Guinzburg

Subject: Cable from Honolulu

A cable from Jones in Honolulu addressed to Murray Brophy, No. W7, a copy of which you have, inquires about how the situation there is affected by the new set-up.

I have answered that the F.I.S. activities initiated by Brophy will be carried on under C.O.I. without interruption. I have told him that he can assure the Army officials who are interested.

I imagine you will want to cable him as well, explaining the nature of the executive order and the re-organization.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: David Bruce

DATE July 22, 1942

TO: Colonel Donovan

SUBJECT:

I recommend that the Hawaiian project be dropped for the time being. If you approve, will you please so indicate.

D.B.
David Bruce

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[illegible]

[illegible]

Major [illegible] July [illegible]

[illegible]

I have a copy of your [illegible] of July [illegible] to Mr. [illegible] relative to the office in [illegible].

The Bureau of the Budget has [illegible] our request for funds for [illegible] outside Washington to [illegible] that we will not have the available positions or the funds required to expand the [illegible] Office. The Budget Bureau approved a total of only [illegible] positions for foreign [illegible] (exclusive of [illegible] and [illegible]) and we already have more people in London than approved for [illegible] stations, so it will be impossible to do anything for [illegible] at this time. I am leaving the matter in Mr. [illegible]'s hands so that his recommendations will be for the other three-quarters of the current fiscal year.

In view of the shortage of funds it would be my recommendation that we close the [illegible] and [illegible] Office in [illegible], recall Mr. [illegible] and have only [illegible] activities in [illegible] until more [illegible] funds can be made available.

[illegible]

cc: Colonel [illegible] J. Donovan
Dr. [illegible] [illegible], III
Kenneth [illegible]
David [illegible]

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

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6/16/42

Mr. Williamnon

Colonel Buxton is sending this to you for your information

F Smith

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
HONOLULU, T.H.
June 4, 1942.

S E C R E T

From: Harold Jones, Major, USMCR

To: Col. Wm. J. Donovan, Coordinator of Information, Washington

Subject: Honolulu Office

In accordance with the plan submitted to Dr. Baxter, et al, we have taken a suite of offices in Honolulu. General Emmons has assigned one man permanently to take over the work set up by Merry Brophy and has also assigned as Liaison, Lt. Col. Bicknell, number one under G2, and Major Albright. I have assurance that when our Research and Analysis office has been established here, Captain Bryan, G2's authority on the geography of the southwest Pacific, will also be assigned to us.

The Navy have been too preoccupied with the situation northwest of Honolulu to assign to this office any personnel. When and if things cool off, it will carry out its assurance of assigning a couple of good men to this office to work with the Research and Analysis department.

Eventually, I believe this Honolulu office should be hooked up directly with our office in Australia, with Washington acting as a central switchboard. Such an arrangement would really coordinate information quickly and [illegible]. It is my belief that because the war in

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the Pacific must of necessity be an amphibious war, and because there are no other Naval bases, that I know of, in our hands capable of basing the Pacific fleet, Honolulu will and must be the springboard of the Pacific war, although Australia will always be very important because of its flanking position.

2. The Situation in Hawaii

As I wired you a week ago, the territory has been under triple alert for the past three weeks and both the Army and Navy thought there would be a direct attack in force on the island. This is still possible. My guess was that the attack would be north. This guess was based on the disposition of the main body of the Japanese fleet in Japan, and the results of the Coral Sea battle. The Navy is now of the opinion that the Jap's main objective is Midway. I still believe that Midway is merely a phase of the general plan and that the real objective is Dutch Harbor. They hope to take Midway to be used as an airfield to harry the Hawaiian Islands, impairing its usefulness as a Fleet base and then strike north at Dutch Harbor and south at Samoa and Fiji. Just a sea adaptation of the pincers strategy with Hawaii between the claws.

3. The Civil Situation.

There is still hiatus between the military government and the civil (political) government. I repeat, the civil government has been very closely held these

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many years by a small group of capitalists who pretty much shape public opinion and who work closely with the professional politicians. There is really no realization by the civil population, the politicians and Federal bureaucrats that this is a total war and that in a fortress such as this, civil rights cannot count for much. I believe the only solution is for the President to issue an executive order, suspending for the duration not only all territorial laws but also all Federal laws and placing the entire Territory under absolute military law. At the same time, a strong military governor with considerable experience in civil government should be appointed to take over the civil and military administration subject only to the joint Navy and Army command, leaving Emmons and Nimitz free to carry out their war plans without the constant worry of civil responsibilities.

Of course this action would cause a very loud outcry among the civil population and particularly among the "old families," the Federal employes and bureaucrats, but until some program like this is adopted these Islands cannot be properly defended.

4. Father William McGuire, Captain, U.S.N.

Father McGuire, the Fleet Chaplain, whom you know and who is a good friend of Jack Ford's, called me up last evening. He has just been ordered to the U.S. Naval Training Station, San Diego. He would like very much to be connected with the Coordinator of In-

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formation and has some excellent ideas. I think it would be profitable if you could have Bunay order Capt. McGuire to Washington for short temporary duty, about a week or more, and let him present them to you in person.

Harold Jones

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
HONOLULU, T.H.
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July 7, 1942

From: Warren Delano

To: Mr. James F. Baxter, II

Subject: Activities, Honolulu Office

The writer would like to make a brief report to you of his activities to date in Honolulu.

On arriving here Major Jones introduced me to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Nimitz; his staff; Lt. General Delos C. Emmons, Commander of the Hawaiian Department; Captain Mayfield, Director ONI, 14th Naval District; Col. Fielder, head of G-2, and others among the service groups and civilians.

Since that time I have been making further contacts among the service groups and among other organizations, including the University of Hawaii, the Bishop Museum, Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association and the so-called "Big Five," who still have much to do with the running of the economic and social life of the community. These meetings have led to an understanding of the facilities available and the problems which naturally arise when operating in conjunction with the armed forces.

One of the major problems is the lack of effective coordination between the armed forces in the lower ranks because of the absence of short cuts. At the present time a request for secret or confidential material by the Army from the Navy or vice versa, except in the case of the investigation of subversive activities, must clear through the top. A case in point is the request by the Army Ferry Command for a picture of an airport under Navy jurisdiction on Tutuila Island (Samoan group). The picture had been seen by the Army Ferry Command and the airport is a dangerous one used by Army pilots enroute to Australia. It is urgent that this field not only be described but shown them before take-off from Hawaii. Six weeks elapsed and the picture had not been received. Mention was made of this particular case when we delivered the maps of Australia which arrived so promptly from Washington. As a result we requested the picture from the Navy for the Ferry Command and a duplicate was made to [illegible] through Admiral Nimitz to General Emmons, not without [illegible] to the writer that the procedure was not [illegible]. Although the personal relationships of the top [illegible] are most cordial, an efficient system of Army-Navy [illegible] for handling urgently needed classified material [illegible] inaugurate [illegible] battle pending or not.

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Baxter, Washington, [illegible]/7/42

[illegible] the Fleet and the Army have material [illegible] should be correlated and there is need for a research [illegible] a [illegible]grapher like West who is also an excellent [illegible], and a draftsman of his choice. Duplication [illegible] adequate but they should bring proper draft[illegible]s.

[illegible] with a Japanese member of the G-2 [illegible] have to date uncovered a considerable amount of [illegible] which should prove useful to the Far [illegible] of the Division of Special Information as [illegible], Psychology and Geography Divisions. [illegible] obtained from bookshops, homes and Jap[illegible] firms. Unless it is subversive, which it is not, it [illegible] but arrangements can probably be made to [illegible] obtain it in some other manner if you consider [illegible] the list which will be sent to [illegible] date.

[illegible] a problem but for the time being [illegible] secret or confidential material in a [illegible]. The most efficient way to [illegible] or Navy would be to work on the most [illegible] individual projects. This can be satis[illegible] Harbor, Hickam Field, G-2 in Hono[illegible] might arise. This would do away [illegible] guards and other resultant overhead.

[illegible], cryptographer, should be at[illegible]; the latter have few if any [illegible] was granted a CAF-7 rating which [illegible] his ability and the very high cost of liv[illegible] high cost of [illegible] should be taken into con[illegible] personnel which might be shifted to this

[illegible] officer is not necessary but someone [illegible] be authorized to approve the expendi[illegible] [illegible] lies, operating expenses, payrolls,

[illegible] Raymond, secretary to Mr. Earl [illegible] representative, has been doing the [illegible] [illegible], as Major Jones has probably [illegible] "[illegible]" man at informational intelligence. [illegible] to General Emmons and to the Navy in [illegible] passing through here, as well as getting [illegible] a hurry with the civilian, military [illegible].

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[illegible] Baxter, Washington. 7/7/42

We appreciate a great deal the cooperation we have received, especially Mr. Leonard Wilson's handling of the Australian maps for the Ferry Command. Should [illegible] be deemed sufficiently important, with the right personnel we can make a real contribution.

Sincerely,

/s/ Warren Delano

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

(COPY)

June 25, 1943

Castle & Cooke, Ltd.,
Honolulu, T.H.

Attention: Mr. Harold A. Mountain

Gentlemen:

In accordance with conversation held today with Mr. H. A. Mountain of your organization, the memorandum agreement heretofore entered into between the Coordinator of Information and Castle & Cooke, Ltd. is hereby revised: Space to be leased the Coordinator of Information (now Office of Strategic Services) is as follows:

> Corner room adjacent to room 411 plus all the space marks of that room, formerly occupied by Bowman, Holst, MacFarland & Richardson.

The rental for the above described space is to be Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350.00) per month, this to include electricity, janitor service, elevator service, furniture, etc.

The Government reserves the right to cancel this month-to-month lease upon written notice, rental for any portion of the month during which the Government does not occupy the premises, to be prorated.

Very truly yours,

Warren Delano
Honolulu Representative,
Office of Strategic Services,
Research & Analysis Division

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DINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 3, 1942

MEMORANDUM for COLONEL DONOVAN:

You mentioned the other day, after our lunch with Colonel Fielder, that you had in mind certain personnel for the Hawaiian group.

Beale is making preparations to leave for Hawaii on Wednesday. In order to survey the situation out there he will want to know before [illegible] something about the personnel which is to be supplied. Can you give me or him an idea of whom you have in mind?

When can you see Tom Beale?

David Williamson

David Williamson.

SECRET

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May 25, 1942

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

Dear Frank:

Watson Slater, a Lieutenant Commander in the Navy, has just returned from the Hawaiian Islands and sends me a note concerning conditions there of which I thought you should be advised. The following is a quotation from his letter.

"If the Hawaiian Islands are vital to the defense of our West Coast, immediate steps should be taken to defend them against another air attack. This can be accomplished by greatly strengthening our long range striking force, which up to a week ago totalled between 18 and 20 B-17's. During the past few days, another transport may have reached the Islands of the B-17 type.

"Since weather conditions may call for torpedo attacks, both types of planes are needed and their ranges must be sufficient to reach the enemy carriers at distances in the vicinity of three hundred miles from shore. To permit scouting and refuelling necessary to this operation, a force of two hundred and forty such planes is required."

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

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May 25, 1942

The Honorable
The Secretary of War
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Major Slater, a Lieutenant Commander in the Navy, has just returned from the Hawaiian Islands and sends me a note concerning conditions there of which I thought you should be advised. The following is a quotation from his letter:

"If the Hawaiian Islands are vital to the defense of our West Coast, immediate steps should be taken to defend them against another air attack. This can be accomplished by greatly strengthening our long range striking force, which up to a week ago totalled between 15 and 20 B-17s. During the past few days, another twenty planes have reached the Islands of the B-24 type.

"Since weather conditions may call for torpedo attacks, both types of planes are needed and their range must be sufficient to reach the enemy carriers at distances in excess of three hundred miles from shore. To permit refueling and refueling necessary to this operation, a force of two hundred and forty such planes is required."

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

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Confidential

May 27-42

PATROL WING TWO

From H N Slater Lt Col USNR.

To Col. Wm J. Donovan.

Subject The Hawaiian Situation.

If the Hawaiian Islands are vital to the defense of our west coast, immediate steps should be taken to defend them against another air attack. This can be accomplished by greatly strengthening our long range striking force, which up to a week ago installed between 18 and 20 B17s. During the past few days another twenty planes have reached the islands, of the B26 type?

Since weather conditions may call for torpedo attacks, both types of planes are needed and their range must be sufficient to reach the enemy carriers at distances in excess of three hundred miles from shore.

To permit the rearming and refuelling necessary to this operation a force of two hundred and forty such planes is required.

H N Slater

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May 12, 1942

DIRECTIVE

TO: Murry Murphy

FROM: William J. Donovan

SUBJECT: Completion of radio organization in Hawaiian Territory

1. You are hereby directed to proceed to Honolulu to complete the organization of an F.I.S. office in the Hawaiian Territory.

2. In order to complete this work you may employ such persons as you think necessary, including secretarial help, and may engage suitable office space.

3. In regard to the 50,000 watt domestic station which I have call on, you are instructed to make such plans and carry on investigations and negotiations as you deem necessary, with the idea in mind of installing it somewhere in the Hawaiian

/s/ [illegible]

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Territory if such installation will be practicable for broadcasts to Japan by medium or long wave.

4. You are instructed to cooperate in every way with the Military and Naval commands of the Islands and all arrangements made by you under this directive shall be subject to their approval.

William J. Donovan

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PMO

WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
Office of the Chief of Special Service
Washington, D.C.

In reply
refer to
SPSPI 311.23
(6-14-42)

File

Copy sent
Murry Brophy

June 1, 1942.

The Coordinator of Information,

Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Your letter to General Marshall, dated May 14, 1942, which had reference to the radio facilities in the Territory of Hawaii, has just been brought to my attention.

It is heartening to see the rapidity with which your plans, as outlined at your luncheon by Mr. Murry Brophy, have been put into effect. Your assistance to General Emmons inevitably will be reflected in the esprit and contentment of his military forces as well as in that of the civilian population which is under his control.

Yours sincerely,

F. H. OSBORN,
Brigadier General,
Chief of Special Service.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

May 31, 1942.

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
26th and Constitution Ave., N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Thank you for your letter of May 14th concerning Mr. Brophy's trip to Honolulu and the resulting efforts which you are making to reestablish the broadcasting of the first-class United States programs by the four Hawaiian stations on a twenty-four hour basis in order that means may be assured for warning the public of attacks and for providing troop entertainment.

Your purchase of battery receivers for distribution to the troops stationed at outlying outposts will be a great help. Their installation will provide both recreation and, with the cooperation of the broadcasting stations, a valuable means for bringing the Commanding General's voice directly to his troops.

I have discussed your letter with General Strong, Chief of the G-2 Division here, and his office would be interested to know the titles of the programs being fed to the Hawaiian stations, their periods, the networks or stations originating them, and whether the Hawaiian broadcasts were made simultaneously with those made in the United States or later by means of recordings.

Your cooperation with G-2 in distributing material to groups of foreign extraction is appreciated.

Faithfully yours,

Chief of Staff.

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

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WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

WASHINGTON

C
O
P
Y

May 31, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
[illegible] and Constitution Ave., N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Thank you for your letter of May 14th concerning Mr. Brophy's trip to Honolulu and the resulting efforts which you are making to reestablish the broadcasting of the first-class United States programs by the four Hawaiian stations on a twenty-four hour basis in order that means may be assured for warning the public of attacks and for providing troop entertainment.

Your purchase of battery receivers for distribution to the troops stationed at outlying outposts will be a great [illegible]. Their installation will provide both [illegible], with the cooperation of the broadcasting [illegible], a valuable means for bringing the Commanding General's voice directly to his troops.

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Your cooperation with G-2 in distributing material to groups of foreign extraction is appreciated.

Faithfully yours,

/sgd./ G.C. Marshall
Chief of Staff.

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May 14, 1942

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

Dear Frank:

I am sending you herewith a copy of a letter which I sent to General Marshall yesterday. It concerns certain radio activities which we are carrying on in the Hawaiian Islands.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Russell H. Dorr DATE May 12, 1942

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

SUBJECT: Hawaiian Report

This is the letter to General Marshall in regard to Mr. Murry Brophy's Hawaiian trip which you asked me to prepare. You will note that there is nothing in it about the illegal stations. Mr. Brophy advises me that we are not in a position to say anything about this and will explain the reason to you if you so desire.

R. H. D.

Attachment

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May 14, 1942

General George C. Marshall
Chief of Staff
United States Army
Washington, D. C.

Re: Radio Facilities in the Territory of Hawaii

My dear General Marshall:

Last month with the approval of the War and Navy Departments, I undertook to look into the type and condition of radio facilities available in the Territory of Hawaii and the extent to which they were being used to advantage. One of my assistants, Mr. Murry Brophy, proceeded to Honolulu at my direction and was in the islands from April 21 through April 26. He has reported to me that the situation as to Hawaiian broadcasting stations at the time of his arrival was as follows:

(a) Two of the four broadcasting stations in the Territory, located respectively at Hilo and at the Island of Lihue, were off the air, partly because of a shortage of equipment and partly for financial reasons.

(b) It was anticipated that the two main stations at Honolulu, KGMB and KGU, would be forced off the air shortly because of lack of tubes, acetate records and other necessary equipment.

(c) Many first class United States programs were not being broadcast over the two Honolulu stations because sponsors of certain of the good network programs did not feel that the Territory offered a field in which advertising would be justified from a commercial point of view.

Copy Jack R. Dorr

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Radio entertainment is of particular importance in the Territory at this time because of the nightly blackouts beginning about 7 p.m. and the curfew at 9:30 p.m. In the opinion of Lt. General Emmons, Military Governor and Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, the situation was an unhealthy one. He felt as did we, that immediate steps ought to be taken to insure the continuance of broadcasts by all stations and to improve the quality of entertainment.

The following steps have been taken to meet radio needs in the Territory:

1. Equipment -- The San Francisco office of the Coordinator of Information in response to a cabled request, shipped by Clipper the equipment necessary to keep the two Honolulu stations functioning. Additional equipment required for the expansion of operations by the smaller stations at Hilo and Lihue has also been obtained and is going forward. We have [illegible] are arranging transportation for one thousand recording discs for the use of the Honolulu stations. This will enable them to make recordings of programs which they may desire to rebroadcast.

We have also arranged for shipping priorities for the recordings of network programs so that the threat of serious delays in the delivery of such transcriptions to the Hawaiian stations would be eliminated.

2. Programs -- Through our San Francisco office we have arranged to schedule daily broadcasts of all forms of entertainment covering 24 hours of the day. Such programs will include wherever possible, major network attractions such as Bing Crosby, Charlie McCarthy, Fred Allen, Kate Smith and others of like caliber. Schedules covering programs a week in advance will be sent regularly to the Honolulu stations.

We have arranged for a daily broadcast of a 15 minute news and editorial round-up prepared by our News Department here in Washington which will be comparable to that which we send to other important foreign points. We are also seeking to arrange to broadcast such outstanding commentators as Raymond Gram Swing and H.V. Kaltenborn.

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Several days ago, General Emmons cabled asking us to furnish programs for the entire twenty-four hours each day, so that the stations will be available if needed for attack warning and troops on night duty will have entertainment. We are now working on this.

It should perhaps be pointed out that these broadcasts are not self-sustaining and are being made possible through subsidies by this office when necessary.

3. Transmission and Control -- The programs will be sent over point to point transmission facilities from San Francisco to Honolulu. The two Honolulu stations will in turn feed the smaller stations. The Honolulu reception and distribution will be under supervision of G-2. I understand that General Emmons is assigning one of his officers to supervise this activity.

4. Receiving Facilities -- In order to make the broadcasts and radio service available to troops in outlying outposts in the Territory, we are arranging at the request of General Emmons to purchase 1130 medium priced battery receivers for distribution in the Islands. These sets are now going forward by express from New York to San Francisco and can reach Honolulu at an early date.

5. Appeals to Groups of Foreign Extraction in the Territory -- As a result of Mr. Brophy's trip, this office has arranged to cooperate with G-2 in distributing to groups of foreign extraction in the Territory material which it is hoped will be useful in securing their loyalty and full cooperation. This office will endeavor to assist in the preparation of material directed to the Japanese population of the Islands. It will, if desired, enlist the services of a Japanese speaking commentator satisfactory to General Emmons, for the purpose of broadcasting material furnished and approved by the Army. We have already shipped to Hawaii 500,000 copies of our production pamphlet of the President's letter to the Emperor of Japan of December 6, 1941. His speech which is set forth in this pamphlet both in English and Japanese should, we believe, have excellent propaganda value among the Japanese, Chinese and other foreign groups in the Islands as well as among the native Hawaiians.

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These various matters have been referred to and approved by Brigadier General Frederick M. Osborn of the Civil Services Branch.

We shall, of course, be glad to give any further assistance possible.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

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WAR DEPARTMENT
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
Office of the Chief of Special Service
Washington, D.C.

In reply refer to
SPSFB 353.8
(6-3-42)

June 3, 1942.

Mr. C. Edward Buxton,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Buxton:

I appreciate very much your letter of May 23rd regarding Hawaii, with attached copy of memorandum from Major Jones and report of Mr. Atherton in Hawaii. I have taken these matters up with the F.S.A. and with the U.S.O. I will not try to go now into detail, but believe we have got going in the proper channels and the information you have given us has been, as usual, very valuable to us.

Yours very sincerely,

F. H. OSBORN,
Brigadier General,
Chief of Special Service.

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May 29, 1942

Brig. Gen. Frederick H. Osborn
Chief of Special Services Branch
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Osborn:

In accordance with your suggestion on the telephone a few moments ago, I am sending you a copy of a personal memorandum sent to Colonel Donovan by Major Jones and attached a report by Mr. Atherton, Chairman of the USO in Hawaii. Mr. Atherton apparently asked Major Jones to forward this memorandum of his to Colonel Donovan with the suggestion that it be given to the President.

Colonel Donovan naturally does not think that the material should be handled in such manner but should be turned over directly to you for your information, since the subject matter is entirely outside the Colonel's jurisdiction. If, however, you feel there is any further information which you would like us to secure, or if you think Colonel Donovan can in any way be helpful to you, I know he will be happy to hear from you.

Respectfully yours,

G. Edward Buxton

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Major Harold A. Jones, U.S. Marine Corps DATE May 9, 1942

TO: Col. Wm. J. Donovan

SUBJECT: Morale and Entertainment of Troops in Hawaii

1. Frank Atherton, Chairman of the USO in Hawaii, asked me to present this memorandum outlining the situation in Hawaii, relative to morale and troop entertainment. I explained to him that this was entirely out of the field of the COI. He insisted that I present it to you and ask you to hand it to the President if you saw fit. He thinks the President is the only person who can help him.

2. To Summarize, Atherton presents the situation as follows:

There are approximately 50,000 troops stationed in the Hawaiian Islands and more are coming in. This does not include the bluejackets and marines.

The troops are scattered all over the Islands in remote places. Very few are in cities or towns. Liberty parties are few and far between. The men must seek their entertainment in and about their posts.

The USO has endeavored to set up entertainment centers in buildings, schools and halls in the plantation communities near the troops. Buildings are available. Some are rent free, others at nominal rentals. However, money is very badly needed to convert these buildings into outpost entertainment centers.

It would take approximately $50,000 to do the job. It seems like there is just no agency established with the written authority to furnish money for this type of work and none have the courage to cut a little red tape and get this much needed entertainment to the boys in Hawaii. I can personally vouch for the statement that such entertainment is very badly needed and a matter of very high concern to military officials and morale officers.

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The hitch seems to be that the USO and FSA will not permit any money to be used for temporary improvements of leased or lent property.

3. The above is the most important thing desired by Mr. Atherton. Second in importance, is a rest hall for military pilots, which could also be used as a recreation spot for enlisted men when on liberty.

The FSA had sponsored the construction of several large permanent buildings at a total cost of $330,000, which money had been allocated and ground had been broken when war was declared. The money is still allocated, but naturally the supplies and men are not available to continue this work.

The Elks have offered to sell their club for a knockdown price of approximately $150,000, and would probably take less. This club is located about half a mile from where the FSA had started to build its building. There are about 88,000 sq.ft. of land, three-story building and three cottages. There is a pier in front of this building, a swimming pool, also Waikiki Beach.

Requests have been repeatedly made that $150,000 or a lesser sum be taken from the $330,000 already allocated for the building of the buildings and used right now to purchase the Elks Club and get the men entertainment. However, the statutes and brass hats say that the FSA cannot use the funds already allocated for the building of a building for the purchase of another building, and insist that these funds already allocated be kept on the shelf while the purpose for which they were allocated goes neglected and the men do without any suitable place for recuperation and recreation. It is all damn silly business.

4. It would help morale a great deal for the movie stars ~~and bands~~ to visit the camps on the coast of Hawaii as they do on the mainland. General Emmons is very much in favor of this procedure and would furnish transportation. Someone in the COI organization could, on his own initiative, get some patriotic soul in Hollywood to organize these

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entertainers. Actors, of course, would donate their time.

REMARKS: Frank Atherton has written reams of letters and spent hundreds of dollars on long distance calls trying to get somewhere. There must be some way of cutting red tape and getting money with no strings tied to it permitting Atherton and his people, in conjunction with the military governor, to furnish the men in the Territory of Hawaii with suitable places for entertainment and suitable entertainment.

Harold A. Jones
Major, U.S.M.C.R.

Attachment-1

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Major Harold A. Jones, U.S. Marine Corps May 9, 1942

Col. Wm. J. Donovan

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Col. Wm. J. Donovan - 2 - May 9, 19[illegible]

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CONFIDENTIAL

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Harold A. Jones
Major, U.S.M.C.R.

Attachment-1
HAJ:hrh

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SECRET

Honolulu, T.H.
May 27, 1942

From: Harold A. Jones

To: Colonel William J. Donovan, Coordinator of Information

Subject: Department of Hawaii

1. Following a conference with General Emmons, Admiral Nimitz and Captain Wilsie, second on Nimitz' staff, the plan for an outpost office of the Coordinator of Information in Honolulu was fully approved by both commanders who jointly expressed their opinion that it would be of very great use and sent you their personal regards.

Harold Jones

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 22, 1942

SECRET

From: Harold A. Jones, Major, Marine Corps,
Attached to Coordinator of Information, Washington, D.C.

To: Lieut. General Delos C. Emmons,
Commanding, Hawaiian Department.

Subject: Organization of Outpost Office of Coordinator of Information in Honolulu.

Reference: Your memorandum dated May 22, 1942.

Your memorandum requested the writer to submit a plan showing in some detail how the Coordinator of Information could be of assistance in the Hawaiian Department.

As you know, the Coordinator, Col. William J. Donovan, is a member of the Executive Staff of the President. As such he is answerable directly to the President. His organization is not an intelligence service nor does it and has nothing to do with M.I.D., O.N.I., G2 or Fleet Intelligence, except that as an officer of the President the Coordinator has access to the information obtained by these services.

Certain sources of information, such as Military and Naval attaches, no longer exist in enemy occupied countries. In such instances the Coordinator has built up his own organization to fill these gaps, in complete agreement with the Army and Navy.

Neither the War Department nor the Navy had a staff of experts gathering and analyzing basic information relative to the enemy, although Russia and Germany had clearly shown the necessity for such an organization. The Coordinator has gathered together the outstanding experts in their various fields and these are now functioning as the "Research and Analysis Division" of the Coordinator's office in Washington under Dr. James P. Baxter, 3rd, President of Williams College.

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All the information gathered and coordinated by the Coordinator is available to the War Department and Navy. At present, a large part of the Coordinator's personnel is made up of Army, Navy and Marine Corps officers working very closely with O.N.I., M.I.S., G2 and A2. The Coordinator does not propose and does not have the facilities to function as a combat intelligence service. However, the facilities he does have are of great assistance to combat intelligence and Washington is making considerable use of them. It is the writer's opinion that once established these facilities will be of considerable use to combat intelligence, Fleet Intelligence, O.N.I. and G2 in the Hawaiian Department and the Fourteenth Naval District.

3. The organization and plan which the writer thinks would be helpful is as follows:



A. Military and Navy Liaison Division

This division would consist of one or more officers assigned by G2 and O.N.I. and Fleet Intelligence, respectively, to establish liaison with the Coordinator in Hawaii and Washington and each other. These officers would have offices with the Coordinator where they would spend part or all of their time working with the Coordinator's staff. They would be charged with the responsibility of seeing that the facilities and information obtained by the Coordinator be made available to their respective services. They would likewise be charged with the responsibility of seeing that information obtained by G2 and O.N.I. be made available to the Coordinator and the President.

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B. Research and Analysis Division

This division would consist of experts in different categories; for example, geographic experts, hydrographic experts, Japanese language and customs experts, photographic experts, etc. These experts would collect, catalogue and analyze source material relative to the enemy and the territory occupied by him.

Upon request by O.N.I., G2, Fleet Intelligence, etc., this division would make special studies. The information gathered would be classified, analyzed and indexed so that it will be a source available to all the intelligence services. It would likewise have a direct hook-up with the large staff of experts now at work in Washington.

Attached to this memo is a functional directory of the personnel of this division in Washington which may be of help in demonstrating to you its scope and purpose.

C. Special Information Division

This division would consist of a number of men requested by Col. Fielder and working directly under Col. Bicknell, supplementing work now being done by him.

There would also be a subdivision called "Oral intelligence," consisting of two or more persons who would interview all visitors from the southwest Pacific, the Far East, etc., and file reports on such interviews with the Coordinator, G2 and O.N.I.

D. Radio, Entertainment and News Division

This division, already established by Mr. Murry Brophy of Washington, would continue to supply radio entertainment and news to the civilian population and troops. It would be under the direct supervision of an officer assigned to it from G2. I believe it has already been helpful and will continue to be helpful as a morale builder and to keep radio stations on the air at all times to warn of air raids, and to render assistance to G2 in counter propaganda among the Island Japanese.

4. The Coordinator would maintain his own separate offices and communications and pay all the expenses in connection with the duties performed by his office. Suitable office space would be made available to all Army, Navy and Marine Corps officers assigned to duty with the Coordinator, or

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active as liaison between the Coordinator and the respective intelligence services.

It is my opinion that the office of the Coordinator would be an excellent method of bringing members of these intelligence services under one roof, pooling information, with new means of obtaining information, and with common objectives.

It would also have more elasticity, because of its civilian nature, than the usual Army or Navy organization, with fewer restrictions relative to personnel and the spending of funds deemed advisable or expedient.

Another advantage would be that it would establish direct and continuous contact with the Coordinator of Information, Office of Naval Intelligence and Military Intelligence Service in Washington, so that problems of the Hawaiian Department would quickly be considered at the Capitol.

5. The Coordinator has directed me to organize an office in the Hawaiian Department along the lines above set forth but only if approved in writing by Admiral Nimitz and the Commander of the Hawaiian Department. If you are of the opinion that the functions described will be of service to you as Department Commander, and to the Hawaiian Department, will you kindly signify your approval in writing in the space provided below on this communication. I shall ask Admiral Nimitz to do likewise.

HAROLD A. JONES (Signed)
Harold A. Jones
Major, Marine Corps
General Representative of the
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D.C.

APPROVED:

C. W. NIMITZ (Signed)
Chester W. Nimitz, Admiral, USN
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

DELOS C. EMMON (Signed)
Delos C. Emmons,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding, Hawaiian Department

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SECRET

Honolulu, T.H.
May 28, 1942

From: Harold Jones

To: Colonel William J. Donovan, Coordinator of Information

Subject: Department of Navy

1. The Job

Murry Bisphy has completed his radio work and has done a very good job. Everybody in the Islands seems to be well pleased.

I have talked over the matter of establishing a small outpost office of the Coordinator in Hawaii with General Emmons and with Captain Wilkie, second on Nimitz' staff; also very briefly with Admiral Nimitz. Emmons requested that I draw up a brief plan and submit it to him, which I did. He then, in writing, approved and requested that the plan be established and seemed delighted. The plan was then submitted to Captain Wilkie who thought it excellent but believed that he had better submit it to War Plans before presenting it to Nimitz.

At this point it ran into a snag, apparently because of personal antagonism to General Emmons, to yourself, or because it was "civilian." I have noticed, and Jack Ford has noticed, considerable feeling against our operations in the Captain class in the Navy. The higher ranking officers think we are doing a good job, but in the Captain class there seems to be much criticism. Knowing the Navy, I would say that this emanates from some source in Washington. My first guess would be someone in O.N.I.. However, this is only a guess. I believe, if you could get Commander Moore of our office to talk, you could probably find out who is spreading the poison.

I don't believe there will be any doubt but what Nimitz will approve the plan and that, once established, the Navy will gain more than anybody else. As a matter of fact the Navy has on paper a direct duplication of our Research and Analysis which we have actually operating. Moreover, the rejection of this plan, requested and approved by Emmons, would be slapping the Military Governor in the face and I don't think Navy Operations really have the guts to do so although they would like to. Unless we do have the hearty approval of Nimitz it is my belief that we should merely withdraw from the picture here.

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2. United Command

From the above it is obvious that there is much to be done before there will really be a United Command in this district. From a military standpoint Emmons really has done a fine job. From a naval standpoint Nimitz has done a fine job. There is unity on matters of separate tactics. But from the standpoint of united long range planning and cooperation there is nothing but disunity. I think the first fault is with the Navy and particularly in the Captain class. The reason for this is that there has been plenty of shake-up in the Flag class but none in the Captain class, and there is where the Brass Hats are -- spelled with a capitol "B."

In the Army, promotions come so fast that the Colonels and the Brigadiers are comparatively young men with some elasticity of mind and not afraid to take chances.

Insofar as the intelligence services are concerned, some effort is being made to establish liaison but nothing can really be done until a true spirit of co-operation is established, and that is far from the fact.

The only way that I can see is to have one hard-hitting officer in full command of all intelligence, military and naval, as per the German system. There is absolutely no chance of this, however, until or unless we have a major military disaster.

3. Japanese Situation

This has not changed since I talked to you in Washington. It is still my belief that the taking over of all the young Japanese of military age and putting them into a Nisei Corps for serving against the German colonials would go a long ways toward solving the problem. As it is, when the Japanese really attack these Islands, white soldiers will shoot these young Japanese, and then the Islands will have 100,000 Japanese saboteurs and Fifth Columnists and we may have (and probably will have another Burma. The War Department has given birth to a plan to remove these young men and use them as work battalions. This would never have been proposed by anyone with any knowledge of Japanese psychology and would be just the thing the Japanese would plead upon -- the idea of America, the home of the great Four Freedoms, making slaves out of American born Japanese.

If we remove any Japs we should remove all Japs. I went around the island yesterday with General Emmons,

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(Japanese Situation - Continued)

inspecting the construction work being done and fully half the labor was being done by Japanese. There is still a lot to be done and I don't know who would do the work if all the Japanese were removed. Of course, as I pointed out in my last memo to you, it is just now mechanically impossible to remove the Japanese because we haven't the boats to bring in enough troops to protect the Islands, let alone hauling out 180,000 Japanese.

4. Military vs. Civil Government

Military government, particularly the Navy, has no conception of total war and no effort has really been made here to prepare the people for total war. They all carry gas masks and have watchers, air raid wardens, etc. as on the mainland, but it's all on paper and there has been no real drill or effort to establish discipline among the civilian population. General Emmons seems to appreciate the problem. However, the civilian population make it very difficult for him to proceed without drastic exercise of power. On the few occasions when he has tried to use his power Washington has interfered, usually through the Department of the Interior to which the civil population immediately appeal.

For example, there is woefully little fire equipment in this city. The Japanese upon their next raid will undoubtedly drop incendiaries on Honolulu and the prevailing Trade winds will carry the flames over the docks and destroy much of the shipping and wharves to which ships are tied. However, if Emmons made an attempt to raze the buildings one block back from the waterfront, he would have the Navy, the Department of Interior and all the civilian population howling and screaming.

5. Shipping

As you remember, I discussed this problem in my memo to you in Washington. At that time there was a battle over jurisdiction relative to ships and cargo among the Army, Navy and Maritime.

In this memo I make only one point, i.e., shipping between San Francisco and Honolulu. This shipping is directed by the Navy and in particular by the port directors of Honolulu and San Francisco, respectively, who are Navy officers.

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(Shipping - Continued)

In both cases they are fine, elderly gentlemen, called back, I believe, from the retired list, who know absolutely nothing about commercial shipping. Also, they were passed over by the Selection Board of the Navy, so probably aren't tops as Naval officers. However, the good old Navy school tie spirit has brought them out of retirement and placed them in these very responsible jobs.

For example, it shouldn't take a ship longer than two days to unload. I know of one ship, just recently arrived here, which has been moved at least three times and has taken five days already to unload and I don't believe all of the cargo is out of her now. The Captain says that this is usual procedure and that he figures he loses six or more days a month in wasted time loading and unloading. This would mean a 20% loss in efficiency or, putting it another way, it would mean a 20% increase in bottoms, with efficient management.

It seems to me that German submarines are causing us enough loss in cargo capacity as it is and that there is no need to turn over ship management to nice, elderly Naval officers for further loss.

Harold Jones

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SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July [illegible], 1942

[illegible] G. [illegible], USA
[illegible]

[illegible] requested Major Harold A. [illegible], [illegible] representative of the Coordinator of Information [illegible] of our situation to determine in [illegible] of Information can help us". [illegible] submitted to you and to Admiral [illegible] the organization of an outpost office [illegible] Information in Honolulu. This [illegible] Information Division" composed [illegible] supplied by the Office of the [illegible], but to work under the control [illegible].

[illegible] Kendall G. Fielder agreed with our [illegible] T. [illegible] Beale to consult with [illegible], and to make a study of [illegible], work to be done by a group [illegible].

[illegible] on June 6, Mr. Beale [illegible] under consideration. In

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SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July 13, Colonel Finder addressed a letter to Mr. [illegible] in which he pointed out that the Office of the Assistant Chiefs of Staff for Military Intelligence was in a position to secure more agents, and that the authorities in Washington looked with disfavor on the use of any other operatives. Colonel Finder stated further that you had suggested that he advise Mr. [illegible] of the new policy.

Under the circumstances I concur in your decision in this matter. I regret that it will not be possible for us to provide the assistance as envisaged in our earlier exchanges. It agrees that in view of the change in conditions no action appears advisable.

May I express my sincere appreciation of the kindness [illegible] to my representatives, and the cooperation extended to them in connection with their work.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Harold Jones, Major, U.S.M.C.R. DATE May 18, 1942

TO: Colonel Donovan

SUBJECT: Head of organization in Honolulu

1. Lieutenant Commander Harry P. Davison called up and said that after reconsidering the matter he did not think he should leave his own post to become head of the Honolulu Division of the C.O.I.

2. After talking to Dr. Baxter it has been decided to leave this position open for the time being. I will be in Honolulu for three or four weeks and can act temporarily as the head of the organization. If no man has been selected by that time, Dr. Baxter's appointee as Head of the Research and Analysis Branch will act as temporary Head of the Honolulu office until a good man is selected.

3. I believe it is very important to get the right man for this job and that we should take our time.

4. It is understood, of course, that no office (other than radio entertainment) will be established until full clearance is received from General Emmons and the various agencies concerned.

H. J.

H. J.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

To: Colonel Donovan
Major Bruce
Colonel Goodfellow
Dr. Baxter

May 11, 1942

From: Harold A. Jones, USMC

Subject: Organization of COI office in Hawaiian Territory.
Supplement to Section 2, Research and Analysis.

Experts to study workings in martial law in Hawaii.

General Emmons made a special request that one or more experts be dispatched to the Islands to make a careful study of the workings of martial law so that the results might be applied to any other area in the United States or Territories which might later be placed under martial law.

During the time that such studies are under way, there will be attached to the Research and Analysis Division of the office in Hawaii, one or more experts, well grounded in this subject. These men will be chosen by Dr. Baxter. It might well be born in mind that the writer believes that Emmons also has an idea to use the experts to advise him in governmental contact as military commander of the Islands.

Harold Jones

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[illegible]

May [illegible], [illegible]

[illegible] Director
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Coordinator of Information has been [illegible] Army officials in Hawaii [illegible] assistance to the radio stations in [illegible] provide programs for the people of the [illegible] population. Because of [illegible] lack of revenue, it will [illegible] for the stations involved to remain [illegible] the requested schedule without [illegible]. It is, therefore, the desire [illegible] to cooperate with the Army officials [illegible] contract with the commercial [illegible] to "purchase time" on these [illegible] rates approved by the Federal Communi[illegible] and the Foreign Information [illegible] Coordinator of Information.

[illegible] was not included at the time [illegible] was submitted, but we will [illegible] the [illegible] $[illegible],000 per month available [illegible] of funds during the remainder [illegible] year if we have authority from [illegible] participate in this new endeavor.

[illegible] you please indicate if the proposed [illegible] meets with your approval.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

[illegible]
[illegible] Policy
[illegible]
[illegible]

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Ralph E. Smiley

TO: Mr. C. W. Barnes

DATE: May 18, 1942

SUBJECT:

It is requested that authority be secured from the Bureau of the Budget and appropriate contracts be initiated for the Coordinator of Information to use the facilities of four broadcasting stations in the Territory of Hawaii to rebroadcast over their medium wave transmitters designated programs released by our San Francisco office. These programs may be furnished by short wave transmission from one of the commercial companies on the Pacific coast or be records made in our San Francisco office and delivered to the stations.

It is suggested that the contract provide for the Coordinator of Information using the facilities of Stations KGU and KGMB in Honolulu approximately 60 hours per month at the rate of $25 per hour, Station KHBC in Hilo approximately 30 hours per month at the same rate and Station KTOH in Lihue for approximately 30 hours per month at the same rate.

This rate was established by the FCC and FIS as equitable charge for rebroadcasting services which resulted from a series of meetings between the officials of these two organizations and representatives of NBAC.

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Murry Trophy /A. B. DATE May 6, 1942

TO: Col. William J. Donovan

SUBJECT:

A serious problem presents itself in Hawaii on the broadcasting situation. As you know, General Emmons is insisting that the stations stay on the air 24 hours out of the day. The General wants the stations on all night, primarily for the need of an adequate warning as well as entertainment for the troops. The two major stations in Hawaii, at the present time, are losing money and if we tax them with an additional [illegible] hours of broadcasting, some arrangements will have to be made immediately for subsidy.

Obviously, your memorandum to the President of January 27, 1942 will automatically take care of it, but if there is great delay, we are [illegible] the stations in Honolulu off the air.

For your information, Station KTOH on the Island of Lihue was off the air and we arranged through the Office of Civilian Defense through Governor Quindexter to finance the station until June [illegible].

I do think this overall picture, at your convenience, should be discussed with the President.

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[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] Walter [illegible]

The situation in [illegible] is most delicate. The [illegible], as you know, is under military control. The following [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible]. I have gone into this matter at some length with General [illegible] and have discussed with Ed Barrett in New York the Island's needs. With this in mind, our [illegible] [illegible] covering cable and wireless news [illegible] should be discussed with Ed Barrett to avoid confusion and [illegible] faith with the military [illegible].

Mr. Robert E. Sherwood
Mr. Joseph Barnes
Mr. [illegible] [illegible]
Mr. [illegible] [illegible]
Miss Lois [illegible]
[illegible] Ed Barrett

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February [illegible], 19[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] William J. [illegible]

[illegible] Atherton Richards

[illegible] proposed solution for the Japanese question in Hawaii

[illegible] Morse Jobsels and the Roberts' Commission Report [illegible] have focused attention on the potential [illegible] United States vital Pacific outpost, the Island of Oahu, [illegible] from the unpredictable activities and loyalties of local [illegible] who are Japanese Nationals or are U. S. citizens [illegible] ancestry. Those charged with protecting Oahu recog[illegible] that uncertainty is a military hazard of no negligible [illegible] such enemy aliens and Japanese ancestry citizens [illegible] for over a third of the Territory's population). Wili[illegible] both in Washington and in the Islands can no [illegible] a chance thereon, — they must be doubly assured of [illegible] strength of the citadel.

[illegible] alternatives, broadly speaking, present themselves:

(a) [illegible] these enemy aliens and unnatured citizens to [illegible] their usual occupations and occupy their [illegible], unmolested, but maintain there[illegible] military surveillance, and establish [illegible] zones

([illegible] evacuation of such group to a selected safe

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prescribed area on the Mainland United States;

(c) Isolate and concentrate the "Nuisance" within the territory but away from the Island of Oahu.

The expansion of the military situation and the temper of the United States point to the selection of the third choice.

Primary goals to be reached consist of:

(1) Achievement of maximum military security for the Island of Oahu;

(2) Minimum disruption to, and drain upon

(a) Civilian morale of Territorial residents;

(b) Local capacity to cope with the emergency without excessive federal aid during or after the war;

(c) Transportation facilities needed to move essential personnel and material to and from the Islands;

(3) [illegible] propriate solution that would not aggravate the [illegible] the Japanese might impose later upon any Americans captured in other areas, as a retaliation.

[illegible] of Oahu and concentration thereon of population, particularly of Japanese ancestry, makes desirable allevia[illegible] critical area. To evacuate to the Mainland a large [illegible] population would beget, amongst other features:

accentuation of the problem as illustrated by the California Japanese situation;

[illegible] of a large group of dependents upon the local government;

[illegible] political reaction.

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 10, 1942

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel William J. Donovan

From: Atherton Richards

Subject: A proposed solution for the Japanese Question in Hawaii

The Pearl Harbor debacle and the Roberts' Commission Report subsequent thereto, have focused attention on the potential danger to the United States vital Pacific outpost, the Island of Oahu, arising from the unpredictable activities and loyalties of local residents there who are Japanese Nationals or are U. S. citizens of Japanese ancestry. Those charged with protecting Oahu recognize that this uncertainty is a military hazard of no negligible proportions (such enemy aliens and Japanese ancestry citizens accounting for over a third of the Territory's population). Military authorities both in Washington and in the Islands can no longer take a chance thereon, -- they must be doubly assured of the inner strength of the citadel.

Three alternatives, broadly speaking, present themselves:

(a) Permit these enemy aliens and unnatured citizens to continue their usual occupations and occupy their customary residences, unmolested, but maintain thereover strict military surveillance, and establish prohibited zones;

(b) Require evacuation of such group to a selected safe

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prescribed area on the Mainland United States;

(c) Isolate and concentrate the "dubious" within the territory but away from the Island of Oahu.

The exigencies of the military situation and the temper of the United States point to the selection of the third choice.

Primary goals to be reached consist of:

(1) Achievement of maximum military security for the Island of Oahu;

(2) Minimum disruption to, and drain upon

(a) Civilian morale of Territorial residents;

(b) Local capacity to cope with the emergency without excessive federal aid during or after the war;

(c) Transportation facilities needed to move essential personnel and material to and from the Islands;

(3) An appropriate solution that would not aggravate the harshness which the Japanese might impose later upon any Americans captured in other areas, as a retaliation.

The small area of Oahu and concentration thereon of population, particularly of Japanese ancestry, makes desirable alleviation of the critical area. To evacuate to the Mainland a large segment of the Oahu population would beget, amongst other features:

(a) An accentuation of the problem as illustrated by the California Japanese situation;

(b) The addition of a large group of dependents upon the federal government;

(c) Unfavorable political reaction.

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Utilizing the Island of Hawaii, for example, as an obligatory rendezvous for the "doubtful" Island resident, however, would permit:

(a) Such "tourists" to be practically self supporting (a marked shortage of labor exists on that Island);

(b) Use of these people to grow, on the sugar plantations of this Island, all their own major food requirements, and provide much that is now imported from the Mainland, thereby contributing to the Island's self sustenance and relieving ship tonnage;

(c) Construction of a number of desirable public improvements through labor thus made available;

(d) localizing the problem, but yet securing a solution deemed satisfactory from a military viewpoint.

What is left of the risk could then be placed under continuous check. Those areas on the Island of Hawaii used for military purposes would presumably be declared out of bounds and tabu.

AR

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: J. [illegible] Hayden

TO: [illegible] J. P. Baxter, 3d

DATE: January 19, 1942

SUBJECT: Treatment of American Citizens of Chinese or Japanese Ancestry as an Aspect of National Morale.

Dr. John F. Embree of the Division of Psychology has suggested that systematic steps should be taken to maintain the morale and loyalty of American citizens of Japanese or Chinese descent residing in continental United States or in Hawaii. He believes that most of the young men and women of such ancestry who were born as citizens are loyal to the United States. They are, however, placed in a difficult position by the suspicion which attaches to them in many quarters. Over a period of time public manifestations of this suspicion may [illegible] their morale as citizens and even make some of them susceptible to enemy influence. Positive steps [illegible] taken, therefore, to secure the loyalty of [illegible] groups.

It is suggested that this problem might be pre- [illegible] the Coordinator's Office to the Office of [illegible] Figures, the Office of Civilian Defense, [illegible] C. B. Osborn, the Morale Officer of the Army, [illegible] to some agencies in the Navy Department.

Delegate Samuel Wilder King of the Territory of [illegible] the matter up with Mr. Atherton Richards, [illegible] Mr. Richards's suggestion I discussed it with Delegate King. Mr. King stated that General Delos C. [illegible] Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, [illegible] understanding of this problem and had been [illegible] "[illegible] job" in maintaining the morale of Japanese [illegible] Hawaii. He suggested that the War Depart- [illegible] secure and publish a statement from General [illegible] this subject.

[illegible] also stated that the representative of [illegible] Hawaii had said to him that as a group [illegible] Japanese of American birth had been [illegible] citizens. He suggested that an [illegible] to secure a statement on this subject [illegible] through the Department of Justice.

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To: Dr. J. P. Baxter, 3d

I believe that action of the sort recommended by Mr. Embree and Mr. King might usefully be taken by the individuals and agencies mentioned. You will know whether the C.O.I. should suggest to them that this be done.

A note on the treatment of American citizens of Japanese ancestry as an aspect of morale in Hawaii is attached hereto.

Attachment.

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NOTE ON TREATMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY AS AN ASPECT OF MORALE IN HAWAII.

J F C.

An important group of people in Hawaii are American citizens of Japanese descent--about 117,000, a third of the population. Most of these are young people, under thirty years of age, born in Hawaii, educated in American Schools and full of a strong loyalty to American democracy in general and Hawaii in particular. The attack on Hawaii was as much of an affront to them as to any mainland American.

On the other hand, the parents of these people are Japanese citizens with Japanese loyalties which places the average young Japanese-American in a difficult position. From long experience in Hawaii and especially my last four years (1937-41) as social-anthropological field worker and teacher, it is my opinion that the majority of the young people are basically loyal to the U.S. Indeed, even some of the parents, who have their children's welfare at heart, also share to a limited extent this American outlook.

The degree of group self-confidence, of morale, among these people is going to depend in large measure on the treatment they receive from and the

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attitudes toward them held by the other Americans of Hawaii--including of course the Army, Navy and civil authorities.

Further, there is no better way to strengthen this morale, to intensify this American loyalty, than by showing some confidence in the people.

(1) One way to do this is to delegate some authority and responsibility to individual citizens of Japanese ancestry such as, for instance, air warden duty. To do this, one must be careful in selection of personnel--do not pick a free and easy Christian because he is a pleasant fellow as such individuals are often disliked by the Japanese. Instead, individuals respected by their own communities should be selected.

(2) Another recommended action is to have chosen from a group of volunteer selectees or commissioned officers a few of Japanese ancestry to carry out some important military mission--to bomb a Japanese warship for instance. If this were done, the man's name should be published and his Japanese ancestry noted as evidence that in spite of his ancestry he is a loyal American citizen. Such a move would not only heighten civilian morale among resident Japanese, it would also do much

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to alleviate fears of the Japanese on the part of those residents of Hawaii who are newcomers from the mainland.

(3) Loose talk of fifth column activity should be avoided. All available evidence shows that there was no extensive fifth column work in connection with the Pearl Harbor attack and certainly comparisons with Norway are gross exaggerations.

(4) It is suggested that these recommendations be brought to the attention of the OCD, OFF and army division of morale.

In particular, Mrs. Roosevelt the next time she discusses civilian morale over the radio, might put in a good word for American citizens of Japanese ancestry, just as she has recently pleaded for tolerance in respect to groups of European ancestry.

General Emmons, who is in military command of Hawaii is evidently doing a good job and has the respect of people in Hawaii (this on the basis of published reports and private letters). A positive statement from him and from Sam King, Hawaii's delegate to Congress, on behalf of the local Japanese would carry weight. In particular, a denial by them of the rumors of large scale fifth column activity would be valuable.

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Mr. MacLeish, who knows something of Japan and Hawaii from first hand experience might have some useful suggestions as to ways and means of carrying out some of the suggestions given above.

These recommendations are made strictly in the interests of civilian morale as an aspect of national defense. A united nation can only exist when made up of united communities. Any area of indifferent or disaffected individuals is a danger spot in national defense especially in such strategic areas as Hawaii and California.

Furthermore, such a policy (of giving American Japanese some responsibilities and duties) would serve as a valuable preventative against Axis propaganda aimed at weakening the civilian solidarity of areas like Hawaii by appeals to race differences and allegations of race discrimination.

Attached are two pictures typical of peace time friendship in Hawaii among Americans of oriental ancestry. For the good of the nation as well as the happiness of the individuals concerned, such good relations should be maintained. (They will not be maintained by crude diagrams of the differences between

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Japanese and Chinese as portrayed by Time and Life a few weeks ago, nor will they be maintained by equally crude cartoons of figures with Oriental features in PM and elsewhere every time they wish to portray an undesirable or unpatriotic person or act.)

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Japanese and Chinese high school pals.

Both American citizens, born in Hawaii -

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Japanese - Chinese Family

Mother Japanese
Father Chinese (1st cousin of Sun Yat Sen)
Both born in Hawaii. Engl is the family language.

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School Honors U. S.-Born Jap

LOS ANGELES, Jan. 19 (AP).—Ted Mikaihata, 17, American-born Japanese, has been nominated for president of the student body of Belmont High School.

Jap Turns In Photos Of Nipponese Navy

VANCOUVER, Wash. (U.P.) Vancouver police were amazed in the recent camera-radio confiscation drive against Japanese when a local Nipponese brought in a handful of photographs of warships of the Japanese navy. "I hope these will be helpful to someone," he told the police.

Scattered news items relevant to loyalty of american Japanese.

In Huntington, L. I., Bunji Kurita, 43-year-old Japanese chauffeur and butler, bought $300 worth of Defense Bonds, contributed $10 to the Red Cross, finally tried to commit hara-kiri—in an attempt, he explained in a hospital, to make amends for his country's treachery. Pm Jan 18

D. C. Writer Shaved Calmly In Hawaii During Japs' Raid

William H. Doherty Mistook Bombing For Navy 'Show'

William H. Doherty, widely-known Washington newspaperman and publicist, was crossing for breakfast about 7:55 a.m. on December 7.

Islanders Confident

But the people of Hawaii have the utmost confidence in their ability to repel an invasion, he added. They point to the huge guns of the coast defenses which can blow to pieces a transport or warship far out at sea.

Mr. Doherty said his information was contrary to the widespread report that fifth column activities had aided the Japanese.

"I was informed," he explained, "that not a single authentic incidence of sabotage was recorded—and certainly there was the opportunity in the surprise of the attack."

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[illegible]

[illegible] Colonel [illegible]

[illegible] Adjutant [illegible]

[illegible] Plane storage and air field [illegible]
Island of Oahu [illegible]

The destruction on Oahu on December [illegible]
planes parked shoulder [illegible]
[illegible] as [illegible]

(a) [illegible] permanent replacement [illegible]
be provided in underground shelters;

(b) the desirability of securing greater dispersion
of [illegible] fields and plane storage than heretofore.
[illegible] would seem advisable that the Commander in Chief visit [illegible]
[illegible] prior to the adoption of a reconstruction plan.

In the past, the development of a number of potentially
[illegible] air fields on Oahu has been curtailed by the cost of
[illegible] agricultural areas occupied and in operation. More-
[illegible] a dearth of naturally good landing sites occurs owing to
[illegible] and hilly nature of a large part of the terrain
[illegible].

The Navy seaplane base at Kaneohe may be taken as
[illegible] of one phase of the problem. The loss of planes

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stationed at that base was appalling. Within the confines of the base area, there is a large sized hill which is believed could be developed for underground plane storage. If such does not provide adequate space coverage, there is a row of hills to the southeast of the landing mat which would afford additional protection.

On the Northern point of the Island (the Kahuku section) is an area which is suitable for a landing field, but has heretofore not been developed because of the existence of a sugar plantation occupying part of the desirable acreage. It would appear wise to consider the condemnation of the requisite space needed to provide runways and service facilities, utilizing the adjacent series of ridges for underground plane storage and as indication of possible bombing damage.

The Islands of Molokai and Lanai, approximately thirty and fifty miles from Pearl Harbor, offer additional sites for air fields, sufficiently close so as to function in the protection [illegible] and still secure the advantages of dispersal. In both instances, the terrain permits development of underground plane storage. The major difficulty on both of these Islands is the non-availability of an adequate water supply, but this can be secured, [illegible] and pipe line facilities being needed.

It would also appear desirable to consider the installation of [illegible] field on the Island of Niihau.

Atherton Richards.

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December 16, 1941

Dear Frank:

I understand that a Mr. H. A. Johnson of the Naval Ordnance Laboratory at the Navy Yard, c/o Commander J. B. Glennon, who has just returned from Honolulu, may have information of value on the morale of the population.

This fits into the very question that I have just been discussing with Admiral Wilkinson, as to the effect of Japanese propaganda. We now have men ready to move to Manila and Honolulu for the short-wave work, and it would be very helpful to talk with those people who know the problem we have got to meet. For that reason, I would like to have Mr. Johnson interviewed, but, before attempting to do so, I would like your permission.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

The Honorable

The Secretary of the Navy

Washington, D. C.

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E. A. Johnson Tel: FR 5700

Naval Ordnance Laboratory

Navy Yard

c/o Commander J. B. Glennon

Left Hawaii Dec 13

Cam in on Clipper

Arr'd S.F. Sunday

Arr'd D.C. Dec 15

Hickman file

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FILE

December 19, 1941.

DEC 23 1941

DEC 23 1941

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
25th & E Streets, N. W.,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Associate Justice Roberts as Chairman of the Commission appointed by Executive Order dated December 18, 1941 to investigate the attack December 7th by Japan on Hawaii has directed me, as Recorder of the Commission, to write you this letter.

The Commission will be leaving Washington and expects to return about two or three weeks from now. At that time it would be useful for the Commission to receive from you a memorandum of any facts or circumstances which from your wide sources of information may seem to you pertinent to the subject of the Commission's investigation. The Commission would also like to have a resume of public opinion about the Commission, its purposes and investigation which could be gathered from editorial and other comment in the Press. The Chairman hopes that you may direct these studies to be made by the C.O.I. so that the Commission may have the benefit of them on its return of which you will be promptly notified.

With sincere personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

Recorder.

WHH/ra

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WALTER BRUCE HOWE
1819 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

December 19, 1941

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Associate Justice Roberts as Chairman of the Commission appointed by Executive Order dated December 18, 1941 to investigate the attack December 7th by Japan on Hawaii has directed me, as Recorder of the Commission, to write you this letter.

The Commission will be leaving Washington and expects to return about two or three weeks from now. At that time it would be useful for the Commission to receive from you a memorandum of any facts or circumstances which from your wide sources of information may seem to you pertinent to the subject of the Commission's investigation. The Commission would also like to have a resume of public opinion about the Commission, its purposes and investigation which could be gathered from editorial and other comment in the Press. The Chairman hopes that you may direct these studies to be made by the C.O.I. and that the Commission may have the benefit of them on its return of which you will be properly notified.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Walter Bruce Howe

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[illegible]

Memorandum for Colonel William J. Donovan

From: Atherton Richards

Subject: Emergency business problem of Hawaii

The discontinuance of, or marked infrequency of shipping accommodations and mail facilities between Hawaii and the mainland creates rapidly a serious economic situation for Hawaii (in addition to the food problem previously outlined) with repercussions upon mainland business [illegible].

A picture of the situation is obtained by visualizing that:

1) Progress of defense construction (with large labor employment and pay-roll) will soon cease through inability to secure materials and supplies, such as lumber and cement, a comparatively negligible inventory of which has been accumulated due to the unprecedented demand of the defense program.

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2) Delivery to the West Coast of thousands of dollars of products ordered by Hawaiian concerns which call for payment in the immediate future by such businesses and which cannot be delivered.

3) Many financial transactions between Hawaii and the mainland normally occur in December & year end settlements of obligations which are left hanging in the air unsatisfied. Federal income tax payments are an example.

4) Continuation of production for the sugar and pineapple companies (who are major employers of labor in the territory) appears doubtful as warehouse facilities are rapidly filled.

To combat this development before it becomes more aggravated it is suggested that Treasury officials, Federal Reserve Bank and R.F.C. authorities be requested to review the situation immediately to recommend a proper solution of the financial features involved.

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September 8, 1941

My dear Mr. Warren:

Thank you very much for your letter of September 8 enclosing copy of a letter received by the White House from Mr. George Paish of Sine Ridge, New York.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Mr. Fletcher Warren

Acting Chief, Division of
Foreign Activity Correlation

Department of State

Washington, D. C.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to

SEP 8 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Colonel Donovan:

As of possible interest to your office, I am attaching herewith a copy of a letter which was received by the White House and forwarded to the Department of State.

Copies of the enclosed letter are also being transmitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department.

Sincerely yours,

Fletcher Warren

Fletcher Warren
Acting Chief, Division of
Foreign Activity Correlation

Enclosure:

From George Paish,
August 2, 1941.

Colonel William Donovan,
144 Apex Building,
Seventh Street and Pennsylvania Avenue,
Washington, D. C.

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COPY

Strictly private
and confidential.

The Boreas
Blue Ridge
New York State

August 3, 1941

Dear Mr. President,

I am really sorry to trouble you with another letter on your holiday cruise, but the matter may be of such immediate importance that I feel compelled to write without awaiting your return.

As I understand the main base of the American fleet in the Pacific is Hawaii and if this be so there must be large reserves of munitions of all kinds in that island. I possess information that cannot be questioned of the existence of some kind of understanding between the large number of Japanese who live in Hawaii, the Japanese Government and the native Hawaiians. I cannot give the source of this information in a letter but shall be happy to do so to anyone who can be trusted not to reveal it to anyone but yourself. The danger of sabotage of these reserves of ammunition and of stores cannot therefore be overlooked and demands the most stringent precautions on the part both of the American naval and of the military authorities in Hawaii. Could Japan destroy these stores and these reserves by sabotage the American fleet would be at the mercy of the Japanese fleet and an almost desperate situation might arise. Further it is of supreme moment that even the American soldiers and sailors detailed to guard these supplies should be chosen from the highly trustworthy. The blowing up of these ammunition reserves including torpedoes would be worth to Japan any risk and any money. A doped or even a drunken American sentinel or guard might possibly be all that was necessary to enable the saboteur to effect his purpose. Then there is the question of money. Japan would doubtless be prepared to pay any sum to any person who would be willing to co-operate. It may be that my anxieties are excessive and that the American army and naval officials have taken every possible precaution against the Japanese living in Hawaii, the Hawaiians themselves or any fifth columnist in American army or navy, but no possible precautions that can be taken to guard these munition reserves should be left untaken in view of the disastrous results that might come from failure to take the necessary precautions.

Hoping

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Hoping you will have a most enjoyable holiday and will come back with renewed health.

Very sincerely yours,

George Paish

The Honorable
F. D. Roosevelt.

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